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THREE ESSAYS ON U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE SPENDING AND U.S. POLITICO-
MILITARY INTEGRATION   
 
Simulations show that recipient nations are directly impacted by U.S. foreign assistance 
spending (in the form of U.S. economic and military aid) in a manner similar to transfer 
payments, spurring growth, and easing liquidity constraints. U.S. foreign assistance spending is 
often accompanied by U.S. politico-military integration, which is defined by the presence of the: 
(1) receipt of U.S. economic aid, (2) receipt of U.S. military aid, and (3) integration into the U.S. 
security apparatus through hosting U.S. troops and/or bases or through military or political 
treaties. Using a new comprehensive RAND database of all U.S. security-related agreements 
since 1955, I create a new database showing which country-years have active (a) U.S. military 
treaties (b) U.S. political treaties. Also new is the inclusion of David Vine's Base Nation 
database, detailing the location and existence of all recognized, unrecognized, and U.S.-funded 
bases. Lastly, I update another of RAND's databases, one detailing U.S. troop deployment 
abroad to include the most recent years. 
Empirical analysis shows a more complicated set of results than those derived in the 
simulations. Using deep lags and controlling for politico-military integration and U.S. military 
aid, I find limited evidence that U.S. economic aid is effective in development. This associated 
positive impact of U.S. economic aid is never large enough to overcome the associated negative 
impact of U.S. military aid and U.S. politico-military integration. While U.S. political treaties 
show a slight impact on economic growth, U.S. military aid, U.S. military bases, and U.S. 
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military treaties overwhelm any positive impact on growth and FDI, with a resulting net effect 
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Chapter 1: A Two-Block, Stock-Flow Consistent Model of U.S. Foreign Assistance Spending 




Stock-flow consistent (SFC) models rarely focus on the interaction between advanced 
market economies and developing or emerging countries. Specifically, this paper investigates the 
significant financial outlays made by advanced market economies and received by developing 
and emerging countries (also known as foreign assistance). In this paper, I adapt a well-known 
post-Keynesian SFC model to the U.S., one of the top contributors of foreign assistance. Federal 
governments, private, and state-owned-enterprises depend on this foreign assistance and 
payments that accompany United States foreign assistance spending. Recipient nations are 
directly impacted by these transfers as they ease liquidity constraints and spur economic growth. 
However, U.S. foreign assistance flows are sensitive to policies set by the recipient governments 
and recipient central banks. This paper explores how the policies set by recipient central banks, 
namely the choice between a managed or freely floating exchange rate regime, affect the impact 
of the transfers and how recipient authorities deploy U.S. foreign assistance. Simulations are 
performed to show how shocks originating from the U.S. impact the rest of the world. Separate 
closures show how fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes alter the hypothesized capital and 
trade flow consequences after receiving U.S. foreign assistance spending. Two scenarios are 
simulated: (A) where the U.S. diverts its own government spending to pay for foreign assistance 
spending, and (B) U.S. increasing its total government spending by the exact amount of foreign 
assistance spending so as to leave domestic government spending unchanged.  
1.1 Introduction 
This paper introduces a dynamic, two-country model of a world where a reserve-issuing 
economy, the United States (U.S.), spends significant resources abroad in the form of financial 
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assistance (economic aid & military aid) spending throughout the rest of the world. For 
simplicity, I treat economic and military aid as uniform in their impact and treat them as one 
aggregate flow (which I refer to as ‘U.S. financial assistance spending’). For the purposes of this 
paper, I simplify the conglomerate of countries who receive foreign assistance spending (FAS) 
from the U.S. into one mega-economy which I refer to as the Rest of the World (ROW). Both the 
U.S. and ROW have their own currency, and both enjoy free trade with each other in both 
financial assets and merchandise. In line with Backus, Brainard, Smith and Tobin (1980), 
domestic and foreign assets are assumed to be imperfect substitutes.  
Previous models exogenously fix open-market supplies of bonds, concentrating 
completely on the resolution between international asset supply and demand to determine 
exchange rates (Isard, 1978). Macedo (1982) was the first to fit Isard’s (1978) exchange rate 
theoretical assumptions into a two-country portfolio balance model. Godley & Lavoie (2003) 
expanded upon insights from both Tobin (1978) and Macedo (1982) to construct a dynamic 
adjustment process. This adjustment process ensures that feedback effects on oneself and one’s 
trading partner—particularly asset flows—are dynamically integrated. Then, under the 
Tobin/Isard premises, these asset flows impact relative prices, trade flows, incomes, and relative 
supply and demand of assets (impacting income flows, asset demands, etc.). Uninhibited, the 
change in trade flows would influence the relative demand and supply of assets and therefore 
income flows and then, once again, the exchange rate (or reserve accumulation/sale). To wit, 
other authors do not include alternative "closures" wherein the exchange rate is held 
fixed/exogenous, and another mechanism handles the imbalance (e.g., international reserve 
holdings, interest rate adjustments, etc.).  
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This paper draws heavily from the work of Godley and Lavoie (2003), models that were 
subsequently formalized and named Models OPENFIX and Models OPENFLEX in Chapter 12 
of Monetary Economics (Godley and Lavoie, 2006), a seminal text of Stock-Flow Consistent 
Approaches (SFCA). As Godley and Lavoie (2003) "amplify the Tobin-Macedo insights by 
characterising some of the relevant dynamic adjustment processes," I intend to build upon and 
amplify the Godley-Lavoie insights by showing how U.S. foreign assistance is another means by 
which the global demand for U.S. dollars is artificially maintained.  
 U.S. foreign assistance spending generates increased economic activity within the 
recipient country. Greater activity catalyses greater economic interaction between the U.S. and 
the recipient country. This paper attempts to model the economic interaction between the Rest of 
the World (ROW)—the conglomerate of countries receiving hegemonic foreign assistance 
spending—and the U.S. The ROW is technically defined as all countries who receive U.S. 
economic and/or military aid. As of writing this paper (2020), U.S. economic aid amounts to $19 
billion allocated to 107 countries and U.S. military aid to $20 billion allocated to 144 different 
countries (Security Assistance Monitor, 2020).  
For the purposes of this paper, U.S. foreign assistance spending includes all economic 
and military aid provided as transfer payments from all relevant U.S. governmental agencies. 
U.S. economic and military aid is a significant portion of the ROW government budget. The 
economic and military aid spent from 1960-2018 translates to an average of 4.2% of recipient 
countries’ yearly GDP. The top decile of U.S. aid recipients, on average, receives 8.3% of their 
governmental spending each year in U.S. economic and military aid, showing what an influence 
U.S. foreign assistance spending has on the ROW's economy. U.S. foreign assistance spending—
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regardless of U.S. taxpayer awareness of size (either individually by country or in aggregate)—is 
not insignificant to the recipient countries.  
This paper explores how U.S. foreign assistance reverberates between the recipient 
country and the U.S. through (1) capital flows, (2) monetary channels, and (3) trade. First, 
foreign households target higher levels of steady-state wealth accumulation and purchase more 
financial products from both the U.S. and ROW. Second, ROW central banks choose to 
accelerate their (existing pattern of) stockpiling of U.S. treasury bills so as to maintain their 
commitment to a managed exchange rate regime (in what are normal central banking operations 
procedures). Third, households within countries receiving U.S. foreign assistance experience an 
increase in their real income and opt to consume more, increasing both ROW consumption and 
ROW imports from U.S. For creditor countries1 (e.g., China since Chinese imports are 
consistently much smaller than Chinese export flows). This asymmetry creates a situation where 
these creditor countries amass dollar reserves. Foreign consumers and businesses in both creditor 
and debtor countries earn and save in local currency but need dollars for large and/or contractual 
export purchases. The central banks are responsible for providing foreign currency to banks, who 
then exchange it with the consumer or business. Note that when a country perennially runs a 
negative trade balance, their dollar reserves are drawn down—perhaps to dangerously low levels. 
ROW foreign central bank reserves are drained as the USD supply abroad is, ultimately, 
backstopped by ROW central banks. Countries denoted as “debtor countries” benefit from U.S. 
transfer payments to a great degree, as injections of U.S. transfer payments replenish their 
waning dollar reserves. In addition, when bilateral trade agreements and status of forces 
 
1 Net importers run down dollar reserves. 
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agreements (contractual agreements regarding U.S. foreign military basing and troop deployment 
operations) are in place, various U.S. entities (OPIC, CIA, FED) provide explicit financial 
backstopping for foreign financial systems and institutions. 
The models presented in this paper stem from stylized facts: the world is defined by only 
two countries, the U.S. and ROW, each of which has its own respective currency and financial 
products. These two countries freely trade services and financial assets with one another, with 
built-in asymmetries to represent the Post-Bretton Woods System. Non-U.S. financial assets 
(whether the assets are dollar-denominated or LCU-denominated) carry a higher risk premium 
and therefore the ROW country consistently maintains higher interest rates.  
By characterizing the macroeconomic systems within a double-entry accounting 
framework and by using variables measured and published within the national product and 
income accounts and the flow-of-funds, all parties can be closely analysed—in both the real and 
financial sectors of each economy—to international transactions, like transfer payments (Godley 
and Lavoie, 2006). To better reflect how modern capitalist economies operate, the behaviour and 
repercussions in the real sector must influence and be influenced by behaviour in the financial 
sector.2 In addition, it is important to consider how time interacts with and impacts system 
dynamics in the real world: financial balances of each sector have corresponding transactions in 
the relevant stock variables they impact. Flow variables determine the end-of-period stocks. In 
contrast, Mundell-Fleming-type models, for the most part, ignore the concept of stock 
equilibrium, instead exploring an "open" single economy with no recognition or account of how 
responses from the ROW may impact the originating economy.  
 
2 The main advantage of SFC models is also its defining characteristic: the integration of the real and 
financial sectors (Nikiforos and Zezza, 2017).  
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SFC models3 successfully explained and predicted some of the policies and events 
leading up to the Great Recession (Nikiforos and Zezza, 2017). In addition, SFC models—by 
their explicit linkage of real economic activity and financial as well as stocks and flows—helped 
to explain the slow recovery that the U.S. has experienced in the decade-plus since.  
SFC models are very similar to those detailed in Reconstruction Macroeconomics: 
Structuralist Proposals and Critiques of the Mainstream. In Reconstruction, Taylor (2002) 
analysed alternative closures, made different assumptions, and came to results generally 
consistent with those found in this paper. Unlike Taylor (2002), I assume that central banks 
target interest rates, and so interest rates do not adjust to clear asset markets. Accordingly, the 
closures used are post-Keynesian4 in that they assume central banks explicitly target and 
participate in open market operations to maintain the targeted interest rate.  
1.11 Literature Review—U.S. Foreign Assistance Spending (FAS) 
The literature intersecting U.S. foreign aid and the U.S. military-industrial complex is 
scant, mostly focusing on either negotiation of basing arrangements or troop deployments, 
attempts to mitigate deleterious effects within their local populace, or the decision-making 
process of host nations when faced with the decision to base U.S. troops and/or grant access to 
the U.S. military (Calder, 2010). While the economic impact is positive, some authors argue that 
the social impact is negative—and, in some cases they have a good point (Vine, 2015).  
Research on the economic impact of bases and U.S. military-related spending is 
overwhelmingly focused on domestically located U.S. bases. Tapp (2001) wrote a detailed 
 
3 See Godley 1999a 
4 For additional support on the assumption of modeling the targeting of interest rates, I direct readers to 
the New Consensus models, an amalgam of a few New Keynesians (Romer, 2000) and central bank 
practitioners (Meyer, 2001; Evans, 2000) 
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master’s thesis for the Air Force Academy analysing domestic base closures, showing that—after 
controlling for active missions—base closures do not, despite what was previously 
reported/believed, impact the U.S. Air Force budget significantly. Hooker (2001) uses a county-
level dataset to estimate employment and income multipliers, concluding that there is little 
impact outside the direct employment loss and little change to per capita income before and after 
the closures. Poppert (2003) analyses the same county-level dataset for the impact of base 
closures, specifically on employment—but again, these findings hold only for domestic U.S. 
bases. Sorenson (2015) examines six (county) case studies of domestic U.S. base closures, 
further reinforcing the relatively new conclusion that base closures do not significantly impact 
indirect employment, arguing that base closures are relatively isolated in their impact, at least 
when we consider local employment. Ashley (2016) builds a systematic dataset and 
understanding of what happens to base closures, but only domestic base closures. 
The impact of international U.S. bases on local (ROW) economies is limited. Cooley 
(2005) analyzes Kyrgyzstan--a relatively new base nation—but looks more at the political 
economy concerns (conditions necessary to maintain presence, analysis of the beneficiaries of 
U.S. presence, identification of opposition groups and mitigation strategies, etc.). Carter (2002) 
performs a similar political-economy analysis, though much larger in scope, concluding that U.S. 
basing efforts are complex and often outside of the control of the DOD—instead requiring 
coordination and communication between many institutions of the U.S. government, including 
the legislative and executive branches. Goure (2001) discusses the “tyranny of forward presence” 




Zacheim et. Al (1996) conducts the most similar analysis to mine, wherein they compare 
the sum of categorical costs that maintain the global U.S. basing operation to the “cost of war,” 
inferring a peacetime “insurance premium” of 1/85 the cost of war. However, Zacheim et al. 
(1996) fail to point out that the numerator of that ratio is a yearly flow while the denominator is a 
stock variable (the “total” bill for fighting in just one “medium regional contingency”). To 
interpret this peacetime “insurance premium” at its face value would be to assume that the U.S. 
would be at war perennially were it not conducting overseas basing activities, a stretch of the 
imagination to be sure. In addition, Zacheim et. Al (1996) is qualitative in nature and lacks the 
rigor of formal analytical modelling. 
To date, there has been little to no research regarding the monetary consequences of U.S. 
foreign assistance spending. The existing literature—which focuses on growth or trade 
consequences—is heavily skewed towards base closures rather than new/sustaining operations 
(Vine (2015), Calder (2010)). Droff (2015) provides a comprehensive methods-based typology 
of the regional analyses of defence economics.  
Of interest is Biglaiser (2007) which attempts to link troop deployment with U.S. Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) and concludes that U.S. investors—but not global investors—include 
U.S. military presence in their decision-making process. The presence of U.S. troop deployment 
impacts not only their decision to invest in that country but is also shown to impact the amount 
of FDI deployed (Biglaiser (2007). 
 
5 Zacheim et al (1996) came to this estimate by concluding that $12B was spent on overseas basing 
activities and comparing that to the requirement postulated by senior military officials that the U.S. 
army must be able to fight two “medium regional contingencies,” concluding that the Gulf War 
(estimated cost of $48B) was a single “medium regional contingency and doubled it when 
calculating the peacetime “insurance premium”. 
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The U.S. has experienced nearly three decades of government budget deficits and trade 
deficits. During this period, the U.S. dollar has served uninterrupted in the roles of international 
store of value and vehicle/denomination of international trade and financial transactions. This 
“dollar hegemony” is consistently and adequately explained by a combination of network effects 
and inertia (Dollar (2009)). There are observed asymmetrical ramifications of U.S. foreign 
assistance spending because of the “exorbitant privilege” enjoyed by the USD (Eichengreen 
(1987)). By combining monetary policy dynamics, multiplier effects, and the presence of foreign 
assistance spending, this paper explores the knock-on consequences of the exorbitant privilege of 
the USD—namely, unlimited spending abroad with little-to-no immediate repercussion.  
There are other comprehensive models that exist to tackle questions of trade and financial 
imbalances (such as Computable General Equilibrium models). However, those models fail to 
account for the inter-temporal stock-flow dynamics necessary to capture the linkages between 
real economic activity and financial sectors of two separate economies.  
For instance, traditional attempts to model exchange rate dynamics fail to account for the 
cascading nature of capital inflows. Economies don’t adjust instantaneously to continuous new 
streams of income flowing into their economy. Instead, stock-flow consistent models assume that 
households gradually target and realize higher levels of wealth, a process which eventually tapers 
off as the rest of the economy acclimates to the new source of income. It is in this way that it’s 
important for all stock-flow consistent models to be time-precise—time inherently matters 
(Caverzasi (2013)). 
Two-country SFC models, like the ones explored in this paper, are especially useful when 
tackling complicated problems of international trade and monetary policy. By linking two 
countries in a matrix where everything goes somewhere, the possibility of explosive or convex 
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growth is limited. Because of the strict enforcing of zero-sum accounting (wherein every year, 
each column and row of the two-country transaction-flow matrix equals zero, indicating that 
every output is income within a country and every external purchase (import, asset purchase) 
corresponds to the corresponding country’s external sale (export, asset sale). In this way, the 
normal double-entry accounting framework is doubled (because of the two countries), resulting 
in a quadruple-entry accounting framework (Godley (2006)).  
Stock-flow consistent frameworks are, in fact, far better suited to tackle mercantilist 
development strategies as their impact is not limited to the tradeable goods sector; mercantilist 
strategies indirectly impact other sectors of the developing economy (specifically, the central 
banking sector and government sector). Stock-flow consistent models are appropriate because 
SFC models accurately reflect the required (and normal) actions of foreign central banks, and 
more importantly the repercussions of those actions.  
I modify a previously published two-country stock flow consistent model, which depicts 
two independent countries linked together, each growing at a steady state rate before a 
perturbation is introduced: increasing one country’s propensity to import (Godley (2003)). The 
perturbation then alters the course of each variable within the system, impacting the trade, 
current account, and government budget balances as well as consumption, income, and wealth 
accumulation (Godley (2003)). 
    As U.S. foreign assistance spending is, in effect, a “transfer payment,” its inclusion 
(and subsequent positive shock) impacts the foreign economy in a manner similar to the impact 
depicted above (Godley (2003)). The main difference is that U.S. foreign assistance spending is, 
itself, “unrequited,” in that there is no reciprocation; U.S. foreign assistance spending, while 
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perhaps “tied” to future obligations, does not itself involve the U.S. government (or its citizens) 
receiving goods or services for those payments.  
For the purposes of this model, I am using a lower-bound with regards to the degree of 
U.S. involvement: the U.S. not only spends considerable resources abroad as FAS, but they also 
spend considerable resources abroad through simple U.S. government spending that takes place 
abroad. This model explores the impact of U.S. foreign assistance spending, where U.S. foreign 
assistance spending (FAS) is defined to be all economic and military aid through U.S. Agency 
for International Development. 
By using stock-flow consistent accounting alongside social accounting matrices, the 
import, export, and international investment decisions of one country impact the other in equal 
and corresponding ways. Because of the quadruple-entry accounting framework in place, both 
countries’ capital account balances must exactly offset their current account balance so as to zero 
their summation. Total inflows equal total outflows. Any current account deficit, by the nature of 
the set-up and the assumed behaviors of the different aggregate entities, is always accompanied 
by an equivalent capital account surplus. And any capital surplus is inevitably matched by an 
equivalent current account deficit.  
While the expenditures of U.S. foreign assistance spending do not directly contribute to 
the trade or capital account balance, it does contribute to the current account balance (as a 
unilateral transfer, part of net factor payments component).  As a result, I model U.S. foreign 
assistance spending to directly impact the Rest of World’s current account on its way towards 
swelling the rest of the world’s national income. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview. Section 3 
presents the theoretical background, and the two tables that comprise the accounting system 
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“with no black holes". Section 4 presents the equations defining general model and the two 
closures. It elaborates four models and the perturbation simulated in each of these models. 
Section 5 presents the results of the simulations for the four models and two closures. Section 6 
concludes. 
1.2 Overview 
Within the larger model, sub-models of real and nominal trade flows drive the underlying 
dynamics, which is ultimately driven by trade prices. Trade prices are endogenously determined 
by domestic and foreign general price levels alongside the nominal exchange rate. Other sub-
models drive other dynamics: the next section describes the income/expenditure sub-model, 
wherein households follow a consumption function that uses the lagged stock of real wealth as 
one of the variables. All sub-models are contained within the overarching model, as shown by 
the two matrix tables, one describing the stocks while the other describes periodic flows. Section 
3 frames the analysis within those two matrix tables.  
Section 1.4 describes the identities that determine how real and financial activity flows 
through the system. In addition, Section 4 also describes the behavioural assumptions that shape 
both U.S. and ROW’s decision-making processes. Other sub-models are integrated inside the 
main model, such as the income/expenditure model, which, following Haig-Simons, defines 
disposable income as lagged real wealth plus this period’s income not saved. Each of these sub-
models must generate some sort of stable dynamic before and after a perturbation is introduced. 
And, in these models, new quasi stationary steady states (see Godley and Cripps, 1983:294) are 
reached when the wealth accumulation-to-income flow ratio is achieved and the change in stock 




Subsections 1.41 and 1.42 describe the many steps involved in defining nominal and real 
income and expenditure identities. These subsections are extensive due to the varying nature of 
prices within the model (prices of imports, exports, and domestic sales for both the U.S. and 
ROW) but are—in essence—little more than accounting relationships. Subsection 1.42 also 
details how certain behaviours, such as the determination of nominal and real trade flows, prices, 
and exchange rates are determined by variables relevant and reflecting real-world decision-
making. Subsection 1.43 sets the accounting identities and behavioral assumptions for household 
income and expenditures. 
Sub-section 1.44 details how and why wealth stocks are accumulated and allocated by the 
private sector: two-stage, Tobinesque decision-making processes wherein first savings flows are 
determined and are then allocated according to preferences, relative price levels, exchange rate 
expectations, and interest rate differentials.  
Sub-section 1.45 then discusses asset supplies, importantly the mechanisms generating 
governmental deficits. Sub-section 4.6 concludes by introducing the main protagonist of the 
story, the source of our perturbation to the steady-state equilibrium: transfer payments, i.e., U.S. 
foreign assistance spending.  
Section 1.4 speaks mostly to the General Model, the base model from which all four 
models are drawn. From the General Model, two unique models will be built and explored: 
Model A (Fixed Exchange Rate; reserves flexible) and Model B (Flexible Exchange Rate; 
reserves fixed).  
Section 1.5 uses a numerical simulation to solve the model as a whole and observe how it 
responds to shocks. For example, (given exogenous monetary policy and fixed exchange rates) 
shocking the transfer payments of one country will result in an equivalent shock of transfer 
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receipts of the other. Resultantly, the foreign exchange reserves of the non-reserve country 
change (while reserve country’s holdings of international reserves are assumed to be zero as U.S. 
central banks are assumed, for my purposes here, to hold no reserves outside U.S.-treasuries 
which, as they are held by the U.S. central bank, do not constitute foreign / international 
reserves). Simulations are presented for the main closure (fixed exchange rate parity; reserves 
adjust) as well as an alternative closure (flexible exchange rate parity; reserves fixed) to the 
scenario mentioned above 
Historically, U.S. domestic government spending does not decrease because of increases 
in U.S. foreign assistance spending. To reflect this reality, I evaluate scenarios wherein U.S. 
domestic government spending is unchanged even after the shock (the increase in U.S. transfer 
payments from U.S. FAS) in Sections 1.6 and 1.8. In those sections, total U.S. government 
spending increases by the exact same amount diverted abroad (in the form of new U.S. foreign 
assistance), leaving U.S. domestic government spending completely unchanged. Section 1.7 
presents a theoretical model—less realistic than that modelled in Section 1.8—wherein U.S. 
government spending is actually diverted abroad, rather than being spent abroad and 
compensated by increases in the total amount of U.S. government spending.  
It should be noted that the modifications to the model, the chosen closures--all these 
decisions, and assumptions—greatly determine the behaviour of the two-block macroeconomic 
models within. There are 90+ total equations, many of which are pure accounting identities. As a 
result, the system is under-determined without making certain assumptions. The closures used—
managed exchange rate or freely floating exchange rate—are extremes from which I abstract 
actual central bank behaviour. Most central banks and monetary authorities allow sufficient 
flexibility within the exchange rate (even while maintaining a ‘managed’ exchange rate regime). 
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In addition, those central banks and monetary authorities may simultaneously also allow foreign 
exchange reserves to adjust as they see fit. Therefore, the results are interpretable as the limit 
cases for analysing the trade, monetary, and fiscal consequences of U.S. foreign assistance 
spending.   
1.3 An Accounting System with No Black Holes 
Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 show the framework for both the stock and flow variables, and 
how they interact with one another. The balance sheet is detailed in Table 1.1 and encompasses 
both economies, the U.S. and the Rest of the World (ROW). Due to the simplifying assumptions 
detailed above, every private asset is financial, and each financial asset has a corresponding 
liability (in this way, there are no ‘black holes’). Households are limited as well: they hold 
wealth as cash (denominated in their home country’s currency—LCUs for ROW households, 
U.S. Dollars (USD) for U.S. households), foreign treasury bills, and domestic treasury bills.  
The first term of the subscript details the country where the asset is currently being held 
while the latter suffix details the location of issuance. So 𝐵𝑈𝑆,𝑅𝑂𝑊 refers to a bill owned by a 
U.S. household but issued by the ROW block.  
Table 1.1 shows that the model is not as realistic as would be desirable: firms hold no 
assets nor liabilities; there is no banking sector; all labor supplied is assumed to be demanded, 
etc. The lack of assets and liabilities in Table 1 precludes the analysis of financial fragility and 
other discussions of solvency/liquidity. Similarly, with regards to the banking sector. We also 
abstract from labor-market dynamics and the consideration unemployment for the present. 
Table 1.1 shows the clear segregation between households, firms, central banks, and the 
government. ROW Treasury bills are issued by the ROW government and not the central 
bank/monetary authority. Similarly, only the U.S. Treasury issues U.S. Treasury bills. Central 
banks issue cash money and have assets comprising of foreign and domestic bills.  
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Table 1.2 (the flow matrix) also uses the double-entry format to describe transactions 
between the U.S. and ROW. All nominal variables are defined in Table 1.2 and, as before, the 
sum of all rows and columns must equal zero by identity after exchange rate conversion (see the 
middle column). The left-hand side represents the ROW (LCUs), while the right-hand side 
represents the U.S. (USDs). The flow matrix is arranged as follows: National income and 
product account-type entries at the top, interest payments in the middle, and flow-of-funds 
accounting in the lower third.  
U.S. households are assumed to only hold USD; ROW households are assumed to only 
hold LCU. Therefore, it follows that all payments/receipts between the U.S. and ROW are 
exactly and simultaneously exchanged into the respective countries’ own currency by the central 
bank. Consequently, the overall outcome of the model is largely determined to how the 
government and central banks respond to changes in reserves that result from everyday central 
bank processes.  
While there is some conjecture that large amounts of USD are hoarded abroad by foreign 
citizens, existing models have not integrated this mixed reality or explored the impact when 
foreign consumers are allowed to hold both LCUs and USD. Future research will explore this 
“dollarization” in simulated scenarios. 
 
Table 1: Balance Sheets 
  
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 Col. 6 Col. 7 Col. 8 Col. 9 Col. 10 
  
Households Firms Govt. Central Bank 
 
Households Firms Govt. Central Bank 
 
  
ROW (LCU) Exch. Rate U.S. ($) Sum 
BALANCE SHEETS 
B1 Cash  +HLCU   −HLCU  +H$   −H$ 0 
B2 LCU Bills +BLCU,LCU 
 
 −BLCU +Bcb:LCU ∗ xrLCU +B$,LCU ∗ xrLCU    0 
B3 $ Bills BLCU,$ ∗ xr$   +Bcb:ROW,$ ∗ xr$ ∗ xrLCU +B$,$  −B$ +Bcb:$ 0 
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B4 Balance −VLCU  NWg:ROW ≡ BLCU NWcb:LCU ∗ xrLCU −V$  NWg:$ ≡ B$ 0 0 
B5 Sum 0 
 










2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 Col. 6 
Col. 




Households Firms Govt.  Central Bank   Households 
Firm
s 
Govt. Central Bank  
  ROW (LCU) 
Exch. 
Rate U.S. ($) Sum 
  INCOME - EXPENDITURE TRANSACTIONS 
Consumption −CLCU +CLCU 





































GDP +YLCU −YLCU 















+rROW; t−1∗ BROW,ROW;t−1 
 
+rROW;t−1∗ BLCU;t−1 −rROW;t−1∗ Bcb:ROW;t−1 ∗ xrLCU +rROW;t−1∗ BU.S.,ROW;t−1 ∗ xrLCU 
   
0 +rU.S.;t−1∗ BROW,U.S.;t−1 ∗ xr$ 
  
+rU.S.,t−1 ∗Bcb:ROW,U.S.;t−1 ∗ xr$ ∗ xrLCU +rU.S.;t−1 ∗ BU.S.,U.S.;t−1 
 




   
+Fb$ −Fb$ 0 








ROW Bills −ΔBROW,ROW 
 
+ΔBLCU −ΔBcb:ROW ∗ xrLCU −ΔBU.S.,ROW ∗ xrLCU 
   
0 
$ Bills −ΔBROW,U.S. ∗ xr$ 
  
−ΔBcb:ROW,U.S. ∗ xr$ ∗ xrLCU −ΔBU.S.,U.S. 
 
+ΔB$ −ΔBcb,U.S. 0 
Sum 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
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The tables above are shown both for the reference of the reader and to elucidate how the 
two economies are intertwined. Table 1 represents the balance sheets of the “World”, which—
greatly simplified—is modelled to be only the “the U.S”. and “ROW”. Following (Godley, 2006) 
and (Godley, 2003), no physical assets exist.  
Departing from (Godley, 2006) and (Godley, 2003), there is no inclusion of foreign 
exchange reserves held in the form of gold. All foreign exchange reserves are held in the form of 
U.S. Treasuries. As a result of the assumptions above, every transaction has a corresponding 
transaction somewhere else in table: a private asset held by the U.S. is a private liability held by 
ROW.  
1.4 Equations Defining the Model 
1.41 Identities describing arterial flows 
All values described are nominal, unless stated otherwise. All capitalised variables are 
nominal (𝑌𝐷) and lower-case variables are real (𝑦𝑑). There is no inventory adjustment or 
investment, and no endogenous (real) supplies to fret over (including no endogenous supply of 
labor). Asset demands and supplies are a main driver of the systems within. Specifically, the 
ways in which asset demands are brought into equivalence with asset supplies drives how the 
system resolves. Businesses and central banks are assumed to hold no assets/wealth, leaving 
households and governments as the only actors in the asset demand market.  
Private wealth is accumulated at the rate that income (a la Haig-Simons) exceeds taxes 
and consumption. The nominal Haig-Simons personal income function includes capital gains as 
well as personal income6 and is defined as follows: 
 
6 In the model, all capital gains result from exchange rate fluctuations only. A modified Haig-Simons 




∆𝑉𝑙𝑐𝑢 ≡ 𝑌𝑙𝑐𝑢 + 𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢,𝑡−1. 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,𝑙𝑐𝑢,𝑡−1 + 𝑟$,𝑡−1. 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,$,𝑡−1. 𝑥𝑟$ + ∆𝑥𝑟$. 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,$,𝑡−1 − 𝑇𝑙𝑐𝑢 − 𝐶𝐿𝐶𝑈   (1) 
 ∆𝑉𝑙𝑐𝑢 ≡ 𝑌𝐷ℎ−𝑠𝑙𝑐𝑢 − 𝐶𝐿𝐶𝑈  (2) 
where V is wealth, Y is total factor income, r is the bill rate of interest, B is Treasury 
bills, xr is the exchange rate, T is taxes, and C is consumption. Equation (2) abbreviates Equation 
(1). Equation (1) represents the wealth accumulation of the ROW denominated in “LCU”, 
necessitating the conversion of USD-denominated interest payments on U.S. bills into LCUs 
(through multiplying 𝑟$,𝑡−1. 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,$,𝑡−1 by the exchange rate). 
The fourth term in Equation (1) (∆𝑥𝑟$. 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,$,𝑡−1) represents the capital gains of the ROW 
citizens, where (since interest rates and bill discounts are constant) exchange rate fluctuations are 
the sole cause of capital gains/losses. Since capital gains are not transactions, this fourth term is 
omitted and does not appear in col 1 row 6 in Table 1.  
U.S. wealth accumulation is defined in a symmetrical manner. Equations (3) and (4) 
provide symmetrical identities for the U.S. 
∆𝑉$ ≡ 𝑌$ + 𝑟$,𝑡−1. 𝐵$,$,𝑡−1 + 𝑟𝐿𝐶𝑈,𝑡−1. 𝐵$,𝐿𝐶𝑈,𝑡−1. 𝑥𝑟$ + ∆𝑥𝑟$. 𝐵$,𝐿𝐶𝑈,𝑡−1 − 𝑇$ − 𝐶$  (3) 
 ∆𝑉$ ≡ 𝑌𝐷$ − 𝐶$ (4) 
National income at current prices is described by columns 2 and 6 of Table 1: 
 𝑌𝐿𝐶𝑈 ≡ 𝐶𝐿𝐶𝑈 + 𝐺𝐿𝐶𝑈 + 𝑋𝐿𝐶𝑈 − 𝐼𝑀𝐿𝐶𝑈 (5) 
 
allowed to adjust. Interest rates are exogenously fixed, and so bond prices are unchanged despite 
additional demand pressures. It is the ROW central banks’ actions that keep both the U.S. and ROW 
interest rate constant.   
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 𝑌$ ≡ 𝐶$ + 𝐺$ + 𝑋$ − 𝐼𝑀$ (6) 
where G is government expenditures, X represents exports and IM: imports. 
Central bank profits (𝐹𝑏) are simplified as there are no interest-paying liabilities (the 
Government is modelled to issue/hold/make good on their country’s T-bills). Therefore, the 
central bank profits for the U.S. are equal to the total interest receipts from any domestically 
issued bills held by the central bank while the central bank profits for the ROW are equal to 
interest receipts on domestically issued bills held and also any foreign treasury bills. Column 4 
and 9 of Table 1 can be simplified to represent the central bank profits for the ROW and the 
U.S.: 
 𝐹𝑏𝐿𝐶𝑈 ≡ 𝑟𝐿𝐶𝑈,𝑡−1. 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝐿𝐶𝑈,𝑡−1 + 𝑟$,𝑡−1. 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝐿𝐶𝑈,$,𝑡−1. 𝑥𝑟$ (7) 
 𝐹𝑏$ ≡ 𝑟$,𝑡−1. 𝐵𝑐𝑏$,𝑡−1 (8) 
The government budget constraint is incredibly simplified since the central bank remits 
all profits back to the government and is represented (using columns 3 and 8) as: 
 ∆𝐵𝐿𝐶𝑈 ≡ 𝐺𝐿𝐶𝑈 − 𝑇𝐿𝐶𝑈 + 𝑟𝐿𝐶𝑈,𝑡−1. 𝐵𝐿𝐶𝑈,𝑡−1 − 𝐹𝑏𝐿𝐶𝑈 (9) 
 ∆𝐵$ ≡ 𝐺$ − 𝑇$ + 𝑟$,𝑡−1. 𝐵$,𝑡−1 − 𝐹𝑏$  (10) 
As can be seen, the bills (𝐵) are the sole liability of the government sector and have 
nothing to do with the central bank. Accordingly, payments on U.S. Treasury bills held by ROW 
are accounted for by the third term in Equation (10) in the term 𝑟$−1. 𝐵$−1. As a result, our first bit 
of asymmetry emerges between the U.S. and ROW: interest payments by the U.S. are a credit to 
the ROW central bank but do not debit the U.S. central banks’ balance sheet.  
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A main strength of SFC models is that there are no black holes. Therefore, total outflows 
from the U.S. to ROW are exactly accounted for as inflows for the ROW. This identity holds 
regardless of whether the flows are trade- or capital-related. Lines 3 and 4 of Table 2 (the 
transaction-flow matrix) account for trade flows while Lines 7 and 8 describe the balance of 
payments. Linking transactions described in Table 2 with the balance sheet in Table 1 requires us 
to take capital gains into account. Balance of payment identities (not shown in Tables 1 and 2) 
are as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐶𝑈 ≡ 𝑋𝐿𝐶𝑈 − 𝐼𝑀𝐿𝐶𝑈 + 𝑟$,𝑡−1. 𝐵𝐿𝐶𝑈,$,𝑡−1. 𝑥𝑟$ + 𝑟𝐿𝐶𝑈,𝑡−1. 𝐵$,𝐿𝐶𝑈,𝑡−1 +𝑟$,𝑡−1. 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝐿𝐶𝑈,$,𝑡−1. 𝑥𝑟$   (11) 
𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐶𝑈 ≡ −𝐾𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐶𝑈 ≡ ∆. 𝐵𝐿𝐶𝑈,$𝑠 . 𝑥𝑟$ − ∆𝐵$,𝐿𝐶𝑈𝑠 + ∆. 𝐵𝑐𝑏$,𝐿𝐶𝑈𝑠 . 𝑥𝑟$ + (1 − 𝛾)𝐺𝑈𝑆𝐹𝐴𝑆 (12) 
𝐶𝐴𝐵$ ≡ 𝑋$ − 𝐼𝑀$ + 𝑟𝐿𝐶𝑈,𝑡−1. 𝐵$,𝐿𝐶𝑈,𝑡−1. 𝑥𝑟𝐿𝐶𝑈 + 𝑟$,𝑡−1. 𝐵𝐿𝐶𝑈,$,𝑡−1 −𝑟$,𝑡−1. 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝐿𝐶𝑈,$,𝑡−1. 𝑥𝑟𝐿𝐶𝑈   (13) 
𝐶𝐴𝐵$ ≡ −𝐾𝐴𝐵$ ≡ ∆. 𝐵$,𝐿𝐶𝑈𝑠 . 𝑥𝑟𝐿𝐶𝑈 − ∆𝐵𝐿𝐶𝑈,$𝑠 − ∆𝐵𝑐𝑏𝐿𝐶𝑈,$𝑠 − (1 − 𝛾)𝐺𝑈𝑆𝐹𝐴𝑆  (14) 
Where CAB is the current account balance and KAB is the capital account balance and 𝐶𝐴𝐵 + 𝐾𝐴𝐵 ≡ 0. KAB, therefore, includes the valuation of the change in official reserves by 
the ROW central bank.  
As can be seen in Equations (12) and (14), the KAB of each country is impacted by U.S. 
Foreign Assistance Spending (FAS). Since FAS is a transfer payment, it appears in the capital 




Prices are allowed to adjust, and trade prices are allowed to adjust independently of 
domestic prices. Trade prices are determined as follows: 
log (𝑝𝑚𝐿𝐶𝑈) = 𝜇0 − 𝜇1. log (𝑥𝑟𝐿𝐶𝑈) + (1 − 𝜇1). log (𝑝𝑦𝐿𝐶𝑈) + 𝜇1. log (𝑝𝑦$) (15) 
log (𝑝𝑥𝑙𝑐𝑢) = 𝑣0 − 𝑣1. log (𝑥𝑟𝐿𝐶𝑈) + (1 − 𝑣1). log (𝑝𝑦𝐿𝐶𝑈) + 𝑣1. log (𝑝𝑦$) (16) 
where all logarithmic transformations are natural logarithmic transformations, and 0 < 𝑣1 
< 1 and 0 < 𝜇1< 1. The elasticities7 reflect stylized observations so that certain situations unfold 
plausibly and intuitively within the model. Prices of imports and exports are determined in such a 
way that trade price-domestic price elasticities for the U.S. and ROW sum to one. This allows for 
a realistic outcome if both economies experience inflation simultaneously: import and export 
prices increase by the identical amount and the exchange rate does not change.  
The other two elasticities are constructed in similar fashions, such that particular 
situations deliver intuitive results with respect to what has historically been seen with regard to 
import and export price behaviour. For instance, currency depreciation is matched one-for-one 
by domestic inflation while other terms-of-trade dynamics are preserved.  
Price symmetry is imposed such that export prices for U.S. consumers are import prices 
for foreign consumers and import prices for U.S. consumers are export prices for foreign firms: 
𝑝𝑥$ = 𝑝𝑚𝐿𝐶𝑈. 𝑥𝑟𝐿𝐶𝑈  (17) 
𝑝𝑚$ = 𝑝𝑚𝐿𝐶𝑈. 𝑥𝑟𝐿𝐶𝑈  (18) 
 
7 See Godley (2006) for explanation and clarification 
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The export volume for the ROW is determined entirely as the whole of U.S. import 
volume, which is determined by the ratio of lagged import prices (in U.S. economy) and lagged 
domestic prices (in U.S. economy), in addition to the usual current income. Note the positive 
impact income has on exports, just like as with imports, and how it is immediate and modelled to 
be elastic, similar to imports. The coefficients, (𝜀1and 𝜀2), are price-import volume and own-
country income-import volume elasticities for U.S. households, and bold variables denote logs: 
 𝒙𝑳𝑪𝑼 = 𝜀0 − 𝜀1. (𝑝𝒎$,𝒕−𝟏 − 𝒑𝒚$,𝒕−𝟏) + 𝜀2. 𝒚$ (19) 
 𝒊𝒎𝑳𝑪𝑼 = 𝜂0 − 𝜂1. (𝒑𝒎𝑳𝑪𝑼,𝒕−𝟏 − 𝒑𝒚𝑳𝑪𝑼,𝒕−𝟏) + 𝜂2. 𝒚𝑳𝑪𝑼 (20) 
As the exports of one country are, in a two-country world, the imports of the other 
country, U.S. export and import volumes must equate: 
 𝑥$ ≡ 𝑖𝑚𝐿𝐶𝑈 (21) 
 𝑖𝑚$ ≡ 𝑥𝐿𝐶𝑈 (22) 
Aggregate trade flows valued in own currencies are given by the next four identities: 
 𝑋𝐿𝐶𝑈 ≡ 𝑥𝐿𝐶𝑈. 𝑝𝑥𝐿𝐶𝑈 (23) 
 𝑋$ ≡ 𝑥$. 𝑝𝑥$ (24) 
 𝐼𝑀𝐿𝐶𝑈 ≡ 𝑖𝑚𝐿𝐶𝑈. 𝑝𝑚𝐿𝐶𝑈 (25) 
 𝐼𝑀$ ≡ 𝑖𝑚$. 𝑝𝑚$ (26) 
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1.43 Income and expenditures 
Domestic prices and trade prices are separately and endogenously determined, which, in 
turn, play a large role in the determination of the disposable income for each country. However, 
the SFCA literature seems to mostly utilize a modified Haig-Simons disposable income function: 
an (real) income function that takes into account both households’ disposable income as well as 
any capital gains stemming from either exchange rate valuation effects or simply increasing 
household investment flows. Wealth is previously defined in Equations (1) and (2), as well as (3) 
and (4) for the ROW and the U.S., respectively. Rearranging Equations (2) and (4) provide us 
with a useful definition of Haig-Simons disposable income (𝑌𝐷):  
 𝑌𝐷𝑙𝑐𝑢 ≡ 𝐶𝐿𝐶𝑈 + ∆𝑉𝑙𝑐𝑢 (2hg) 
 𝑌𝐷$ ≡ 𝐶$ + ∆𝑉$ (4hg) 
The price of domestic sales (𝑝𝑑𝑠) is used to calculate the change in the real stock of 
wealth: Δ𝑣 ≡ 𝑉𝑝𝑑𝑠 − 𝑉𝑡−1𝑝𝑑𝑠𝑡−1. 
Similarly (but slightly different), the Haig-Simons disposable income function is 
inflation-adjusted: 
 𝑦𝑑𝑙𝑐𝑢 ≡ 𝑌𝐷𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑠𝑙𝑐𝑢 − 𝑣𝑙𝑐𝑢,t−1. Δ𝑝𝑑𝑠𝑙𝑐𝑢/𝑝𝑑𝑠𝑙𝑐𝑢 (27) 
 𝑦𝑑$ ≡ 𝑌𝐷$𝑝𝑑𝑠$ − 𝑣$,t−1. Δ𝑝𝑑𝑠$/𝑝𝑑𝑠$ (28) 
Like the wealth change determinations modelled in Equations (2) and (4), the change in 
the real stock of wealth is determined by the difference of real spending and real consumption:  
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 Δ𝑣𝑙𝑐𝑢 ≡ ydlcu − 𝑐𝑙𝑐𝑢 (29) 
 Δ𝑣$ ≡ yd$ − 𝑐$ (30) 
where real consumption (𝑐) is based not only on the real disposable income available to 
the households but also their initial stock of real wealth: 
 𝑐𝑙𝑐𝑢 = 𝛼1,𝑙𝑐𝑢. 𝑦𝑑𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 + 𝛼2,𝑙𝑐𝑢. 𝑣𝑙𝑐𝑢,𝑡−1 (31) 
 𝑐$ = 𝛼1,$. 𝑦𝑑$𝑒 + 𝛼2,$. 𝑣$,𝑡−1 (32) 
where a superscript (𝑒) denotes an expected value. More information on the consumption 
function will follow later8. 
Expectation functions are simple things within this model, which take into account past 
mistakes and positively inform future decision-making processes. To illustrate that the 
expectation functions within are harmless, let us rearrange Equations (29 – 32)9 and isolate the 
change in expected wealth to examine  
Δ𝑣𝑙𝑐𝑢 = 𝛼2,𝑙𝑐𝑢. (𝛼3,𝑙𝑐𝑢. 𝑦𝑑𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 − 𝑣𝑙𝑐𝑢,t−1)   
 
8 The consumption function is a two-stage decision-making process a la Keynes 1936 wherein households 
decide initial savings flows first, and wealth allocation decisions second. (Keynes 1936: 166) 
9 Substituting equation (31) into Equation (29) yields 
 Δ𝑣𝑙𝑐𝑢 = 𝑦𝑑𝑙𝑐𝑢 − 𝛼1,𝑙𝑐𝑢. 𝑦𝑑𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 − 𝛼2,𝑙𝑐𝑢. 𝑣𝑙𝑐𝑢,𝑡−1 
 Δ𝑣𝑙𝑐𝑢 = (1 − 𝛼1,𝑙𝑐𝑢). 𝑦𝑑𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 − 𝛼2,𝑙𝑐𝑢. 𝑣𝑙𝑐𝑢,𝑡−1. Multiply the first term on the RHS by 𝛼2,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝛼2,𝑙𝑐𝑢: Δ𝑣𝑙𝑐𝑢 = 𝛼2,𝑙𝑐𝑢. (1−𝛼1,𝑙𝑐𝑢)𝛼2,𝑙𝑐𝑢 . 𝑦𝑑𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 − 𝛼2,𝑙𝑐𝑢. 𝑣𝑙𝑐𝑢,𝑡−1 and let 𝛼3,𝑙𝑐𝑢 = (1−𝛼1,𝑙𝑐𝑢)𝛼2,𝑙𝑐𝑢  to get Δ𝑣𝑙𝑐𝑢 = 𝛼2,𝑙𝑐𝑢. (𝛼3. 𝑦𝑑𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 − 𝑣𝑙𝑐𝑢,𝑡−1)  
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where 𝛼3,𝑙𝑐𝑢 = (1−𝛼1,𝑙𝑐𝑢)𝛼2,𝑙𝑐𝑢 . If changes in real wealth are zero (the LHS = 0), then the above 
becomes 𝑦𝑑𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 = 𝛼3 ∗ 𝑣𝑙𝑐𝑢,t−1, implying a quasi-steady state and the achievement of an implicit 
optimal wealth target (𝑣∗) and a corresponding wealth-to-income ratio (𝛼3,𝑙𝑐𝑢; 𝑖. 𝑒. 𝑣𝑙𝑐𝑢∗ =𝛼3. 𝑦𝑑𝑙𝑐𝑢).  
In assuming that interest rates positively impact 𝛼3,𝑙𝑐𝑢, I also assume that higher interest 
rates do not (in the short run, at least) negatively impact aggregate demand. In order to ensure 
that this does not happen, I assume that 𝛼3 is also defined to be 𝛼3 ≡ 𝛼30 + 𝛼4. 𝑟10. Putting this 
all together yields the quasi-steady state conditions of: 
 𝛼2,𝑙𝑐𝑢 = (1 − 𝛼1,𝑙𝑐𝑢)/(𝛼30,𝑙𝑐𝑢 + 𝛼4,𝑙𝑐𝑢. 𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢) (33) 
 𝛼2,$ = (1 − 𝛼1,$)/(𝛼30,$ + 𝛼4,$. 𝑟$) (34) 
The remaining equations have been relegated to Appendix B and are largely identity 
related. 
1.44 Asset demands 
Asset demand originates from household wealth allocation decisions. In a stationary 
steady state, households accumulate a certain percentage of their wealth, allocated between U.S. 
and foreign treasuries. Households undergo a two-stage decision: their saving rate to determine 
the total amount of wealth, and then the allocation of wealth between the two generalized 
categories: U.S. and foreign treasuries.  
 
10 As assumed in (Godley & Lavoie, 2003) 
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Bonds are not addressed within this paper, nor are they particularly addressed within the 
literature. There are papers that focus on the stock-flow dynamics of the financial markets, 
specifically a few exploring “kindleberger dynamics” or “minskyian dynamics” (Dos Santos, 
2005; Miess & Schmelzer, 2016; Passarella, 2012); however, inclusion of such complications 
would further complicate an already abstruse model with near a hundred equations in total. 
Additional endogenous variables would require further closures and this paper would depart to, 
perhaps, too great a degree from the existing literature. This paper focuses on the trade and 
financial flow dynamics that result in perennial U.S. transfer payments. The type of those 
financial flows (whether portfolio investment, FDI, corporate, or sovereign debt) matters little 
for this analysis. This paper seeks to establish a baseline dynamic to study the impact of U.S. 
military aid and other U.S. transfer payments abroad. Empirical analysis is needed to see whether 
the trade and financial flows do, in reality, increase as a result of U.S. transfer payments.  
The household decision-making process is influenced not just by the interest rate 
differential (reflecting ROW's higher risk premium) but also by the exchange rate expectations. 
The models in this paper assume a simple exchange rate expectation function, in that the 
exchange rate is expected to be the same as the exchange rate in the last period. Integrating the 
two-stage decision making process yields asset demand functions for the U.S. and ROW 
households as follows: 
 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑 = 𝑉𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 . (𝜆10 + 𝜆11. 𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢 − 𝜆12. (𝑟$ + 𝑑𝑥𝑟$𝑒) − 𝜆13. 𝑌𝐷𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 /𝑉𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 ) (35) 
 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,$𝑑 = 𝑉𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 . (𝜆20 − 𝜆21. 𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢 + 𝜆22. (𝑟$ + 𝑑𝑥𝑟$𝑒) − 𝜆23. 𝑌𝐷𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 /𝑉𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 ) (36) 
 𝐻𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑 = 𝑉𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 . (𝜆30 − 𝜆31. 𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢 − 𝜆32. (𝑟$ + 𝑑𝑥𝑟$𝑒) + 𝜆33. 𝑌𝐷𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 /𝑉𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 ) (37) 
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 𝐵$,$𝑑 = 𝑉$𝑒 . (𝜆40 + 𝜆41. 𝑟$ − 𝜆42. (𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢 + 𝑑𝑥𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 ) − 𝜆43. 𝑌𝐷$𝑒/𝑉$𝑒) (38) 
 𝐵$,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑 = 𝑉$𝑒 . (𝜆50 − 𝜆51. 𝑟$ + 𝜆52. (𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢 + 𝑑𝑥𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 ) − 𝜆53. 𝑌𝐷$𝑒/𝑉$𝑒) (39) 
 𝐻$𝑑 = 𝑉$𝑒 . (𝜆60 − 𝜆61. 𝑟$ − 𝜆62. (𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢 + 𝑑𝑥𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 ) + 𝜆63. 𝑌𝐷$𝑒/𝑉$𝑒) (40) 
where the sum of coefficients in each column (𝜆10, 𝜆20,…) is equal to zero and the sum of 
constants in each equations is equal to one (𝜆10 + 𝜆11 + 𝜆12 = 1), a superscript of ( 𝑒  ) denotes 
expectations, and appending 𝑑 to the beginning of any variable denotes the proportional rate of 
change (so 𝑑𝑥𝑟𝑒 reads as the expected change in the exchange rate).  
To understand how asset demands are determined, let’s look at (35). Looking at (35), it is 
easily seen that the own-interest rate coefficient would be positive in determining demand for 
ROW treasuries by ROW households. Similarly, the U.S. interest rate coefficient is negative in 
(35) as higher U.S. interest rates would make U.S. treasuries more appealing and ROW treasuries 
less appealing to ROW households. Lastly, 𝜆13 is negative to reflect that expectations of lower 
future disposable income-to-wealth ratios negatively impacts asset purchases. As you can see by 
the negative inclusion of 𝜆23 in (36), lower expectations negatively impact U.S. treasury 
purchases as well as ROW treasury purchases. The positive inclusion of 𝜆33 and 𝜆63 in the 
equations determining the cash11 holdings (𝐻$𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑 ; Equations (37) and (40), resp.) show 
 
11 Because of the over-determined nature of the model, I follow previous authors by omitting the 
equations explicitly detailing the demand for money and instead assume that anything not invested in 
the other two assets is held as money (Godley, 2003; Godley, 2006). By omitting the redundant 
equations and re-defining the stock of cash held by foreign and domestic households to be the 





that lower expectations lead to cash hoarding. Equations (35) through (40) aim to reflect Tobin’s 
principles of imperfect assets (Tobin, 1980; Backus, 1980; Brainard, 1992; Godley, 2006) 
Rather than looking at exchange rate changes themselves; it is more helpful to use 
relative changes (gross changes divided by initial values): 
 𝑑𝑥𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 = Δ𝑥𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 /𝑥𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢 (41) 
 𝑑𝑥𝑟$𝑒 = Δ𝑥𝑟$𝑒/𝑥𝑟$ (42) 
And, by doing so, we can better understand the intuition behind the middle term in 
Equations (35) through (40). The middle term in Equation (35) is −𝜆12. (𝑟$ + 𝑑𝑥𝑟$𝑒), negative 
because Equation (35) determines the ROW household demand for ROW treasuries (𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑 ); 
with U.S. interest rates (𝑟$) and the expected proportional change in exchange rate (𝑑𝑥𝑟$𝑒) 
combining to represent the expected rate or return on bills issued abroad at the end of the period.  
An expected exchange rate is assumed to exist. Exchange rate expectations are simply 
designed to reflect the existence/belief in a fundamental exchange rate around which reflect 
households’ expectations vacillate. Simple expectations are excusable so long as past mistakes 
are integrated and proactively inform future decision-making processes. Then, decisions will, 
over time, correct for undesirable outcomes their decision-making as they arise.  
In the first set of the simulations within (Model FASFIX and cFASFIX), the treatment of 
exchange rates or expected exchange rates is of no concern, as the exchange rate is assumed 
exogenously fixed / defended by the central banking authorities. In the second set (Models 
FASFLEX and cFASFLEX), exchange rate expectations will be impacted by realized changes in 
exchange rates. To tie up the model, the ephemeral, so-called fundamental exchange rate is 
endogenized such that expected and real exchange rates equate in the (very) long-run: 
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 𝑥𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑒 = 𝑥𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢,t−1𝑒 + β. (𝑥𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢 − 𝑥𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢,t−1𝑒 ) (43) 
 𝑥𝑟$𝑒 = 𝑥𝑟$,t−1𝑒 + β. (𝑥𝑟$ − 𝑥𝑟$,t−1𝑒 ) (44) 
Cash is seen as a buffer that individuals hold in case of emergency situations and the 
actual determination of the cash holdings (rather than the planned cash allowance) is as follows, 
where the superscript (d) indicates demand: 
 𝐻𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑 = 𝑉𝑙𝑐𝑢 − 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑 − 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,$𝑑  (45) 
 𝐻$𝑑 = 𝑉$ − 𝐵$,$𝑑 − 𝐵$,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑  (46) 
Remembering the naming convention, 𝐵$,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑 is an LCU-denominated (ROW-issued) bond 
that is demanded and held by a U.S. household.  
1.45 Asset supplies 
When governments actively set tax rates and public expenditure commitments, they run 
government budget deficits, which are accompanied with new bond issuance. Government 
surpluses diminish their own national debt (by Treasury buy-backs). That asset is then obviated 
once the government purchases back a debt to itself (naturally).  Governments have limited 
control over the amount of newly issued Treasuries, as the government sets both taxes and 
government spending, and so indirectly determines the amount of newly issued Treasuries. The 
issuance of this debt may emerge on the other side of the balance sheet as a wealth holding for a 
U.S. citizen, ROW citizen, ROW central bank, or even the U.S. central bank. Central banks are 
assumed to, when possible, accommodate both domestic and foreign purchases and sales of bills 
(at a given interest and exchange rate combination). In this way, the private-sector supply of U.S. 
and ROW Treasuries passively matches demand.  
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As is Post-Keynesian tradition12, money supply is also modelled to be demand-led, just as 
is the supply of bills. The U.S. money and bill market equations are: 
 𝐻$𝑠 = 𝐻$ℎ (47) 
 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,$𝑠 = 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,$𝑑 . 𝑥𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢 (48) 
 𝐵$,$𝑠 = 𝐵$,$𝑑  (49) 
And ROW assets, acquired domestically or from abroad, are defined to be: 
 𝐻𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠 = 𝐻𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑  (50) 
 𝐵$,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠 = 𝐵$,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑 . 𝑥𝑟$ (51) 
 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠 = 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑  (52) 
Where a superscript s (s) denotes supply and (d) denotes demanded and actual holdings of 
cash rather than planned holdings. Cash is not—strictly speaking—supply-led, since the 
constraints/determinants of national cash supplies (the asset side of the central bank balance 
sheet) are all endogenously-determined themselves, making cash endogenously determined, 
ultimately. To see this, column 9 of Table 1 (which, when summed together must equal zero, by 
identity) yields the following identity: 
 
12 Central Banks are modelled to set or steer interest rates rather than target money supply levels or some 
target supply of bond issuance. In this way, I follow Post-Keynesians in an attempt to more 
accurately model central bank behaviour within well-defined, rigorous models that include both the 
real and financial side of one or more economies. 
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 𝐻$𝑠 = 𝐵𝑐𝑏$𝑑 (53) 
As Treasury demand is supply-led, ROW central banks are free to purchase as many U.S. 
Treasuries as they like: 
 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢,$𝑠 = 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢,$𝑑 . 𝑥𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢 (54) 
To keep interest rates at the targeted level, U.S. central banks absorb the supply of U.S. 
bills after ROW households, U.S. households, and the ROW central bank supplies are accounted 
for: 
 𝐵𝑐𝑏$𝑑 = 𝐵𝑐𝑏$𝑠 (55) 
 𝐵𝑐𝑏$𝑠 = 𝐵$𝑠 − 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,$𝑠 − 𝐵$,$𝑠 − 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢,$𝑠  (56) 
ROW central bank demand/supplies are similarly determined as a residual: 
 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑 = 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠  (57) 
 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠 = 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠 − 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠 − 𝐵$,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠  (58) 
As we can see by comparing Equations (56) and (58), this is an important exception to 
the symmetry in the representation of the U.S. and ROW. 
Table 2 ensures that all assets equal the sum of private sector, as is seen by vertically 
summing column 4 to get the U.S. treasury bills held by ROW central banks, denominated in 
LCU: 
 Δ𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢,$𝑑 = Δ𝐻𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠 − Δ𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑 + Δ𝑥𝑟$. 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢,$,𝑡−1𝑠  (59) 
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where the last term on the RHS of (59) measures the capital gains/losses experienced by 
ROW when the exchange rate is allowed to adjust. In Models FASFIX and cFASFIX, exchange 
rates are assumed exogenous and so this last term is annihilated. Rearranging (59) allows us to 
see how, absent an exchange rate adjustment mechanism, ROW holdings of U.S. Treasuries are 
the only central bank policy lever available to resolve the inevitable discrepancies that arise 
between the ROW current account and the ROW net accumulation of foreign-issued assets 
(NAFA). For debtor countries (of which most FAS recipients are), this more often than not 
means purchases of U.S. Treasuries to prevent an unwanted exchange rate appreciation. 
To complete the model, I simply need to define that the exchange rates are reciprocal to 
one another: 
 xr$ = 1/𝑥𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢 (60) 
1.46 Transfer payments 
Until this point, the model outlined within follows Models OPENFLEX/OPENFIX very 
closely (Godley, 2006). I keep most, if not all, of the assumptions made within Models 
OPENFLEX/OPENFIX13 in creating Models FASFIX/FASFLEX: 
• Pure service economy 
• Instantaneous production of physical/productive capital without cost, to be exhausted 
within the same period 
• Every financial asset has a corresponding liability 
• Two aggregate financial assets: U.S. Treasuries and ROW Treasuries 
 
13 Whose results are reproduced in Appendix C for easy comparison purposes 
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• ROW and U.S. households trade goods in addition to purchasing U.S. Treasuries, & 
ROW treasuries 
• Fiat, transactional money (no credit money) 
• No commercial banks 
• Full employment (both U.S. and ROW)  
• Unlimited, instantaneous capital mobility 
• Households/governments only purchase services from firms 
• Services are instantaneously provided and consumed 
• Identical endowments for both countries and identical parameters (same initial GDP, G, 
wealth, debt, CAB, KAB, interest rate, etc) 
• No physical property assets 
The models within do not differ from Models OPENFIX/OPENFLEX in the structure or 
the (fundamental) initial set-up/steady states; the models within differ in that they allow for large 
transfer payments to occur from the U.S. to ROW. As with all entries on the RHS of Table 2, 
these transfer payments are denominated in USD and must be converted (by the foreign central 
bank) to LCU in order to be absorbed into the local economy (whether it’s by government 
purchases, programs, cash hand-outs, or any other means).  
To reflect the transfer payments (known as Foreign Assistance Spending, or FAS, for 
short), row 3 of Table 2 was inserted which splits U.S. government spending into a domestic 
portion, (1 − 𝛾). 𝐺$ and a foreign portion, 𝛾. 𝐺$ and allocates the foreign portion to the ROW 
economy (after converting the funds from USD to LCU), making ROW government spending 
equal to 𝐺𝑙𝑐𝑢 + 𝛾. 𝐺$. 𝑥𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢. 𝛾 is assumed to be 10%, and both U.S. and ROW government 
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spending (𝐺$, 𝐺𝐿𝐶𝑈) are exogenously fixed at 16.  For completeness, (11) and (13) are augmented 
to include this additional transfer payment and become: 
𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐶𝑈 ≡ 𝑋𝐿𝐶𝑈 − 𝐼𝑀𝐿𝐶𝑈 + 𝑟$,𝑡−1. 𝐵𝐿𝐶𝑈,$,t−1. 𝑥𝑟$ + 𝑟𝐿𝐶𝑈,t−1. 𝐵$,𝐿𝐶𝑈,t−1 +𝑟$,t−1. 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝐿𝐶𝑈,$,t−1. 𝑥𝑟$ + 𝛾. 𝐺$. 𝑥𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢  (11b) 




1.5 Solutions to the Main Model 
1.51 Practical implications 
Simulations start from full stationary steady states, then the introduction a perturbation, 
and last an evaluation of the sequence of events. Specifically, I am looking to identify new 
stationary or quasi-stationary states, or at the very least interpret the resulting instability in a 
clear and coherent fashion.  
While no economy is ever (or will ever) be observed in steady state, positing the 
existence of this particular hypothetical is helpful when looking at the resulting behavior as it 
helps us see the impact of a perturbation on a "healthy" economy, ceteris paribus. Baseline 
scenarios function as a benchmark to facilitate drawing cogent conclusions from our simulation 
or model. In all scenarios, each country is modelled to be at a steady state for the first five 
periods. At period 5, there is a shock to the variable denoting U.S. foreign assistance spending, 𝛾, 
representing the U.S. starting its transfer payment spending abroad, which continues with the 
same amount each year thereafter.  
In the first model explored, Model FASFIX, the ROW experiences a transfer payment 
from the U.S. (the perturbation), which is sustained indefinitely. Figure 1 shows how this transfer 
payment impacts the ROW CAB, GDP, and budget deficit: 
Since—in addition to a fixed exchange rate regime—monetary and fiscal policy are held 
exogenous as well, U.S. FAS can’t help but increase the ROW current account balance (CAB). 
The impact on ROW CAB is the direct impact of U.S. FAS: by definition as transfer payments 
are positive entries in the CAB. As can be expected, the ROW government budget balance 
increases (meaning lower government deficits) as greater economic activity translates to greater 
tax receipts with no greater outlay of government spending (as it is held constant for ROW). 
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Indirectly, U.S. FAS increases both ROW purchases of foreign assets (net accumulation 
of financial assets—net of official reserve accumulations, especially) and ROW purchases of 
foreign services (imports). Both of these are due to the positive ROW income elasticities with 
respect to imports and financial assets (U.S. Treasuries and ROW Treasuries both). While the 
demand for imports settles to a new level and remains there (with a negative trade balance as a 
result), the net accumulation of financial assets increases every period up until the ROW 
household wealth target is achieved and then settles back to zero halfway through the simulation.  
Figure 2 shows how the process can continue indefinitely: the current account balance for 
ROW can and will increase in so long as U.S. FAS keeps coming. Unlike monetarist models, 
there is a definitive lack of an automatic adjustment mechanism. Initially, the CAB closely 
follows the trade balance (plus the direct U.S. FAS injection, a perennial constant). However, 
once a significant amount of U.S. Treasuries are accumulated by the ROW (see the green dotted 
line in Figure 3), the interest payments on those holdings (while small, in the order of 2-3%) add 
up, generating  
Figure 1: Impact of FAS on ROW External Variables, 




larger and larger payment flows from the U.S. to ROW and resulting in something akin to a 
'Nike’ style swoosh curve.  
The shape of the ROW current account balance is because the positive ROW net 
accumulation of financial assets negatively impacts the ROW current account balance 
immediately and offsets some of the accumulating interest receipts from ROW holdings of U.S. 
Treasuries. Once changes in ROW household wealth revert to zero, ROW net financial 
accumulation of assets also reverts to zero, and the ROW CAB starts to grow exponentially. 
Once NAFA is zero, the current account tracks the governmental (central bank included) 
accumulation of foreign assets exactly. Governments accumulate assets in the form of foreign 
reserves, or U.S. Treasuries.  
Contrary to alternative models and frameworks, this process can and does continue indefinitely. 
ROW central banks fulfil their goals of monetary stability, absorbing excess liquidity in their 
economies. To check that ROW central bank is doing its job, Figure 2 shows the evolution of the 




ROW stock of money (LCUs) in the blue dotted line. After some very slight positive changes to 
the issuance of LCUs, the change in ROW money supply reverts to zero and stays there 
indefinitely. The ROW government is experiencing a current account surplus, a governmental 
surplus, and accumulating international reserves at an exponential basis—all the while holding 
money supply constant. The constant money supply is made possible through the 
Figure 4: Impact FAS on ROW and U.S. Debt-to-GDP, 
Fixed Exchange Rate.. 
Figure 3: Impact of FAS on ROW rGDP and U.S. rGDP, 
Fixed Exchange Rate. 
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“compensation” undertaken by the ROW central bank when they decrease their own holdings of 
ROW Treasuries. As Figure 2 shows, this compensation matches the reserve accumulation 
dollar-for-dollar.  
Figure 3 shows the direct impact on ROW GDP: a ~3% increase immediately felt (within 
3-5 periods) and a ~4% level increase in the LR. In Model FASFIX, the U.S. decreases 
government spending domestically retained. So too, GDP decreases. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the negatives in this dynamic: U.S. GDP decreases and is at a lower 
steady state (3% lower), with increasing U.S. debt-to-GDP ratios, growing exponentially. This 
path is sustainable only because the USD is internationalized and the U.S. Treasury is seen as 
one of the safest and most liquid assets.  
To sum up, U.S. FAS transfer payments increase ROW disposable income, increasing 
consumption and output through the multiplier effect. Increased ROW income leads to increased 
imports (U.S. exports) to the ROW from the U.S., as well as increased wealth targets by ROW 
households and increasing wealth accumulation behaviour. The mechanisms here are similar to 
those that would cascade from a tax break, large government program, natural resource windfall, 
or any other positive income shock event.  
1.52 Theoretical implications 
As more U.S. FAS flows into the ROW government, additional dollars are exchanged by 
the ROW central government for LCUs. ROW central banks find themselves with a rising 
stockpile of dollars, which they use to purchase U.S. Treasuries. The U.S. is not financing its 
deficit through luring ROW central bankers to purchase U.S. Treasuries, nor does the ROW 
central bank “intervene” in any undue way. The ROW central bank undertakes normal monetary 
operations (exchanging USD to LCU and purchasing U.S. Treasuries with excess USD), and the 
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result is that the U.S. Treasuries are purchased by ROW central banks and the (official) U.S. 
capital account surplus then offsets the U.S. current account deficit.  
 The ROW central bank, like its U.S. counterpart, is in charge of keeping interest rates 
constant, which is exactly what it’s doing by selling ROW Treasuries as they purchase U.S. 
Treasuries on the open market. As the ROW governmental budget balance increases (and budget 
deficit is eliminated), the ROW central bank draws down on its holdings of domestic bills (since 
less are created every period). As excess foreign currency is sold to central banks, central banks 
use it to purchase foreign reserves. In this way, this model exemplifies the compensation thesis 
(Berger 1972; Lavoie 2001), wherein any excess liquidity created by rising reserves is 
immediately offset by decreased claims on the domestic economy.  
The reverse is true about the U.S. economy: the decrease in GDP causes a temporary and 
slight dip in the U.S. money supply and U.S. central bank holdings of U.S. Treasuries. However, 
these revert to zero after the new equilibrium level of GDP is found (about 3% lower). The 
USD’s status as international currency means that the U.S. central bank (Fed) doesn’t need to 
intervene/sterilize/compensate in order to keep money supply constant. The U.S. Treasury 
provides the counterpart to the current account deficit—there’s no need for holding or drawing 
down reserve holdings. 
The FAS flows do not directly impact private wealth flows at all. Private disposable 
income of both U.S. and ROW households is not influenced by ROW’s receipt of U.S. FAS. If 
the U.S. were to relax fiscal policy sufficiently such that GDP does not decrease (the only 
plausible scenario, explored in Model cFASFIX below), the main impact would be that U.S. 
trade and governmental deficits would be even greater than they already become within this 
 
43 
paradigm. However, what would be the impact for the households and businesses in the U.S. and 
ROW? 
U.S. households, still producing the same amount, will be consuming domestically 
(absorbing) more than they produce. ROW households, with their twin surpluses (trade & 
government), will be absorbing less than they produce, but still consume more than before. All 
the while, ROW governments’ budget balances decrease and foreign reserves stockpile. The 
process can and seems to be continuing indefinitely: many countries experience a raft of benefits 
(greater consumption, greater imports, greater private wealth accumulation, higher foreign 
reserve stockpile, lower government deficits); U.S. citizens enjoy greater consumption today at 
the expense of increasingly higher debt-to-GDP ratios and its corresponding mountainous pile of 
debt; the U.S. government experiences greater influence abroad to advance U.S. interests (a 
stated strategic aim of the U.S. State Department); U.S. trade balance is artificially propped up 
(still in deficit, but not near what it would be without U.S. FAS); and there is greater demand for, 
therefore lower yields on, U.S. Treasuries (greater valuation of U.S. Treasuries). 
1.6 Compensated Foreign Assistance Spending 
Let us now assume that the U.S. decides not to lower its domestic government spending 
as a way to finance their foreign assistance spending (FAS), but instead increases government 
spending by exactly the amount of the FAS. This is the more probable story.  
To set-up Model cFASFIX (compensated Foreign Assistance Spending under a FIXed 
exchange rate regime), I simply change the perturbation so that it is now two perturbations: one 
increasing U.S. transfer payments to ROW and one augmenting of U.S. government spending by 
the exact amount of those U.S. transfer payments (FAS). This would amount to the new 
Compensated FAS(CFAS), so that 𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑆 = (1 + 𝛾). 𝐺$ now. 
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As was the case before, this can go on forever. The yearly U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio may 
increase but, at the same time, both U.S. and ROW GDP increase, U.S. trade balance increases, 
ROW’s wealth increases (for households and the governments), and ROW’s foreign reserve 
stockpile increases. The (compensated) FAS (CFAS) shock will result in a higher steady state 
level of income for both the U.S. and ROW in a dynamic which can continue indefinitely with 
little-to-no immediate negative consequence to either party.  
1.61 Practical implications 
As before, simulations start from a full stationary steady. Afterward the perturbation, the 
sequence of events is analysed. In this second exhibit, ROW experiences a transfer payment from 
the U.S. which is maintained indefinitely. Fiscal policy for the U.S. is exogenously shocked so 
that U.S. domestic government spending—and U.S. output—is no longer directly impacted 
only—by U.S. FAS.  
Figure 5 shows the consequences of U.S. FAS on ROW CAB, ROW central bank reserve 
holdings, ROW central bank holdings of ROW treasuries, and the ROW money supply. Figure 5 
also shows a similar story as Figure 2, wherein excess USDs are traded to the central bank, who 
stores them as U.S. Treasuries. Excess liquidity is absorbed by ROW central bank through the 
sale of ROW Treasuries, keeping interest rates constant. The supply of (Local Currency Units) 
LCUs increases slightly (as new wealth targets are set and achieved) but then returns to zero and 
stays there for the remainder of the simulation—as before, the supply of LCUs does not change, 
the indirect consequence of the central bank’s interest rate stabilization policies. 
Figure 5 shows a ‘swoosh-like’ ROW CAB, in that there’s an immediate shock to the CAB 
(which is identity-related) followed by a small dip, and then a convex function. This is because 
the positive shock to ROW net accumulation of foreign assets (see the red line in Figure 6) is not 
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only larger in magnitude but longer in duration. This is because there is no longer depressed 
economic activity within the U.S. as a result of U.S. FAS. U.S. CFAS allows for 𝐺$ and 𝑌𝐷$ to 
stay the same, which translates to the same import volume (as opposed to smaller import 
volumes in Model FASFIX), but this time with even higher wealth targets for the ROW citizens 
and, therefore, a longer period of accelerating household wealth accumulation until they reach 
their higher wealth-to-income ratio target.  
Figure 6 also shows the persistently positive U.S. trade balance that results from U.S. 
FAS year after year. The U.S. experiences a twin deficit—current account and government 
budget deficits—while U.S. net accumulation of foreign assets (household wealth accumulation) 
increases slightly then returns to zero. The increase in U.S. NAFA is due to the larger U.S. 




export volume, which targets temporarily increasing U.S. GDP, incomes, and U.S. household 
wealth-to-income ratio. The U.S. current account balance remains in deficit, while the overall 
government sector keeps selling assets on an equivalent scale, which is why U.S. CAB comes to 
match U.S. government budget balance exactly, once ROW NAFA goes back to zero. 
1.62 Theoretical implications 
As before, ROW central banks, now awash with USD, see a small opportunity: they can 
either store the USD as cash reserves, earning no interest, or they can purchase U.S. treasuries 
and earn interest. While the interest paid on U.S. treasuries is small, when applied to large 
stockpiles of millions, billions, or even trillions of U.S. treasuries, interest payments can add up 
to something significant. So, ROW central banks store all excess USD as U.S. treasuries. 
Purchasing U.S. treasuries increases the demand for U.S. treasury market, and seeing as all 
treasuries (both U.S. and ROW) are settled relative to one another, excess demand on the U.S. 
treasury market results in depreciated (Local Currency Units) LCUs / appreciated USDs. ROW 
central banks decide: (a) do nothing, allowing exchange rate to depreciate, or (b) sell their own 




(ROW) treasuries. It is in this way that exchange rate management guides the impact of U.S. 
FAS receipt.  
Given a spending influx and a fixed exchange rate, the regular mechanisms of wealth 
accumulation and standard central banking operations result in foreign households' increased 
import appetite as well as increased rates of net foreign asset accumulation. To preserve a fixed 
exchange, the foreign central banks must intervene. Were ROW central banks to abandon their 
defence of their exchange rate and refuse to accelerate their accumulation of foreign reserves, the 
LCU exchange rate would adjust to a level where a quasi-stationary state may emerge. 
ROW households do require a few periods before the full impact of the U.S. spending 
takes effect. The U.S. aid and foreign assistance spending will impact government initially, then 
firms, then households. Larger incomes lead to greater consumption as well as higher wealth 
targets. Larger ROW household consumption is what drives the multiplier process: extra income 
translating to extra consumption resulting in, unsurprisingly, extra income in turn. Typical of any 
Keynesian multiplier, this process continues indefinitely but we can approximate its effect. ROW 
central bank purchases LCU treasuries, alleviating demand pressures internationally, depressing 
their currency—and also accumulate foreign reserves with excess USD on-hand due to the direct 
and indirect consequences of U.S. FAS. 
All economies are assumed to be overdraft economies, the status quo for most modern 
central banks. Overdraft economies explicitly have no control over high powered money but 
influence control over the credit markets and target interest rates, a reflection of how central 




1.7 Flexible Exchange Rate Closure 
Let us now assume that the ROW central bank is unwilling to defend their fixed 
exchange rate (for whatever reason) and makes no reserve transactions. As U.S. spending in 
ROW increases, U.S. net financial asset purchases increase. Changing demand for U.S. treasuries 
will impact the exchange rate.  
To make this change, equation (59) is altered such that the LHS is now 0 (no reserve 
transactions means Δ𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢,$𝑑 = 0); changes in ROW money supply match exactly changes in 
ROW Treasuries. The last item on the RHS of equation (59) is also zeroed, as 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢,$𝑠,−1  (the 
supply of U.S. treasuries to ROW) is unchanged each period. Therefore equation (59), 
reproduced below, 
 Δ𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢,$𝑑 = Δ𝐻𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠 − Δ𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑 + Δ𝑥𝑟$. 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,$,t−1𝑠  (59) 
becomes 
 Δ𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑 = Δ𝐻𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠  (59f) 
A new issue emerges: 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢 appears on the LHS of our system of equations more than 
once and needs further restriction. Without the room to drop an equation (and under-identify the 
model), we simply invert the troublesome equation (55): 
 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑 = 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠  (55) 
to  
 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠 = 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑  (55f) 
 
49 
Now, we are not out of the woods—𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠  now appears on the LHS of two equations. 
The equation determining the supply of ROW Treasuries is defined by equation (58), 
 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠 = 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠 − 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠 − 𝐵$,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠  (58) 
which must now be changed to equation (58f) by moving 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠  to the RHS: 
 𝐵$,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠 = 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠 − 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠 − 𝐵𝑐𝑏𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠  (58f) 
Lastly, we must rewrite equation (51) to (51f) to move 𝐵$,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠 to the RHS: 
 𝐵$,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠 = 𝐵$,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑 . 𝑥𝑟$ (51) 
 𝑥𝑟$ = 𝐵$,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑑 /𝐵$,𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑠  (51f) 
1.71 Practical implications 
Simulations start from a full stationary steady. After the perturbation, the sequence of 
events is analysed. In Model FASFLEX, ROW once again experiences a transfer payment from 
the U.S. which is maintained indefinitely. Fiscal policy for the U.S. is held constant, meaning 
U.S. output is directly and negatively impacted by U.S. FAS. With ROW government spending, 
ROW interest rates, and ROW reserve holdings all held fixed, the added pressure of foreign net 
accumulation of foreign assets is reflected in the adjustment of the exchange rate, as detailed 
above. 
After the spontaneous rise in U.S. FAS, ROW income and CAB increase as U.S. FAS is a 
transfer payment. Immediately, private income and official budget flows are impacted. Figure 7 
shows the consequences of U.S. FAS on ROW CAB, ROW central bank reserve holdings, Local 
Currency Unit (LCU) exchange rate (one LCU in USDs), and the ROW money supply. ROW 
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government experiences a higher budget surplus, while ROW imports increase (due to larger 
ROW income), depressing the ROW trade balance. Higher incomes for ROW households 
translate to higher wealth-to-income target ratios and faster accumulation of assets by ROW 
households (as well as both ROW Treasuries and U.S. Treasuries). The net change in demand for 
foreign assets causes the LCU to appreciate in order to clear all asset markets simultaneously.  
The LCU will continue to appreciate until the ROW balance of payments finds its way 
back to zero (its initial steady state value). If the ROW balance of payments is non-zero, the 
balance of payments generates changes in net demand of LCU treasuries in each country and—
barring foreign reserves, ROW government spending, or ROW interest rate changes—the LCU 
must appreciate to equilibrate the asset markets.  
Keep in mind that the LCU is not the only thing to change; absolute and relative prices of 
imports and exports change, impacting trade volumes, impacting income flows, influencing 
wealth allocation decisions, which, in turn, influence the CAB. For this process to stop: the 
change of all stock variables must equal zero.  
Figure 7 illustrates the processes described above: an exponentially increasing ROW 
government surplus, a new quasi-steady state ROW trade balance, a short-lived ROW CAB 
spike and an appreciating LCU. The LCU reflects the ROW CAB, so a decreasing CAB at a 
decreasing rate means an increasing LCU exchange rate also at a decreasing rate. Once the ROW 
CAB finds its way back to zero, the LCU stops appreciating, but only after a hefty 30% 
appreciation, enough to destabilize any export-oriented economy14.  
 
14 Future research will better calibrate the ROW economy to reflect greater economic reliance on exports 
as is often the case of emerging countries. 
 
51 
Figure 8 shows the impact of U.S. FAS on both the U.S. and ROW real GDP. U.S. GDP 
decreases initially and directly, as U.S. government spending is partly diverted abroad without 
replacement. Then, U.S. GDP increases steadily until ROW CAB stabilizes, ending up at a 
quasi-steady state value about 2% higher than initially and 4% higher than the lowest point. 
Figure :  Figure 7: Impact of FAS on ROW External Vars, Flexible 
Exchange Rate 




ROW GDP increases by the 2% that the U.S. initially decreases when U.S. FAS kicks in, but 
then settles back to around the exact same GDP as before when the quasi-steady state is reached 
once CAB reaches zero. Figure 9 shows the long-term impact of U.S. FAS. U.S. debt-to-GDP 
increases slightly initially and continues to increase, without settling at a new quasi-steady state. 
ROW debt-to-GDP decreases and continues to decrease. The non-mirroring behaviour of the 
U.S. and ROW debt-to-GDP is due to the LCU appreciation influencing how the ROW debt-to-
GDP shows up on a USD graph.  
1.72 Theoretical implications1 
The resulting dynamics from a flexible exchange rate adjustment, as shown above, are 
similar to those seen if the ROW government reacted to the U.S. transfer payments by decreasing 
their government expenditures by a corresponding amount. ROW prices of imports (relative to 
exports) fall, increasing ROW real imports given constant ROW real exports. The ROW terms of 
trade continue to improve as the LCU appreciates further, until the ROW CAB finds its way 
back to zero and all changes in stock-flow variables revert to zero, too. Prices adjust, altering 
Figure 9: Impact of FAS on U.S. & ROW Debt-to-GDP, 
Flexible Exchange Rate 
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trade flows, incomes, wealth target ratios, and so on until a quasi-steady state is reached, with a 
lower output than initially. 
Compare these forced appreciations to the forced depreciation that would occur should 
the ROW experience a positive shock to its import propensity. A spontaneous rise in ROW 
imports would negatively impact ROW current account, trade, and government budget balances, 
causing net changes in the supply of ROW Treasury supplies, then equilibrated by a depreciated 
LCU exchange rate (or change in ROW reserves in a fixed exchange rate regime model).  
1.8 Compensated Flexible Exchange Rate Closure 
Let us, once again, assume that the U.S. increases its government spending by exactly the 
amount of the FAS. To set-up Model cFASFLEX (compensated Foreign Assistance Spending 
under a FLEXible exchange rate regime), I simply change the perturbation to include an 
augmentation of U.S. government spending (𝐺$; 16) that is exactly equivalent to the amount 
diverted abroad (by simply changing 𝐹𝐴𝑆 =  𝛾. 𝐺$ = 0.1 ∗ 16 = 1.6) to get 𝐺$𝑎 = 16 + 1.6 =17.6 ) as before) 
1.81 Practical implications 
Figure 10 shows a similar story to Figure 7, except now the ROW government budget 
balance increases at an increasing rate, growing to yearly budget surplus nearly twice what it was 
in Model FASFLEX, where the same 10% of U.S. government spending is FAS but now U.S. 
government spending total increases by that 10%, so domestic U.S. government spending is 
unchanged.  
The ROW CAB has a positive shock that’s slightly larger and of longer duration than 
before (due to the fact that no decreased U.S. government spending translates to no U.S. 
recession and no decrease in U.S. import volume/value). Without the compensation, U.S. import 
demand wanes which shrinks ROW export volume and adds negative pressure on the U.S. CAB. 
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So, the FAS’ impact (a positive entry itself in the CAB as a transfer payment) is no longer pulled 
down by the decrease in U.S. imports/ROW exports. This can be seen by the larger trade deficit 
(negative trade balance), which is persistent in the quasi-steady state that emerges once changes 
in ROW CAB cease to be non-zero. 
With U.S. imports no longer decreasing and the positive spike in ROW CAB larger, it is 
no surprise that the LCU exchange rate appreciates to the order of 50% instead of 30%. It also 
takes a bit longer than in the uncompensated model (Model FASFLEX).  
Figure 11 shows a very interesting dynamic: U.S. real GDP increases (this time by 10%) 
while ROW GDP increases and then goes back to its initial steady state value (when measured in 
USD). Now, U.S. real GDP increases because of the perturbation: in the compensated version of 
the simulations, any U.S. foreign assistance spending increase also increases total U.S. 
government spending. As U.S. government spending is a part of expenditure-side GDP 
accounting, GDP increases. The more interesting thing is the fact that the recipient/host countries 
(ROW) experience only a slight increase in real GDP before returning to their original steady 
state. In these simulations, U.S. aid spending abroad has no long-term positive impact on GDP—
a finding that corroborates the lack of any empirical support for the aid-growth link.  
Figure 12 shows long-term repercussions that are much milder for the U.S.: a debt-to-
GDP ratio that increases but at a very mild and linear trend (only .1 over 50 periods; starts at 1.5 





Figure 11: Impact of CFAS on U.S. & ROW rGDP, Flexible Exchange Rate 
  






U.S. FAS, whether compensated or not, is a public flow of funds from the U.S. to a 
foreign country and can have important financial and monetary repercussions. In the normal 
course of defensive actions, central banks wishing to keep their exchange rates managed 
neutralize any impact that the public flow injection (U.S. FAS) may have on the financial system 
(Godley & Lavoie, 2003). Central banks will expand their balance sheet to absorb or compensate 
for the public flow, either with repos or some other mechanism(Godley & Lavoie, 2003). Action 
is needed to keep both the exchange rate and the overnight lending rate (the base rate of any 
financial system) stable and within the targeted ranges (Godley & Lavoie, 2003). 
I presented a two-block model that makes up the entire world. The model is set up with 
one block, the “U.S”., and another block, “ROW”. Goods are freely traded and financial assets 
(although imperfect substitutes) are freely exchanged. The ROW economies are overdraft 
monetary set-ups with central banks that use U.S. Treasuries as reserve assets. All models within 
Figure 12: Impact of CFAS on U.S. & ROW Debt-to-GDP, 
Flexible Exchange Rate 
 
57 
are rigorously defined with double entry, “watertight” accounting between countries and between 
stocks/flows. Income, consumption, and wealth, as well as government budget balances, trade 
balances, money supplies, and asset stocks are all endogenously determined. The models are 
solved dynamically over time. 
The U.S. has been and continues to be the largest foreign aid provider. The impact of 
these transfer payments on foreign countries are felt in direct and indirect ways. The results from 
the dynamics modelled are most likely a lower bound, as there are numerous indirect benefits of 
receiving U.S. aid and integrating oneself with the U.S. global military security theatre. In fact, 
preliminary research suggests that U.S. aid and U.S. foreign military presence positively 
influences sovereign credit ratings and U.S. FDI, showing just two of the indirect impacts of U.S. 
foreign involvement.  
1.91 Caveats 
Readers may be wondering to themselves: why doesn’t the U.S. just pay FAS in LCUs? 
Wouldn’t that prevent this sequence of events from occurring? Well, not quite.  
Most direct purchases and payments from the U.S. to aid recipients are made with local 
currency. The U.S. Agency for International Development has also created and maintained local 
currency trusts within many ROW countries—within or in coordination with the banks of 
ROW—which may be used to pay part or all USAID-related payments15. Further, these local 
currency trust have arrangements with their host country's ROW central banks to provide 
expedited U.S. treasuries and other settlement tools. The U.S. Department of Defense 
 
15 U.S. Agency for International Development Automated Directive Systems 627 details currency trusts 




comptroller has policies requiring the U.S. to pay ROW (all foreign) contractors in LCU (local 
currency units) unless there is a particular circumstance that warrants USD substitution (U.S. 
AID (2014)).  
However, even if most or all of U.S. FAS was denominated in LCU, there is still the 
matter of the indirect impact on asset demands. Regardless of denomination, ROW household 
wealth increases, so ROW NAFA increases, and ROW holdings of ROW and U.S. treasuries 
increase. One feature of all stock-flow consistent models is that governmental treasuries are sold 
only to cover ROW governmental budget deficits. As such, ROW treasuries supplied are 
exogenous, with the exchange rate determined both by the demand for ROW treasuries, the 
demand for U.S. treasuries, and the supply of U.S. treasuries.  
The U.S. central bank is assumed to be largely passive, and so U.S. treasuries are 
likewise assumed exogenous. In this way, we can think of the exchange rate—which is both 
determined by, and determining of, many (simultaneous) equations — as the balance between 
the demand for U.S. treasuries and demand for ROW treasuries, ceteris paribus16, particularly 
with regards to given supply levels of U.S. and ROW treasuries. Higher demand for U.S. and 
ROW treasuries by the ROW citizens will catalyse exchange rate pressures that will not be 
resolved on their own and can continue indefinitely if the ROW central bank does not intervene.   
Normal operations by ROW's central bank result in the ROW central bank selling some 
of their ROW treasuries, to alleviate the renewed demand pressure for their own ROW 
government treasuries. They do this in the normal course of inflation targeting, as well as to 
 
16 None of the models within this paper corroborate this “ceteris paribus” clause, as U.S. foreign 
assistance spending will always result in an increase in the U.S. deficit, which, in turn, increases 
yearly U.S. treasury bill supply as the U.S. government borrows to cover its fiscal outlays not 
generated through tax revenue.  
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allow ROW households the freedom to allocate their wealth according to their Tobinesque asset 
demand. In order to nullify the upward pressures on the ROW exchange rate, the ROW central 
bank must enter the ROW government treasury market and act as a lender of last resort. Though 
no banking panic has ensued, ROW's central bank must meet the liquidity shortage posed by the 
renewed demand for ROW treasuries or face the consequence of a stronger exchange rate.    
It is important to bear in mind that both the ROW central bank and households 
accumulate U.S. treasuries because of U.S. foreign assistance spending. Indeed, the models here 
corroborate that ROW households do accumulate more U.S. assets (ROW households increase 
their net accumulation of U.S. assets). Larger incomes and larger asset appetites result from 
receiving foreign assistance spending. ROW's central banks accumulate U.S. treasuries because 
it is preferable to holding cash on their balance sheets—and just as liquid.  
So, ultimately, the denomination of U.S. FAS is of little import; it is the effect of wealth 
accumulation that destabilizes the equilibrium of the treasury’s markets in both economies. 
While the positive demand shocks of ROW may not be sufficient to sizeably impact—
individually—the U.S. Treasury bill market, I posit that the aggregated value of all countries' 
who receive U.S. foreign assistance spending is of economic significance. 
1.911 Dollarization 
Some countries choose to use the U.S. dollar as their domestic currency. This would alter 
the impact of the dynamics when receiving U.S. transfer payments. While the direct impact on 
foreign imports (increase) and net financial accumulation (also increase), the indirect impact that 
results from the central banks need to balance its supply and demand for its own financial assets 
will no longer be observed. Less money would be returned to the U.S., at least immediately. 
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Depending on how closely trade and financial markets are tied, the long-term impact could be of 
no substantial difference.  
1.912 Infrastructure spill over 
As stated in Section 4, infrastructure externality/spill-over effects are not the focus of this 
paper. As of yet, the degree of infrastructure accumulation abroad from foreign assistance 
spending receipts has yet to be empirically established. Aschauer (1989) looks at how, whether, 
and under what conditions public spending could be productive domestically in the U.S. 
Calderon (2015) perform a large cross-country analysis on the output elasticity of infrastructure 
input and find the elasticity to be statistically and economically significant (0.07-0.10). So, while 
there may be good reason to include infrastructure spill over effects, doing so would further 
complicate the model by adding yet another stock-flow process and all the variables that come 
with that. While capital accumulation is a vital part of economic development, this paper focuses 
on the monetary consequences of foreign assistance spending rather than the growth 
consequences, and so the exclusion of physical capital (and infrastructure) is permissible given 
the already extensive nature of the models. 
1.913 Labor Endogeneity 
The economies are assumed to not be at full employment. Since this paper is looking at 
the monetary consequences, the exogeneity and level of employment does not play a role. So 
long as ROW economies are not simultaneously and consistently at or near full employment, the 
results within should not significantly change due to the inclusion of an endogenous labor 
supply. Were economies to be coordinated in their full employment, U.S. transfer payments 
would still impact ROW import demand and asset demand behaviour.  
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The issue stems from the possibility that ROW labor supply is, in fact, both endogenous 
and at a level below full employment. Future research should endogenize the labor supply and 
start the ROW economy at a level of employment below that of the U.S., to better reflect a real-
world starting scenario.  
1.914 FDI & Crowding Out 
U.S. transfer payments can, under the right circumstances, crowd out private investment 
in the host/recipient country. This possibility is low, due to the undeveloped and shallow 
financial markets that exist in most host/recipient countries.  
A greater possibility is that U.S. transfer payments spur additional FDI, which does 
crowd out private domestic investment within the host/recipient country. Currently, the models 
are pure service economies, meaning that they use no capital/inventory and as such the need for 
FDI (investing or receiving) is non-existent. Including a more realistic business sector, with asset 
allocation demand functions similar to those of households, would allow for a more complicated 
analysis of U.S. transfer payments and their long-term impact on the host/recipient country. For 
the moment, inclusion of greater FDI flows inflates the existing impact and adds little to the 
overall analysis.  
1.92 Concluding Remarks 
Model FASFIX shows that the U.S. can feasibly and without penalty run a twin deficit 
situation perennially. Model cFASFIX doubles down on that lesson: the U.S. can easily control 
its high-powered money and interest rate, and not only that, but the U.S. can also run and 
exacerbate a twin deficit through deficit spending. 
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In addition, if the U.S. is the hegemon of the world, U.S. deficits are required to assure 
full employment in the ROW17. Otherwise, ROW governments are forced to run their own 
government deficits, drawing down reserves and hoping that they won’t have to resort to central 
bank swaps or, in the worst-case scenario, IMF agreements. The U.S. twin deficit is the condition 
that allows for ROW full employment to exist alongside positive ROW government budget 
balances.  
The other lesson is that U.S. transfer payments drive ROW to experience both trade and 
government budget surpluses, with no destabilization of the LCU money supply, the LCU 
exchange rate, or the ROW interest rate.  
Consider the alternative—were the ROW to spend the U.S. transfer payments without 
intervention, the balance of payments deficit would either: (a) erode official reserves, (b) depress 
fiscal policy, (c) constrain monetary policy, (d) force central bank authorities to abandon their 
management of the LCU exchange rate target/band. 
In the remainder of the paper, I showed that the main model could be adapted to 
alternative closures, namely a flexible exchange rate closure. In all models some form of quasi-
stability emerged once changes in the current account balance revert to zero. When a foreign 
central bank decides to allow their exchange rates to adjust, the dynamics change greatly for 
ROW. ROW income increases only temporarily in Models FASFLEX and CFASFLEX (Figure 8 
on p52 and Figure 11on p55). In the first model, where U.S. government spending stays constant 
but some is diverted abroad, ROW GDP initially by the direct injection amount (97.5, the initial 
steady-state rGDP, increases by 1.6 to 99.35, as 10% of U.S. government spending, which is 16, 
 
17 Thank you to Ramaa Vasudevan for this important point. 
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is 1.6) and then decreases within forty to fifty periods back to the initial value of 97.5. There are 
no long-term income gains for ROW when the exchange rate is allowed to adjust. Figure 11 
shows the same picture, except that U.S. rGDP grows by nearly 12%! ROW rGDP increases by 
the same 1.6 as before to 99.35 and then returns to 97.5, its initial value, once the exchange rate 
reaches its new, higher, equilibrium value.  
The results of Models CFASFIX and CFASFLEX are outer bounds for what impact U.S. 
FAS may have on the ROW economy. Most central banks are not strict in their exchange rate 
management policies, allowing for some float while targeting a band of values. ROW net 
accumulation of foreign assets can spike and then return to zero (in Models FASFIX and 
CFASFIX) or they can decrease at an increasing rate, never returning to a steady state (as in 
Models FASFLEX and CFASFLEX). Only in the least realistic model (that of FASFIX) does 
ROW rGDP increase and stay higher. In all other models, ROW rGDP increases only 
temporarily and then returns to its initial steady state value. It seems that U.S. FAS, due to the 
nature of the international monetary system, is U.S.-enriching while neutral to ROW income.  
It is not to say that ROW does not benefit whatsoever: in all scenarios, ROW government 
budget balance increases, meaning that the yearly governmental deficit is lower. This makes 
sense, as U.S. FAS can easily be used to fund government projects, a situation known as 
“fungibility” in the foreign aid literature. If ROW central bank decides to tend more towards 
defending their fixed exchange rate, ROW international reserves increase, which can be useful 
up until a certain point. After a certain adequacy level, international reserves fail to be as much 
of a priority for developing and emerging countries. ROW trade balance always decreases by 
some small amount and finds a new quasi-stationary value, while U.S. trade balance always 
increases by the same amount.  
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U.S. rGDP increases in three of the four simulations and increases by nearly 12% in 
Model CFASFLEX. This increase in income is not without cost: U.S. debt-to-GDP is always 
increasing (in all four models) and U.S. government debt is also constantly increasing (meaning 
the government is constantly running a deficit). These last two things have been historically true 
for the U.S. in the past thirty years, largely the result of its status as the international lender of 
last resort and sole mint of the world international reserve currency and asset.  
Future research and modelling concerning U.S. transfer payments will require increasing 
the complexity of business sectors both for the U.S. and ROW. Sectoral concerns are integral to 
explaining the effectiveness of different types of aid. U.S. transfer payments may also alleviate 
or exacerbate Minskyian/Kindleberger dynamics that other stock-flow consistent analyses find 
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Within this paper, I test how U.S. military aid and economic aid separately and in 
conjunction impact economic growth. U.S. security integration is purported to enhance regional 
security, and therefore indirectly affecting economic growth. This study seeks to ascertain 
whether aid-dependence, hosting a U.S. military base, and signing security-related agreements 
with the U.S. positively correlate with recipient per-capita GDP growth. The aid-growth 
literature has only managed to show the statistical insignificance of aid on its impact on growth 
and economic development. U.S. aid is no exception. By disaggregating aid, a different picture 
emerges: military aid spent in conjunction with signed security agreements does increase 
economic growth, but only slightly. In general, there is a much larger negative impact on growth 
from signing military security-related treaties and hosting U.S. military bases, individually. Aid 
spent on infrastructure and productive investment projects, consistent with the literature, fails to 
show any statistically significant impact on economic growth. Over long periods of time, 
military aid and U.S. security integration negatively impact economic growth.  
2.1 Introduction 
What are the channels through which U.S. aid promotes lasting economic growth? 
Interest in this question stems from a rich history of nation-building and subsequent analysis of 
its effectiveness. While the literature on military aid and intervention constrains its analysis to 
places and years where U.S. military aid, economic aid, and military intervention occurred, I 
expand this line of inquiry to include situations where no military intervention occurred—despite 
the presence military-related security agreements, political-related security agreements, and the 
presence U.S. military bases. From here on, I use the term “politico-military integration” to 
express when countries: (1) receive U.S. economic aid, (2) receive U.S. military aid, and (3) are 
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integrated into the U.S. security apparatus through in-force security agreements and/or U.S. 
military bases.  
Politico-military integration with the U.S. takes many forms, but for the purposes of this 
paper, I limit U.S. security integration to include the presence of at least one military-related 
security agreement. Politico-military integration is different than politico-economic integration, 
as the latter analyzes phenomenon such as taxation, tariffs, quotas, and spending policies in the 
context of their impact on economic development (Frey et al., n.d.). Spending policies of 
recipient/host countries are of little interest in the context of politico-military integration (due to 
the fact that tied aid creates spending obligations). Further, politico-economic integration is 
different from politico-military integration as politico-military integration encompasses concrete 
actions which tie the security and defenses of both countries together—in addition to enmeshing 
two (sometimes disparate) political systems for the purposes of joint policy making. Politico-
economic integration also has elements of political enmeshing but focuses instead on the 
economic interdependence created as a result of joint policy.  
In the limited literature addressing U.S. politico-military integration, U.S. troop 
deployment is often used as the best proxy for U.S. security integration (alongside the 
widespread use of a 100-troop cut-off). However, using a new dataset which accounts for all 
security-related agreements (including those which detail the barracking of U.S. troops and/or 
hosting of U.S. bases), I find that the type of security integration matters—even holding the 
number of U.S. military bases constant.  
U.S. foreign aid spending started with the Marshall Plan and continues now; U.S. foreign 
aid has been and continues to be one of the largest aid flows globally (Tarnoff & Lawson, 2010). 
U.S. foreign aid peaked during the Marshall Plan period, then trended downward with 
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intermittent spikes caused by the Alliance for Progress18 (1961) and the Camp David Middle 
East Peace Accords (1979) (Tarnoff & Lawson, 2010). 1997 marked the nadir of U.S. aid 
spending, representing near $18B (constant 2010 USD) or 29% of the peak of foreign aid 
committed during the Marshall Plan period.   
The underlying motives of aid spending has changed significantly over the past 75 years: 
the glaring capital deficit in post-WWII Europe during the 1950s, technological gaps in the 
1960s, the reaction to accusations of “aid for inequality”, which led to “aid for equity” in the 
1970s (Fei, 1979; Feng, 2011; Ranis, 1978), balance of payments support/stabilization concerns 
in the 1980s, and structural adjustments in the 1990s (Gunatilake et al., 2015). 
Before the 1990s, Asia received the largest share of aid receipts in aggregate terms from 
donor nations, with Africa a close second. The 1990s saw a shift in the destination of aid, with 
Africa receiving most of the multilateral aid inflows (Gunatilake et al., 2015). Aid spending 
evolved in the 2000s to focus on technical assistance and conditionality lending, as donors and 
recipient nations learned the importance of institutions and how they interact with aid’s 
effectiveness (e.g., Asian Financial Crisis) (Gunatilake et al., 2015). 
After the events of 9/11, U.S. security concerns started to dominate U.S. aid spending. A 
discussion of post-9/11 U.S. security-aid entanglements can be found in “Coalition of the Bribed 
and Bullied?” U.S. Economic Linkage and the Iraq War Coalition, wherein the authors note—
among other things—that many of the countries in the U.S.’s coalition of the willing (COTW) 
 
18 Essentially, a Marshall Plan for Latin America, as a bulwark against creeping communist influence. 
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were, historically, large recipients of U.S. aid (Newnham, 1995). Anecdotal evidence1920 also 
points to the use of U.S. aid for political purposes (Hooker, 1995; Newnham, 2008). The most 
salient example of this would be the failed U.S. attempt to gain access to Turkey in its 2003 
invasion of Iraq; the U.S. wanted to force Saddam into a two-front war and offered Turkey as 
much as $24 billion in aid (Winrow 2006; 200). Turkey’s initial acceptance and subsequent 
congressional veto—and rejection of the $24 billion aid package—negatively impacted the 
Turkish economy21.  
In general, U.S. aid’s focus has pivoted to more military and security related concerns, 
especially in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in the recent decades.  
In this paper, I expand upon the period analyzed in previous analyses of U.S. politico-
military integration to include the post-9/11 period, a period of rapid expansion in both U.S. 
military aid and U.S. security integration activities. I include two new databases: one which 
exhaustively documents all acknowledged or unacknowledged U.S. military bases and another 
which documents and classifies every security-related agreement that the U.S. has ever signed.  
Anecdotally, it seems, U.S. aid allocation and effectiveness is conditional to the security 
salience and foreign policy goals of the U.S. State Department and Department of Defense. The 
preliminary findings corroborate those findings: U.S. military aid and U.S. security integration 
 
19 For instance, Yemen—3 days after voting against the first Gulf War in 1991—lost its entire U.S. aid 
budget after being forewarned that “that would be the most expensive ‘no’ vote you ever cast” 
(Anderson et al. 2003:1) 
20 The exceptions to this rule include Guinea and Cameroon—former French colonies and members of the 
UNSC in early 2003—explicitly agreed to the French anti-war position at the annual summit of French 
and African states in Feb, 2003 (Howorth, 2006) 
21 There was a 25% fall in the Turkish stock market and significant financial outflows as international 
investors questioned the “strategic premium” of Turkish debt, in that the U.S. would keep Turkey 





are bad for growth, in the long-run. When interacted, the coefficient estimate for the interaction 
term is positive, indicating that U.S. military aid is nonlinear in its impact on aid, conditional on 
the degree of U.S. security integration. However, the coefficient estimate on the interaction term 
is quite small, suggesting that the overall growth impact is usually negative.  
2.2 Literature Review 
Foreign aid programs were launched in the 1950s with a broad mandate to alleviate 
poverty and stimulate economic growth (Boone, 1996). Foreign aid increased during the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s, with aid spending increasing yearly until its peak in 1991 when aggregate 
non-military donor aid approximated $50 billion (over 8% of the 1981-90 average of all recipient 
countries' GNP) (Boone, 1996).   
Maizels & Nissanke (1984) are some of the first to model "recipient need", explaining 
multilateral aid by recipient nation characteristics, but fail to do so for bilateral aid flows. Their 
findings are still relevant, showing that multilateral aid flows in the 1970s were generally driven 
by recipients' needs up until the 1980s where aid started more so to reflect donors’ strategic 
interests (Maizels & Nissanke, 1984). This trend accelerates to this day.  
Lumnsdaine (1993) uses simple correlates to investigate some of the most important 
determinants of the direction of aid: colonial history, the democratic status of recipient nations, 
income (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). Consensus in the aid literature is as follows: income levels, 
colonial ties, ex-ante trade flows, strategic interests, and institutional quality determine and 
influence aid flows. But there is little empirical support to rank or quantify the relative 
importance of these five categorical explanations in their impact on aid flows (Alesina & Dollar, 
2000).   
A methodological weakness of the early literature stems from a "chicken and the egg" 
problem: is it aid that disables economic growth or is it that countries with historically low 
 
92 
economic growth receive more aid? This problem still exists and there are a few promising ways 
to tackle it. The lack of a definitive answer in the aid-endogeneity question may be due to the 
exclusion of important security variables in the economics literature, and important economic 
variables in political science / international affairs literature. This research aims to bridge that 
gap.  
When discussing aid, there are a few different types/ways to categorize it. Aid can be 
bilateral or multilateral and can be as broadly categorized as economic aid and military aid. 
Economic aid can be further disaggregated into U.S. foreign assistance, Peace and Security 
assistance, Humanitarian Assistance, Health, Environment, Education, Social Services, 
Economic Growth, Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance, and “Cross-Sectoral” aid. 
There are special aid programs like the “Aid for Trade” (AfT) program, a program to offset free 
trade agreements (e.g., elimination of tariffs). Military aid can be disaggregated into Foreign 
Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, and Peacekeeping operations. 
Foreign military financing is the largest of the three, providing grant assistance for “key friends 
and allies” to acquire “U.S. defense articles, services, and training which promotes U.S. national 
security by contributing to regional stability; strengthening military support for democratically-
elected governments; and containing transnational threats, including terrorism…” (US DOD & 
US DOS, 2019). 
U.S. aid is primarily bilateral and conducted through the United States Agency for 
International Aid (USAID). U.S. economic aid to Africa is focused on education and health 
sectors (Wang & Ozanne, 2010; Amusa, Monkam, & Viegi, 2016). U.S. economic aid to South 
Asia focuses on economic support and global health programs, alongside migration and refugee 
assistance and “Food for Peace” (Security Aid Dashboard | Security Assistance Monitor, n.d.). In 
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addition, U.S. military aid in South Asia is focused on Afghanistan Security Forces and Coalition 
Support Funds, as well as International Narcotics Control, Counter-Drug assistance, and Foreign 
Military financing. U.S. military aid to East Asia is primarily used for foreign military financing, 
non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, and Indo-Pacific maritime security initiative (e.g., policing the 
South China Sea). U.S. economic aid in the Middle East is focused on economic support and 
development, migration and refugee assistance, and “Food for Peace” while U.S. military aid to 
the Middle East is primarily foreign military financing and counter-Islamic state funding, 
alongside the Iraq Train and Equip Fund and the Israel Cooperative Programs Fund. (Security 
Assistance Monitor, 2020) 
The literature regarding the impact of foreign aid on growth shows no correlation positive 
or negative—a surprising result as foreign aid is designed to further economic development.  
2.21 Micro-Macro paradox 
The micro-macro paradox refers to the conflicting empirical results when comparing the 
positive results from microeconomic data evaluating aid-financed projects and inconclusive 
results from macroeconomic aid-growth regression specifications. (Mosley, 1986) posits three 
reasons for the micro-macro paradox: (i) data inaccuracies, (ii) biases in project data reporting, 
and (iii) macroeconomic effects outside of the project-based rate of return formulae. As my 
analysis regarding aid’s indirect impact on growth through security, the third explanation is 
relevant. While direct effects are the multiplier of the direct injection or economic consequence 
of the project, the indirect effects take place on both the public and private sector. (Mosley, 
1986) is one of the first to explain these public sector indirect effects: how, as governments 
receive aid, they may change their existing spending patterns, a problem of “fungibility” of aid 
receipt. Private sector spending is indirectly impacted as well through relative price changes. 
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Aggregating the rate of return results from microeconomic projects fails to account for the 
indirect effects on the public or private sector of the aid-receiving country.  
Looking at 131 cross-country regression analyses over the last 30 years of the 20th 
century, (Hansen & Tarp, 2000a) conclude that there are only a few consistent patterns with 
regards to aid: (i) aid increases investment, (ii) aid increases savings, and (iii) aid has a positive 
impact on growth (but only in capital-accumulation driven growth environments).  Looking over 
three generation of aid literature, (Hansen & Tarp, 2000a) argue that the micro-macro paradox 
with respect to aid and growth is non-existent, as the number of analyses showing positive 
relations clearly outnumber the negative studies—and that the negative studies happened to be 
highly influential.  
In one of those influential papers—though in the meta-analysis category--(Doucouliagos 
& Paldam, 2008) look at 68 papers with comparable estimates of the effect of aid on growth and 
conclude that a substantial amount of the variation in aid’s impact on growth can be attributed to 
data choices, specification differences, publication outlet, and institutional affiliation. They 
conclude that the only “real” differences between studies are regional in nature: Asia’s aid-
growth effect is the strongest22. Lastly, they conclude that further exploration is needed as the 
meta-analysis indicates that indirect effects are confounding factors in using aid as a treatment 
given to poor countries to generate development (Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2008). 
Building off Doucouliagos & Paldam (2008), Jemaneh Mekasha & Tarp (2013) use the 
same 68 studies, also concluding that there is no evidence of any significant aid-growth 
 
22 In general, countries within the tropics are some of the worst-performing when it comes to aid 
effectiveness. However, when the timing of aid effects is better accounted for, (Clemens et al., 2012) 
find that Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East/Northern Africa grew “substantially more than they 
otherwise would have because they received more aid than average”. Once again, the literature 
outlines regional effects but fails to consistently show which regional effect is significant.  
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relationship. In addition, their results with regards to model selection show that random effects 
are preferred; and their statistical and graphical analysis shows a heterogeneity in the estimates 
of the “true effect” of aid on growth when looking at all 68 studies. Further, fixed effects have a 
“effect homogeneity assumption”23, which is unrealistic when looking at any type of aid. As my 
panel is collapsed into a cross-section of lagged averages and sums, I sidestep this issue.   
Minoiu & Reddy (2010a) follow Mosley (1986), arguing that attempts to capture even the 
direct impact of aid necessitate a sufficiently long time-horizon to account for all of the 
institutional, infrastructural, and multiplier impacts. I approach the regressions within from this 
perspective and use similar deep lags as Minoiu & Reddy (2010b) do. 
(Mosley, 1986) conclude that sectoral allocation within countries is another way in which 
aid effectiveness could be maximized, as certain sectors historically absorb aid better than others 
(whether due to intra-sectoral differences in corruption and institutional quality, or due to the 
specific sectoral needs of different countries and regions—health aid is better spent in countries 
with lower infant mortality rates. In a similar way, I argue that disaggregating aid into military 
and economic aid is necessary to analyze aid effectiveness.  
How does U.S. politico-military integration (U.S. security integration) impact aid 
effectiveness? The purpose is to empirically study how helpful or harmful U.S. security 
integration is to host/recipient countries during peaceful times as well as when conflict occurs. 
Earlier studies provide evidence that U.S. military aid does improve the effectiveness of 
economic aid and its impact on growth, but only during times of conflict (Creasey et al., 2015). 
In the re-building phase (commonly assumed in the literature to be 1 to 7 years), military aid 
 
23 Effect homogeneity in measure “occurs whenever the effect in one population (or subgroup) is equal to 




seems to hinder economic aid’s impact on growth (Paul Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Creasey et al., 
2015) . However, this analysis looks only to U.S. military interventions, leaving out instances 
where the U.S. security apparatus has integrated the recipient country willingly and without 
conflict/regime change – i.e., politico-military integration.     
It is always possible that U.S. aid is showing simple correlates, since U.S. aid could be 
primarily serving those places where the tradeable sector is already large or shows significant 
growth potential. Endogeneity also interferes when looking at conflict’s impact on aid, as certain 
studies show that the amount of aid is determined by the degree and extent of conflict within the 
country and even the country’s regional neighbors (Flynn, 2020). 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how the share of GDP funded by U.S. military 
and economic aid, U.S. security agreements, and U.S. military bases impact separately and 
together on recipient’s per-capita GDP growth rate. I use deep lags, averages, and summations in 
order to look at the long-term impact and avoid any concerns about endogeneity. As a result, my 
panel dataset is collapsed into a cross-section where all right-hand side variables are either 
averages or sums during three different periods (1970-2010, 1980-2010, and 1980-2000). The 
left-hand side variable is always per-capita GDP growth, averaged over 2010-2019.  
2.22 Foreign Aid & Growth 
The impact of aid on economic growth would work primarily through multiplier effects. 
As aid flows are received by governments, by definition, it follows that there is an enlargement 
of the government sector. So long as crowding out and corruption are sufficiently mitigated, 
larger government spending would have a positive impact on development and economic growth 
in general. Increased aid increases government spending, thus increasing aggregate demand and 
GDP. U.S. military bases & trainees and U.S. military deployment should have a similar impact.  
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The aid effectiveness literature can be broadly categorized into four groups. For the sake 
of brevity, I will cover them only briefly. The first group argues that aid, in fact, leads to 
economic growth (Hansen & Tarp, 2000b). There are debates within this group, as is expected. 
Of note, C. J. C. Dalgaard et al. (2004) conjecture that good policies and economic aid are 
substitutes, so aid effectiveness (high when bad policies are in-place) decreases as policies 
improve.  
The second group argues that there are necessary key features with which aid may 
effectively stimulate growth. The key features vary, from good policies (Burnside & Dollar, 
2000a) to climate (Chauvet & Guillaumont, 2004; C. J. C. Dalgaard et al., 2004). 
Group three argues that aid is counterproductive. Like debt-relief and investment 
catalysts, aid promises lots but delivers little. This  group blames policymakers’ lack of 
considering basic economic incentives when developing and implementing aid programs 
(Friedman, 1995). 
The last group argues that aid does work, conditional on the goals set and benchmarks 
used for success. This group argues that academics’ and policymakers’ focus on GDP per-capita 
is myopic and inadequate, as aid is multifaceted in its goals: poverty reduction, hunger reduction, 
advances in healthcare and longevity, greater educational/entrepreneurial opportunities(Kenny, 
2008). When aid flows coincide with effective programs, outcomes are positive24 
In light of the historical attempts to identify a definitive aid-growth relation, one clear 
thing emerges: indirect channels through which aid impacts growth exist and may very well be 
the root cause of the inconsistency of aid’s impact on development. 
 
24 See Greenhalgh, Kristjansson, and Robinson (2007) and Bailey et al (2007) for examples of aid’s 
effectiveness on growth when in conjunction with school lunch programs for disadvantaged students 
and circumcision efforts in Africa (significantly reducing individual risk of HIV acquisition). 
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When aid’s lack of impact can be traced to higher relative prices of non-tradeables, a 
classic “transfer problem” arises. The “transfer problem” literature focuses on the exchange rate 
pressures and capital endogeneity. Historically, aid receipt impacts tradeable prices. However, 
aid could also impact growth through non-tradeable services. Using simple two-good model, 
McKinnon (1976) expand upon the existing paradigm to show that aid typically also impacts 
non-tradable services, as they typically have unfulfilled demand—a spending effect. Thus, 
increased aid increases construction, education, and health care spending25. There is a 
consequent increase in prices that leads to an appreciation of the foreign exchange rate, hurting 
their terms of trade, what is termed a resource curse effect26. This resource curse effect is also 
known as “Dutch disease”, when the impact of aid inflows leads to exchange rate overvaluation 
and a consequent adverse impact on growth (Rajan & Subramanian, 2011). There could be a 
version of the Transfer paradox operating such that foreign aid is donor-enriching and recipient 
immiserating due to terms-of-trade effects associated with aid flows (Martínez-Zarzoso et al., 
2014)  
Despite these plausible narratives, there is scant evidence that aid positively impacts 
economic growth (as measured by percentage changes in real per-capita GDP). McPherson and 
Rakowski (2001) use a multi-equation system specification and find that aid impacts GDP 
growth, but only indirectly through investment.  When interaction effects of the choices of 
macroeconomic variables are introduced, Burnside and Dollar (2000) do find that aid is 
beneficial but only when countries adopt appropriate, stable (and overlapping) policies that 
 
25 These short-run impacts may be mitigated through increased productivity of foreign workers (through 
education and learning-by-doing externalities from aid spending). The medium-run impact cannot be 
determined by theory alone, due to so many moving parts (Dudley et al., (1976)).  
26 With proper financing (from exports, U.S. aid, or central bank swap agreements), foreign central banks 
can and do take sufficient action such that any spending effect is rendered non-existent. 
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promote good institutions. But it is not the case that aid receipt is associated with better 
macroeconomic policies (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). 
A variety of factors have been ascribed a role in explaining the lack of impact of aid 
impact on growth. These include capital market imperfections, lack of investment opportunities, 
political regime and institutional constraints. 
Griffin (1969) shows that foreign capital injections (more generally) increase growth 
when domestic savings are moderately sensitive to capital imports. Early inquiries followed this 
line, to point to capital market imperfections as the explanation for aid’s lack of impact on 
growth and development (Chatterjee & Turnovsky, 2004). The argument is that profitable 
investment projects might go unfunded in the recipient countries due to capital market 
imperfections. 
It has also been argued that lack of domestic savings is a consequence (not a cause) of 
low-yielding investment opportunities. In such a context, where domestic savers (mostly 
domestic elite) face a dearth of investment opportunity, increased aid inflow would merely 
enrich the political elite. In this way, income inequality may also influence aid’s impact on 
growth. 
Historically, critics of aid allocations also argue that political regime type is a 
fundamental ingredient in achieving successful economic development (Shleifer, 2009), and 
would thus have a bearing on the impact of aid. Collier and Dollar's (1998) show that the level of 
poverty and quality of economic institutions are prime determinants in the maximization problem 
of poverty reduction given a constant amount of aid. (Alesina & Dollar, 2000).   Countries that 
receive significant amounts of aid also tend to participate in unproductive, consumer spending, 
and therefore undercut any potential benefits of foreign aid receipt (Burnside & Dollar, 2000a). 
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Alesina and Dollar (2000) also point to institutional quality, inefficiencies, and technological 
shortfalls as important obstacles to the beneficial impact of aid.  On the donors’ side, the choice 
of recipients and allocations based on political and strategic concerns rather than variables that 
influence the effectiveness of aid, also mutes beneficial economic impact of aid (Alesina & 
Dollar, 2000).  The aid literature in the 1970s concluded that foreign aid  crowded out private 
saving, led to increased public consumption, and failed to deliver any significant macroeconomic 
policy/growth improvement (Alesina & Dollar, 2000).  
It bears mentioning that there is the possibility that military aid leads to increases in 
recipient government military expenditures, which would then increase growth. Some literature 
is in support of this (Langlotz & Potrafke, 2019). Langlotz & Potrafke (2019) find that conflict-
prone and aid -dependent countries27 do show increases in military expenditures28 as aid receipt 
increases. Government spending and the size of recipients’ military spending are included in 
robustness checks and do not alter the results significantly.  
 
2.23 Security Integration 
Despite the universality of sizeable military budgets, little evidence exists to show the 
positive impact of military spending on economic growth. And while aid inflows positively 
correlate with military spending, this may be a by-product of economic development, of growing 
 
27 Aid-dependent is measured by ODA Net Total disbursements of all DAC donors as a % of recipient 
general government final consumption expenditure and conflict-prone means interstate or domestic 
conflict dummy variables 
28 Military expenditures do also appear influenced by recipient government political structure, with 
presidential systems spending more on defense than parliamentary systems. When majority rule and 
presidential systems co-exist, however, military expenditures decrease (Albalate et al., 2012) 
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government budgets, in general. Here too, the literature is divided, with some studies finding a 
negative impact and others a positive impact. 
Aizenman & Glick (2003) evaluate the non-linear interactions between military 
expenditure, corruption, conflict, and other relevant control factors, finding that high levels of 
military spending, everything else equal, are associated with lower growth, but—in the presence 
of conflict—military expenditure positively impacts growth. They use a proxy of external threat 
by counting the number of wars and adversaries against whom each nation has been in conflict 
with, or the number of years a country was at war with each of its adversaries, summed over the 
set of adversaries. They compute this from militarized interstate dispute (MIDB) data collected 
by the Correlates of War Project (COW) (Aizenman & Glick, 2003). 
Foreign bases have been allowed by governments for a variety of reasons: the result of an 
armed occupation and regime change (“nation-building”), for certain compensation packages, in 
exchange for political concessions (such as when Portugal granted U.S. basing access in 
exchange for a promise from the U.S. to stop supporting liberation movements in Portugal’s 
African colonies). Oftentimes, U.S. basing arrangements contain some negotiated sovereignty 
rights (types of activities the base can be used for, criminal jurisdiction that apply to foreign 
troops stationed on the base) and differ with respect to their duration and, even, whether they are 
of limited duration at all. Some are highly informal, like those with the United Kingdom. Some 
grant U.S. access for an indefinite amount of time while others must be renewed periodically. 
(Cooley & Nexon, 2007). All of these agreements are included in the RAND security-related 
agreement database used within.  
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2.231 Positive impact of U.S. security integration 
U.S. foreign troop deployment and overseas basing makes significant contributions to 
regional security and stability, and as a result nations with U.S. troops enjoy greater trade with 
the U.S. & greater economic growth in general (Bove et al., 2014; Heo & Ye, 2019a; Jones & 
Kane, 2012). Biglaiser & DeRouen (2007) also find that U.S. FDI is influenced by U.S. security 
relations. 
Braithwaite & Kucik (2017) find that U.S. troops deployed post-Cold War, positively 
impacted the stability as well as the political and legal institutions of the base-host nation. Kane, 
(2012) look to a variety of World Bank social development indicators and found that each one of 
them improved more in countries with U.S. troop presence when compared to those with zero 
U.S. troop presence.  
Despite its magnitude and omnipresence, the literature is, to my knowledge, does not 
address inclusion or discussion of U.S. security-related agreements when discussing aid’s impact 
on growth. Many of these security-related agreements are tied to foreign military financing, the 
main source of U.S. military aid abroad. Foreign military financing is used to purchase U.S. arms 
and U.S. training for those arms and systems. U.S. arms exports are a significant fraction of U.S. 
goods exports ($37 B total U.S. arms sales in 2017 of the $2.4 T U.S. goods exports in 2017)  
(Security Assistance Monitor, 2020). 
2.232 Negative impact of U.S. security integration 
The evidence of a negative impact of U.S. security integration comes in the form of 
anecdotal and macroeconomic evidence(Calder, 2010; Vine, 2015; Yeo, 2011) 
Vine (2015), more journalistic/anecdotal analysis concludes that “there is no evidence to 
say conclusively that overseas bases make the United States or the world safer in a military 
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sense, [but] we have seen abundant evidence that bases abroad are harming the safety, security, 
and well-being of millions of people”. This account looks at the impact of bases not only on the 
host nation’s local residents, but also on the families and well-being of the base service members 
and employed civilians and finds the net impact of U.S. basing to be decidedly negative.  In 
addition, Vine (2015) points to the general opposition that U.S. overseas base presence creates, 
including some rare but extremely violent cases (the attack on marines in Lebanon in 1983 and 
on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000) and also draws on historical analyses (for instance how the 
U.S. occupation of Afghanistan was a major recruitment tool for al-Qaeda and a major 
motivation for Osama Bin Ladin’s terrorist attack on New York).  
Macro-evidence is rare but the most compelling is that country citizens’ willingness to 
fight for their country decreases once U.S. troop deployment reaches a certain threshold (100 or 
500 troops) (Jakobsen & Jakobsen, 2019). This was first pointed out by Machain & Morgan, 
(2013), who showed that the 5-year lagged  U.S. troop deployment levels are consistently 
negatively associated with the military personnel of the host state. In addition, Machain & 
Morgan, (2013) find no decrease in the chance of either initiating or being the recipient of a 
militarized interstate dispute (MID) when U.S. troops presence in that country increases.  
U.S. aid and leadership were central in post-WWII reconstruction. The required 
economic conditions for inclusion to new supra-national governmental organizations (IMF, 
GATT, World Bank), which were also led or funded by the U.S., essentially created a monopoly 
on inter-governmental lending. This “steady tightening of political, military, and economic 
control” led to a subordination of the “assistance aspects increasingly to U.S. military 
strategy”(Zevin & Hudson, 1975). 
2.3 Analytical Framework 
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This study mainly differs from earlier research in that it: (1) looks at simultaneous and 
individual instances of U.S. economic aid and military aid disbursements and (2) explicitly 
includes U.S. security integration actions (using the presence of U.S. bases and/or U.S. security-
related treaties).  
Other papers modify the neoclassical growth model to analyze the impact of aid (Rajan & 
Subramanian, 2008), but fail to differentiate between different types of aid. The first attempts at 
differentiation were with regards to multilateral aid, but provide good guidance for the analysis 
within (Minoiu & Reddy, 2010b). This paper is an extension on that work. This paper differs 
from Minoiu & Reddy (2010) because I am interested in countries with established and lasting 
politico-military relations with the U.S. In this way, this paper also borrows from Creasey et al. 
(2015), who look at nation-building and ascertain its effectiveness.  
My analysis differs from nation building (which requires (1) economic aid, (2) military 
aid, and (3) conflict or post-conflict), as I am identifying how U.S. politico-military integration 
(which requires (1) economic aid, (2) military aid, (3) U.S. security integration), where U.S. 
security integration can be the establishment of U.S. base or the presence of a signed, in-force 
military-related security agreement.  Thus, the study goes beyond the narrower focus on security 
integration in the literature. Adopting a broader interpretation of U.S. military relations is 
necessary for two reasons: (1) U.S. foreign military actions and influence are not limited to those 
years and places in which explicit conflict occurs and (2) testing how different types of aid 
(military and economic) impact growth requires both control variables and interaction terms, as 
aid effectiveness depends not only on institutional backgrounds but is also contextual to degree 
and type of U.S. military relationship. This paper aims to bridge the gap between the aid-growth 
literature and the nation-building literature. Lack of consistent significant evidence within both 
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literatures shows that something is missing; I argue that the missing thing is this broader 
interpretation of U.S. military relations to include non-violent, non-conflict U.S. integration 
phenomenon.  
2.4 Model Selection 
The major focus of this study is the indirect effect of disaggregated U.S. aid on economic 
growth through their impact on security. U.S. military aid and security integration alleviate 
recipients’ governmental budget concerns. Typically, military spending takes away funds that 
would have otherwise been invested, therefore diminishing economic growth and its 
determinants (namely, human capital through inadequate education spending). 
The literature specific to the simultaneous disbursement of military and economic aid is 
limited, despite the numerous nation-building attempts made by the U.S. and others in the 20th 
century and presently. This joint provisioning of military and economic aid may increase the 
effectiveness of aid in conflict and post-conflict states through stimulating private investment 
through security-related reassurances and “U.S. backstopping” (Creasey et al., 2015). 
Alternatively, the provisioning of such large amounts of aid can create dependency on donors 
and/or crowd out domestic private investors, negatively impacting growth.  
The aid-growth literature is plagued by identification concerns (mostly endogeneity). The 
other main identification concern (heterogeneity) reflects that likelihood that aid violates the 
slope homogeneity assumption on theoretical grounds; the effect of aid on growth has been 
shown to be a function of other factors. This strand of research can be called the “conditional” 
strand, where the conditionality of aid’s effectiveness on growth rates is not dependent on ‘good’ 
policy, instead arguing for decreasing returns to aid and a high sensitivity to estimator choice and 
control variables chosen. Burnside & Dollar (2000b) show that developing country growth rates 
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depend on “initial income, institutional and policy constraints, aid, and aid interacted with 
distortions”.. 
As a counterpoint, another strand of literature argues that the lack of any significant 
positive effect of aid is due to misspecification. To correct this, authors introduce a squared aid 
variable, as they argue aid has diminishing returns. Other studies introduce interaction terms are 
used to identify the partial effect of aid on growth as it is a function and not a constant (Hansen 
& Tarp, 2001).  
C. J. Dalgaard et al. (2004) test aid-squared as well as aid-squared interacted with 
measure of policies (CPIA) and fail to find convincing evidence of any interaction effect. 
However, C. J. C. Dalgaard et al. (2004) did find that, for the last three decades of the 21st 
century, there has been a persistent and negative interaction between aid and being located in the 
tropics. Geographic/climatic characteristics certainly shape the rate at which convergence should 
occur, but such a persistent and negative impact—the authors posit—cannot be explained by 
geography or climate alone. After exhausting every iteration of the reduced-form equations they 
derive, C. J. C. Dalgaard et al. (2004) conclude that “Disentangling the channels through which 
aid matters for productivity seems to be a crucial research topic at this stage”..  
After controlling for investment and human capital, Hansen & Tarp (2001) find no 
significant impact of aid on growth. However, aid does significantly impact investment, and 
therefore indirectly impacts growth (Hansen & Tarp, 2000a; Stiglitz & Obstfeld, 2009).  
2.41 Endogeneity concerns 
The typical endogeneity concern within the aid-growth literature relates to developmental 
or economic aid: the amount of aid received may be influenced by the present or future growth 
rates (Minoiu & Reddy, 2010b). This type of bi-directional causation would violate the Gauss-
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Markov principles. This concern about bi-directional causation stems from both concerns about 
economic aid and growth as well as the relation between economic aid and income levels, as 
lower-income countries may be perceived to be needier and receive greater aid as a result. I 
argue that the same is not true with regards to U.S. military aid and security integration. 
Nonetheless, as a robustness check, I will include the initial income level of military aid+-
recipients as a control variable29 to deal with the possible endogeneity between even military aid 
and economic growth.  
Attempts at addressing the endogeneity between aid and growth fall into three categories: 
(i) instrumental variable (IV) analysis, (ii) lagging aid, and (iii) examining the effect of aid on 
economic growth over longer periods of time (Minoiu & Reddy, 2010a).  
2.411 Instrumental Variables (IVs) 
Instruments are typically geopolitical factors: lagged aid, lagged population, squared aid, 
terms of trade changes, agricultural output fluctuations, export demand shifts (Rajan & 
Subramanian, 2008; Reddy et al., 2006). Instrumenting for aid’s endogeneity with respect to 
growth30 originates from the seminal work of Boone (1996), who looks at non-military aid flows 
to 96 countries and instruments aid with political/economic regime type (egalitarian, elitist, and 
laissez-faire).  
Boone (1996) shifts the dominant approach to solving the aid-growth puzzle, after 
instrumenting for aid to find that political regime type is the best predictor for the impact of 
 
29 As was also done in (Reddy et al., 2006). 
30 The relationship between military aid and military expenditures is also frequently tested and shown to 
be endogenous, resulting in IV strategies using civil wars, international wars, external threats, 
neighbors’ military spending, logged population, internal threats, democratic dummies, logged GDP 
per capita, as well as a few interaction IVs: donor origin and recipient language (important for the 
UK), donor origin and recipient religion (also important for UK aid), and donor origin and political 
similarity (important for the U.S.).  
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foreign aid. His main finding is that aid has the largest impact on governmental size, small 
positive impacts on investment and growth, and no measurable impact on poverty as measured 
by human development indicator improvements. Boone (1996) uses three instruments: (1) the 
logarithmic transformation of population, (2) a measure of geostrategic interests by key donors 
(Friends of U.S., Friends of OPEC, or Friends of France), and (3) using twice-lagged, 5-year 
averaged aid data.  
2.412“Geostrategic Controls 
Coding for alignment of strategic or geopolitical interest with donors has been coined the 
“friends of the donors” variables by Easterly (2003) as a result of Boone (1996)’s success and its 
pivoting of the aid-growth literature to novel ways of addressing endogeneity. 
The “friends of the donors” variables exploit how aid is given for more 
geopolitical/strategic reasons than based on need. Examples include former colonialization, 
sharing a common language, being a member of a strategic alliance (usually NATO), and even 
UN voting patterns.  
The “friends of donor” approach is valid if—after controlling for income, growth rates, 
etc—aid flows vary purely due to political reasons. This may not always hold true for 
nonmilitary aid and is instead a more plausible assumption with regards to military aid; U.S. 
military aid and security integration is driven by factors unrelated to country need (after 
controlling for the standard aid supply control variables), and therefore a geostrategic IV 
approach would work. 
However, typical “friends of aid” approaches use aid donor characteristics, and as I am 
looking at just U.S. aid flows, these variables (e.g., colonial past, part of the ‘Scandinavian club’ 
of donors, etc) will not work. Similarly, the use of common language dummy is flawed as 
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English is the international language of business and a country whose main language is English 
does not denote a tie such as a French-speaking country in the Francophone.  
Some traditional “friends of aid” instruments are still valid and warrant exploration, such 
as a UN security council presence, admittance into a military coalition, the formation of certain 
alliances, or other rotations onto organizations within which U.S. geostrategic interests dominate. 
Using the dummy for whether the member is a signatory to a strategic alliance usually means 
NATO, and most NATO countries are excluded from this analysis as the scope of my analysis is 
developing and emerging countries. As USA’s colonial past is limited, that instrument will not 
be explored within an appendix; U.S. quasi-colonial ties are, for the most part, maintained in the 
form of territories, which are excluded from the analysis as I treat them de facto as part of the 
U.S. security apparatus.  
Geostrategic variables may not be the most valid instruments for total aid but are 
excellent instruments for military aid and security integration: geostrategic-incentivized aid 
disbursements may have limited-to-no impact on actual development and are often instead used 
to purchase or reinforce political allegiances. Simply put, economic development often explicitly 
takes a backseat to political and geostrategic concerns when it comes to U.S. military aid and 
security integration policy.  
Reddy et al, (2006) show a “strategic bias” problem to the typically-used ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and 2-stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimators, concluding that it arises from either 
a failure of geopolitical instrumental variables to wholly pick-up the effect of aid on growth 
(picking up only on the non-developmental aid’s impact on growth) or a failure to disaggregate 
types of economic aid when the “true” effect of development and non-developmental aid on 
growth is different (Headey, 2005; Reddy et al., 2006). While the above poses a threat to the 
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validity of geostrategic variables as instruments for total aid, the existence of such a paradigm 
reinforces the validity of using geostrategic variables to instrument for non-development/military 
aid. 
2.413 Lagging Aid 
Lagged aid has often been used as an exogenous source of variation, using the exclusion 
assumption31 (C. J. C. Dalgaard et al., 2004).  
The approach taken by Boone (1996) was to use five-year averages of the data and use 
twice-lagged aid. By lagging the data, aid and emergencies should not be correlated, aid and 
business cycle factors as well. But aid remains correlated with any strategic or longer-term 
political factors that determines aid supply (especially for the U.S.). 
2.414 Longer Time Periods 
Similar to the approach of lagging aid ,Boone (1996) used longer periods of sufficient 
duration as to rule out any conditioning of aid on expected growth expectations. Minoiu & 
Reddy (2010a)  address the problem of endogeneity with regards to aid’s impact on growth by 
both disaggregating aid into developmental and geopolitical aid and by using deep lags and find 
that developmental aid is good for growth but only over sufficiently long periods of time.  
It should be noted, however, that questions of endogeneity aren’t as worrisome in the 
context of  U.S. military aid and security integration, : as pointed out in (Jones & Kane, 2012), 
the “supply” or sending of U.S. military aid, troops, or signing of security-related agreements are 
 
31 The exclusion restriction condition is the second condition for Instrumental Variable Regression 
Analysis. The exclusion restriction “requires that any effect of the proposed instrument on the outcome 
is exclusively through its potential effect on exposure”. While this assumption is not verifiable, it is 
falsifiable. To falsify this test, a subgroup must be identified in which the proposed instrument does 
not affect the exposure. For instance, using lagged aid  
 
111 
not chosen explicitly to countries with high expected growth. Instead, high security salience32 is 
usually the determining factor. After all, U.S. politico-military integration, even when it does not 
occur simultaneously or closely following conflict, is likely to be in places that are inherently 
unstable and therefore provide expectations of low investment and anemic growth, if anything. 
However, to address any endogeneity concerns, I use deep lags similar to (Minoiu & 
Reddy, 2010a; Rajan & Subramanian, 2008), using lagged periodic averages and sums to explain 
growth ten or twenty years later. By using recent growth rates as the dependent variable and deep 
lags as independent variables, there is no concern of reverse causality: growth in the 2010s 
cannot influence aid allocation or U.S. politico-military integration policy of the 1970s, 80s, and 
90s.  
2.5 Empirical Estimation 
To gauge the growth effects of politico-military integration, I augment the neoclassical 
growth model, incorporating U.S. politico and military-related security agreements, the number 
of U.S. bases, and the share of GDP accounted for by military aid and economic aid receipt.  
Following (Reddy et al., 2006), I disaggregate aid into two components: military aid and 
economic aid (which Reddy et al. (2006) called Non-Developmental Aid (NDA) and 
Developmental Aid (DA), respectively. The standard aid-growth model they use is as follows: 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖(𝑡 + 𝑇) − ln(𝑦𝑖(𝑡)) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1. DA + β2. NDA + 𝛿𝑅 . C + 𝑒𝑅 (1) 
Where C is a matrix of standard control variables. Using the standard Solow model as a 
foundation, I include initial GDP levels, 𝑦𝑗(𝑡), as growth may depend on a country’s distance 
 
32 Security salience is defined as the relative importance of an overseas U.S. base or ally. For instance, 
countries with high security salience for the U.S. means that the U.S. cannot credibly threaten to 
remove troops from that country or region (Bell, Clay, & Martinez Machain, 2017) 
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from its own steady state. The possibility of unique steady states also drives the inclusion of the 
determinants of the steady state growth rate: capital, human capital, and population growth.  
Inclusion of U.S. security integration within the standard growth model expands it to the 
following framework, substituting NDA for Military Aid (MA) and DA for Economic Aid (EA): 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖(𝑡 + 𝑇) − ln(𝑦𝑖(𝑡)) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1. MA + β2. EA + β3. #𝑈𝑆 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 +𝛽4. # 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽5. # 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 +𝛽6. 𝑀𝐴 ∗ # 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛿𝑅 . C + 𝑒𝑅 (2) 
The main identification strategy of this paper is that U.S. military aid and security 
integration both separately and interactively impact per-capita GDP growth. As shown in the 
literature review, the aid literature is puzzling in its lack of consistent macroeconomic evidence 
with regards to aid’s positive impact on growth and exports. One of the main ways in which this 
puzzle has been “solved” has been to disaggregate either aid (by type) or exports (sectorally).  
Another way by which these aid-growth puzzles have been solved has been by 
identifying and testing different types of indirect channels (Clemens et al., 2012; Radelet et al., 
2005) and non-linear empirical specifications (mostly through novel interactions)—squaring aid 
and interacting aid as in Aizenman & Glick (2003). 
Reddy & Minou (2010), look at 86 countries between 1960 and 2010. I look at the same 
countries but extend the analysis to include data for the most recent data available (2019). I also 
include data on U.S. base presence and U.S. security agreements. Control variables are the same 
as were used in Reddy & Minou (2010), using their analysis as a baseline.  
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2.51 Dependent Variables 
2.511 Economic Growth 
In addition to the indirect impact on economic growth that U.S. aid+ has on economic 
growth, direct effects exist as well, through multiplier effects. Greater government spending, 
regardless of its source, will increase income by some multiplier33. However, as we have seen, 
the impact of aid on growth is not always positive. To look at economic growth, I use per-capita 
GDP growth from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI:  
2.52 Independent Variables 
2.521 U.S. Military Aid 
Foreignassistance.gov aggregates all public and private aid and provides a sectoral 
dataset, broken down most simply into economic aid and military aid, which themselves consist 
of humanitarian and developmental aid for economic assistance and non-economic, military-
enhancing aid for military assistance.  
USAid.gov, which is consolidated with Foreignassistance.gov data, categorizes assistance 
disbursements whether they are economic or military assistance. Countries recognized as an 
“Independent State” by the U.S. Department of State and receiving over $500,000 cumulative 
military and economic assistance are included.  
Military assistance is foreign aid grants for the express purpose of enhancing recipients’ 
military capabilities. Any foreign aid not categorized explicitly as economic assistance is 
military assistance. Military assistance can be as benign as peace keeping operations (~5%) to 
International Military Education and Training (~1%) and Foreign Military Financing (~40%) 





the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, ~11% allocated to Counter – ISIS Train and Equip Fund. 
The rest of U.S. military assistance is allocated to writing off excess defense articles (~3%) and 
general operation and maintenance (~5%).  
2.522 U.S. Military Bases 
David Vine, Anthropology Professor at American University, has a dataset freely 
available listing  U.S. Military Bases Abroad, 1776-2019 (Lists of U.S. Military Bases Abroad, 
1776-2019 | AU Digital Research Archive (american.edu)). This data is not continuous, however, 
and the only relevant years are those pertaining to 2015 and 2019. While there are data for 
previous years, they are few (1989, 1945, 1939) and reflect the existing politico-military 
structures of their time (Cold War, Post-WWII, pre-WWII). While it breaks with the pattern of 
all right-hand side variables being lagged averages, the inclusion of the most updated military 
base dataset is a better control and is used in my analysis.  
2.523 U.S. Trainees 
Trainee data is sourced from the same source as U.S. economic aid and U.S. military aid, 
Foreignassistance.gov. U.S. trainees are foreign military personnel that U.S. active-duty military 
personnel or U.S. civilian contractors are training. U.S. training programs may occur in 
conjunction with sales or grants provided by U.S. Foreign Military Financing. U.S. Training 
occurs in countries selected by the Secretary of State under the program of International Military 
Education and Training (IMET), which aims to train foreign leaders, establish and enhance U.S.-
foreign military rapport, enhance joint operation interoperability and capabilities and provide 
English language training assistance (International Military Education & Training (IMET) | 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, n.d.) 
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2.524 U.S. Treaties 
The RAND corporation provides a comprehensive record on historical security-related 
treaties signed by the United States from 1955-2012. Bilateral and multilateral treaties and 
security-related agreements are included in the database, but for our purposes I only use bilateral 
security-related agreements. Previous data sources have gaps in their coverage, failing to cover 
both current and historical security-related treaties. To address this, the RAND corporation 
developed a data set that details every treaty: start date, end date, and type. Over five thousand 
individual treaties span from 1955-2012 between the United States and other countries. Security-
related treaties and agreements34 can include joint training agreements, military alliances, access 
treaties (for U.S. bases and U.S. personnel), and material transfer treaties (such as Foreign 
Military Financing). For our purposes, I only look at treaties with the following characteristics: 
mutual defense, amity, troops, training, SOFAs. The only omitted set of agreements are those 
that are Air Force specific. Air Force specific security agreements pertain to overflight, airfield 
access, or space-related issues. 
Some recoding of the dataset was necessary for it to be useful for econometric analysis. 
Each treaty covers multiple years and has different characteristics.  First, I expanded each treaty 
so that the variables reflected each year the treaty was in-force (rather than just the year in which 
the treaty was signed or entered). Then, I looked at each of the five security-related agreement 
characteristics: mutual defense, amity, troops, training, and SOFAs. If a treaty had the 
characteristic of both mutual defense and amity, then each of those variables was coded as 1 for 
all of the years. 
 
34 Only formal treaties and agreements between two or more states are included—informal agreements 
and understandings are excluded. 
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Lastly, I create two categories of U.S. treaties: U.S. political treaties and U.S. military 
treaties. To my knowledge, this is the first analysis to not only explicitly include the presence of 
certain types of treaties, but also the first analysis to aggregate them into categories reflecting 
either their political or militaristic nature. Using a new database, the first comprehensive U.S. 
security-related treaty database, I take the liberty to group mutual defense and amity agreements 
into “U.S. political treaties”, as, in terms of security-related treaties, these two require the least 
amount of effort and often are symbolic. U.S. military treaties (a grouping of U.S. base-related 
treaties—also known as Status of Forces Agreements--, U.S. troop-related treaties, and U.S. 
training-related treaties) are, by contrast to U.S. political treaties, accompanied by concrete 
actions: money spent, land rented, bases built, troops barracked, rights provided to military 
personnel and their families, and foreign soldiers trained by U.S. troops. U.S. military treaties are 
quite different than political treaties and should be grouped differently. In doing so, I find that 
military treaties and political treaties impact growth and interact with aid in different ways.  
2.5241 U.S. Political Treaties 
U.S. political treaties is a binary variable, taking the value of 1 for years which a country 
has an active (a) mutual defense agreement or (b) amity agreement. 
2.52411 Mutual Defense Agreements 
Mutual Defense agreements are just that: agreements that indicate the degree of security 
reinforcement expected during different escalations of war, internal and external. While mutual 
defense agreements include both mutual defense and collective security provisions, only the 
mutual defense provisions35 will be captured as I only look to bilateral security-related 
 
35 It is important to note here that there are treaties titled “mutual defense assistance agreements”, which 




agreements.  The presence of a mutual defense agreement is coded as a dummy variable, just as 
with SOFAs, with a 1 indicating an active mutual defense agreement and a 0 indicating no such 
agreement for that year with that country. 
2.52412 Amity Agreements 
Treaties that detail the peaceful settlement of disputes, proclaim cooperation, or promote 
amity are coded as “Amity Agreements”. Years for which countries have active Amity 
Agreements are coded as a 1, 0 otherwise.  
2.5242 U.S. Military Treaties 
U.S. military treaties is a binary variable, taking the value of 1 whenever a country has, 
for a particular year, either: (a) troop-related agreements, (b) training agreements, or (c) SOFA 
agreements. 
2.52421 Troop-related agreements 
Troop-related agreements address U.S. troop commitment for any operation (training, 
observing, or contingency). Years for which countries have active troop-related agreements are 
coded 1, 0 otherwise.  
2.52422 Training Agreements 
As previously mentioned, a large portion of U.S. military assistance takes the form of 
either Foreign Military Financing (FMF) or International Military Education and Training 
(IMET). Both FMF and IMET have a training component. In addition, any security-related 
agreements having to do with U.S. provided training or joint training is included in this subtype. 
Training agreements are likewise coded as a dummy variable, with 1 indicating at least one 
 




active training agreement during that year with that country and a 0 indicating no active training 
agreements. 
2.52423 Status of Forces Agreements 
Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) govern the rights and status of U.S. military 
personnel and family-members when stationed overseas. SOFAs often—but not always—
preclude or coincide with U.S. basing operations. SOFAs are coded as dummy (or binary) 
variables, with 1 denoting the presence of at least one SOFA and 0 denoting no active SOFA 
agreement during that year with that country. 
2.53 Control Variables 
2.531 U.S. Economic Assistance 
When cumulative military and economic aid totals are greater than half a million dollars 
(and the country is recognized by the U.S. Department of State), U.S. aid is recorded, and each 
program/disbursement is categorized as economic or military aid. Economic aid has a 
humanitarian or development objective: humanitarian aid can be a response to a disaster (natural 
or man-made) or a response to a failed or failing state; development aid promotes sustained, 
broad economic growth as well as increased geopolitical stability.(US AID, 2018) Economic aid, 
lagged, must be incorporated as a control variable so as to identify the conditional impact of 
politico-military integration on economic growth.  
2.532 Conflict 
The first choice is to use the standard conflict database, the Correlates of War (COW) 
project. The application of other conflict variables is included, as the COW dataset does have an 
annual fatality threshold of 1,000; Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) employs a threshold 
of 25 (Creasey et al., 2015).  The most recent iteration of the Militarized Interstate Disputes 
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(MID) database (v5.0) provides information relevant to my analysis. MID instances are not just 
explicit acts of war, but range in intensity from threats to use force. Also, MID provides 
categorical information when exact fatality numbers are unknown or unverifiable, allowing for a 
greater inclusion of fatality data. I code a binary variable to have a value of 1 when fatality 
deaths are greater than 25 in any given year from any MID instance. For robustness, I also code a 
variable that takes a value of 1 when the “Hostility Level” indicator, is a 3 or higher, indicating 
that the interstate dispute is at the very least a “Display of force”36 . 
2.533 Initial GDP (in 2010 constant USD) 
As stated before, standard growth regression specifications include a measure of initial 
income to account for differing rates of convergence. I use the real GDP, as measured by the 
World Bank WDI indicators (WDI: NY.GDP.MKTP.KD), take the first value for each country, 
and take its log and include it as a control in my regressions.   
2.534 Institutions / Regime type 
The two most popular ordinal indices are the Freedom House indices (with 7 categories 
each) and the Polity2 index (with 21 categories) (Cheibub et al., 2010). While these indices 
identify different levels of democracy (a “3” in the Polity2 scale signals a more democratic 
regime than a “2”), they lack specific characteristics of each ordinal level and thus cannot tell us 
much about different kinds of democracy. In addition, the use of any one of these constructed 
indices creates problems of errors in measurement, as ideological bias may be influencing the 
 
36 Level 4 on the Hostility level of dispute index is “Use of force”; Level 5 is “War”  
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categorization rules. I use other popular democracy indicators37 as a robustness check, despite a 
high correlation between most indices (Skaaning et al., 2015).  
Lastly, I use the World Bank CPIA ratings (used by P Collier & Dollar (2002) and Reddy 
et al., (2006)) as a proxy for the “quality” of policy environments. I use the “CPIA public sector 
management and institution cluster average (1=low to 6=high)” (WDI: IQ.CPA.PUBS.XQ) as it 
accounts for transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector, as well as property 
rights and rules-based governance and the quality of public administration, financial 
management, and revenue mobilization.  
2.535 Population 
Using the logarithmic transformation of the population is a standard control in cross-
country growth regressions. Population data comes from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators and counts all residents of the country regardless of legal status or citizenship (WDI: 
SP.POP.TOTL ).  
2.536 Education  
The education expenditure, as a % of GDP, is another common control variable in cross-
country growth regressions. This includes all expenditures (current, capital, or transfer) that 
occur regardless of source (international or domestic) on education by a government body (local, 
state, or national) (WDI:  SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS).  
2.537 Domestic Investment 
Physical capital, alongside human capital, is a classic determinant of growth. Therefore, I 
include the logged percentage of GDP that consists of both fixed asset additions as well as 
 
37 I plan to introduce V-dem and Economist Intelligence Unit indices as robustness checks, in addition to 
two new democracy indices: the lexical index and the six-fold regime classification presented in 
Cheibub et al. (2010). 
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changes to inventory levels. The gross capital formation data (% of GDP) is from the World 
Bank World Development Indicators (WDI: NE.GDI.TOTL.ZS) 
2.538 Geography (Rainfall; mm/yr) 
The literature is divided in whether any particular geography proxy is the best, and as a 
result, there are many geographic proxies available. Some combine the fraction of a country’s 
area in the tropics average number of frost days per month per winter (Bosworth et al., n.d.; 
Radelet et al., 2005; Reddy et al., 2006). Others use rainfall (average mm of rain per year 
weighted by its long-term average) in their attempts to investigate aid effectiveness (Clemens et 
al., 2012). I elect to also use rainfall as it is the most complete dataset and provides the widest 
cross-country sample. 
2.539 Terms of Trade 
Mercantilist or export-oriented development strategies are at the root of some of the most 
successful development stories. As a result, we must control for their influence. The best way to 
do this is to include two variables relating to the individual recipient countries’ terms-of-trade: an 
average growth rate and the standard deviation. Looking at the average growth rate allows us to 
see how increases in recipients’ terms-of-trade (export prices increasing relative to import prices) 
increase that recipients GDP, and, in turn, growth. I account for the standard deviation of the 
terms of trade as a proxy for large price fluctuations in the export and import markets of the 
recipient countries. Large standard deviations are expected to be associated with lower growth, 
as stability in prices is preferred when pursuing any development strategy (Bruckner, 2013). 
Terms of trade data comes from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI: 
TT.PRI.MRCH.XD.WD) and is defined as the “Net barter terms of trade index (2000 = 100)”.  
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2.530 Initial Life Expectancy 
Lastly, I include another proxy measure of institutional quality, the initial life expectancy 
of the recipient/host country. Similar to (Radelet et al., 2005), I take the first non-missing value 
of each period of Total Life Expectancy, as provided by the World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI: SP.DYN.LE00.IN). Life expectancies are often used a determinants of aid 
effectiveness, though usually in combination with another indicator, like daily caloric intake as 
in Schraeder et al. (2016). For robustness, I also run the regressions with the average of life 
expectancy over time, as well as the infant mortality rate.  
2.54 Interaction Variables 
Interaction terms are created and introduced to test certain non-linearities of economic 
and military aid. First, I test the interaction between economic aid and institutional quality (as 
measured by CPIA, polity2 and Freedom House indicators). It has been posited (but not shown) 
that economic aid is only effective in stimulating economic growth when in the presence of good 
policies. I find no evidence that lagged economic aid, when interacted with lagged institutional 
quality, has a statistically significant impact on economic growth.  
Second, I construct and use a pair of interaction variables: (1) to see how changes in 
military aid interact with the number of military treaties and (2) how changes in economic aid 
intersect with the number of political treaties. 
2.541 Military aid ∩ Military treaties 
After taking cross-sectional averages, I multiply the logged, lagged military aid’s share of 
GDP by the summed number of military treaties during that period (1970-2010; 1970-2000; 
1980-2010). This creates the interaction term 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑖𝑑 ∩ 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠, which, if 
positive, indicates that U.S. military aid’s effectiveness on growth increases as the number of 
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military treaties increase. If the interaction term is negative, this means that U.S. military aid’s 
effectiveness decreases as the number of military treaties increase.  
2.542 Economic aid ∩ Political treaties 
Using the same process as above, I create an interaction term between the logged, lagged 
economic aid’s share of GDP by the summed number of political treaties during that period. This 
interaction term, 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑖𝑑 ∩ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠, would show a positive feedback effect 
between U.S. political security-related agreements and treaties if the coefficient estimate for it 
was statistically significant and positive. However, in none of the estimations is this variable 
significant and as such is not reported in the results below. 
2.6 Empirical Evidence 
I estimate standard cross-country growth-aid models for a sample of developing countries 
from 1970-2019. Both economic and military aid are taken as shares of GDP and then logged. 
Lagged values of military and economic aid are used to explain recent (2010-2019) variations in 
recipients’ average growth rates over that 10-year period. Per capita GDP is the dependent 
variable for each regression, averaged from 2010-2019. All other variables are either averages, 
initial values, or sums from periods preceding 2010 (1970-2010; 1980-2010; 1980-2000).  
My baseline specification is similar to that of (Minoiu & Reddy, 2010b; Rajan & 
Subramanian, 2008), with control variables standard to growth regressions: logged GDP, 
institutional quality, indicators for the number of hostility episodes (including revolutions), the 
growth rate of the terms-of-trade, the standard deviation of the terms of trade, and the initial life 
expectancy.  
2.61 Cross-sectional results 
In order to estimate the long-term effects of aid and conflict on growth, I include 3 sets of 
deep lags for the aid variables, while the dependent variable remains the growth rate of per capita 
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GDP from 2010-2019. Other explanatory/control variables are similarly lagged and then 
averaged or summed over the three periods (1970-2010; 1980-2010; 1980-2000). 
The results obtained provide more evidence that (1) deeper lags are necessary and (2) 
disaggregating aid flow data is necessary to tease out the “true” impact of aid. In addition, I add 
to the existing literature that shows non-linearities in the way that aid impacts growth. 
Disaggregating U.S. security-related agreements and treaties proves useful, as the presence of 
military treaties attenuates the negative impact of military aid. The following equation is 
estimated: 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1. ln (𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐺𝐷𝑃 )𝑖 + 𝛽2. ln (𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐺𝐷𝑃 )𝑖 + 𝛽3. 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4. ln (𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐺𝐷𝑃 )𝑖 ∩ 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5. 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 +𝛽6. 𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑆 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽7. 𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑆 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽8. ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖 +𝛽9. ln ( 𝐾𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖 + 𝛽10. ln (𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃 )𝑖 + 𝛽11. ln(𝑝𝑜𝑝)𝑖 +𝛽12. 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽13. 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽14. 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 +𝛽15. 𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽16. ln(𝑇𝑂𝑇)𝑖 + 𝛽17. 𝑠𝑑(𝑇𝑂𝑇)𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 (3) 
where institutional quality is represented by either the CPIA, polity2, or Freedom House 
indicator and the number of years with conflict is either measured as having a hostility level of 3 
or above (meaning there is at least “use of force”) or having had fatalities greater than 25.  
Table 1 presents three novel specifications, which I use to examine the possibility that 
differing types of aid have unique impacts on economic growth. Three specifications are used to 
test different lags: the first uses lagged values from 1970-2010 regressed on growth from 2010-
2019, the second uses lagged values from 1980-2010, the third uses lagged values from 1970-
2000. All specifications have average growth from 2010-2019 as the dependent variable.  
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The results are fairly consistent through the specifications: military aid and security-
integration (by way of signed, enforced security-related agreements) negatively impact economic 
growth. Average growth is lower as recipient/host countries receive military aid, host U.S. bases, 
and sign security-related treaties. Economic growth was 0.675-.70 percentage points lower for 
countries which has received an additional 1% of GDP as military aid from the U.S. The effects 
are economically and statistically significant as the coefficients are sufficiently large and hold at 
the 90 and 95% confidence levels.  
The number of U.S. bases is shown to have a negative impact on economic growth, with 
each additional U.S. military base associated with decreases in economic growth of 26-32 
percentage points per base. The highest number of bases within the sample of developing 
countries is 8, so the maximum negative impact of U.S. base present is well above the range of 
the dependent variable (200 percentage points) and shows large economic significance: if a 
country has 8 bases, it is expected that their economic growth will be 213 to 255 percentage 
points lower than a country with the exact same characteristics but 0 U.S. military bases. U.S. 
bases are often positioned in conflict-torn countries or in places with security-issues, so it is 
possible that this variable is picking up regional turmoil in addition to the (intended) isolated 
impact of U.S. basing presence abroad and should therefore be interpreted cautiously. There are 
controls in-place for conflict, however. The specifications within are robust to the inclusion of 
two widely-used conflict indicators, both from the MIDB (hostility levels rising above a level of 
“3” and fatalities greater than 25). Both controls are statistically insignificant and do not change 
the sign of the U.S. base coefficient estimate significantly.  
A weaker—though still strong—effect is identified with regards to the more politically-
motivated security-related treaties (mutual defense agreements and amity agreements): for every 
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year with a politically-motivated security-related treaty signed and in-force within the lagged 
period (only for 1980-2010 and 1980-2010), growth is shown to increase by 1.8-2.4 percentage 
points. Some countries have politically-motivated security-related treaties in-force for nearly 
every year within the period, so the maximum value for these variables is 22 and 31 respectively. 
In the full panel (before the time abridgement), the correlation between military and politically-
related security treaties is low (0.318), so it is not necessarily the case that every country with a 
military treaty also has a political treaty. And the lagged summed number of political treaties is 
statistically and economically significant: if countries have politically-related treaties in-force 
during the whole of the analysis, economic growth could increase from 39.6 to 74.4 percentage 
points, nearly half of the range of economic growth (min: -65; max: 140) 
When regressing 1970-2010 and 1980-2010 averages onto 2010-2019 average growth 
rate, the statistical and economic significance of the interaction effect between military aid 
receipt and security-related treaties is positive, suggesting that aid non-linearly impacts growth. 
However, the magnitude of the interaction effect is always less than the individual impact of 
military-related treaties, suggesting that the overall impact for military-related treaties is 
negative, even in conjunction with military aid receipt. This adds further evidence to an already 
growing body of literature regarding aid’s nonlinearity (see lit review). Upon first look, the 
interaction variable between U.S. military aid and U.S. military treaties seems economically 
insignificant: the impact of security treaties only changes slightly as the average amount of 
military aid rises. Taken from a different perspective, the result becomes more meaningful: 
increases in the level of security treaties ameliorates the negative impact of military aid on 
growth (to the tune of 3 percentage point increases for each additional security treaty). The same 
can be said with regards to the negative impact of military aid: in the second model (regressing 
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1980-2010 values on average growth from 2010-2019), while 1% increases in military aid 
independently decrease economic growth by 0.7%, the same 1% increase in military aid will 
decrease growth by 0.67% if there is a new military treaty with that country. It seems that the 
presence of military aid receipt in conjunction with military treaties only slightly mitigates a net 
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Asia Dummy  77.04** 28.08      
N 55 48  53 47  40  
Adj R-squared 0.4995 .5161  .5360 0.4118  .7098  
* Statistical significance at the 1%; ** Statistical significance at the 5%; *** Statistical significance at the 1% 
T-stats are provided in parentheses during some robustness checks.  






2.7 Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, I estimated the relationship between different types of aid and per-capita 
economic growth in a large cross-section of aid recipients. U.S. aid is already labelled as military 
or economic, where military aid is any aid not explicitly tied to development goals or aims. My 
specifications allow for aid’s impact on growth to take place after long time lags.  
I find that U.S. aid has a robust, negative, effect on subsequent growth. Initially, it 
seemed that military aid was the culprit: coefficient estimates show significant impact within the 
cross-country regressions: 1% increase in average U.S. military aid over 1970-2010 is associated 
with average per capita GDP growth rates in the 2010s that are lower by .67-.70 percentage 
points. The negative growth effect occurs despite controlling for the existence and number of 
U.S. military bases. However, these regressions also include the amount of foreign GDP 
financed by economic aid, which moves with military aid for the most part.  
By checking the correlation coefficient, I see that multicollinearity issues between 
economic aid and military aid exist (r=0.66). By looking at just the growth rate of economic aid 
(logged economic aid as a share of recipient GDP) and the military aid’s fraction of total aid, I 
sidestep this multicollinearity issue and see a slightly different, though reinforcing picture: US 
aid (whether it is labelled economic or military) is associated with lower long-term growth rates, 
all else equal. This negative impact is ameliorated by the presence and number of years with 
active US military treaties, treaties that—while not correlated in the data—are accompanied by 
troop movements, US foreign trainees, sales of US arms, and US foreign basing operations, all 
actions which increase host economic activity. This impact is seen but is weak, the amelioration 




My other main findings are that not all U.S. security-agreements are equal in their impact 
on growth. Military-specific security agreements (those having to do with U.S. training, bases, or 
troops) are, generally, negatively associated with economic growth. Countries with one more 
military-related security agreement over 1970-2010 are associated with average per capita GDP 
growth rates in the 2010s that are lower by 2.8 to 4.2 percentage points. Conversely, more 
politically-leaning security agreements (those having to do with mutual defense pacts or amity38 
agreements) are positively associated with economic growth. An additional politically-leaning 
security agreement is shown to be associated with increases in per capita economic growth of 1.8 
to 2.4 percentage points. These results hold over most specifications and robustness checks.  
U.S. politico-military integration takes place for different reasons in different regions. 
Often, these regions have security-related concerns which precipitate a desire for U.S. integration 
to create more stability—an understated determinant of economic development. The evidence 
presents a different picture: U.S. politico-military integration is generally associated with lower 
growth rates. Increases in security treaties—only in conjunction with military aid flows—can be 
associated with increases growth. Otherwise, military treaties are associated with lower 
economic growth, an unexpected result. This may be because U.S. military treaties are mostly 
with countries in or around regions where security is a problem, dragging growth down. 
Regional controls were introduced and did not change the coefficient estimate results 
significantly.   
Years of hostility was controlled for in two different ways, but both of them come from 
an interstate database, lacking information about domestic terrorism, civil wars, and other violent 
or security-indicative events that may draw or ward off US foreign investors. It may well be that 
 
38 Loosely translates to “a friendly relationship”. 
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U.S. military treaties have no impact on growth, positive or negative, but that the countries with 
which the U.S. has most of its military treaties with are geographically or regionally limited in 
their growth potential.  
There is limited support that U.S. political treaties increase economic growth. This fits 
with our expectations: U.S. political treaties (mutual defense and amity treaties) address security 
concerns without any explicit manifestation. U.S. military treaties (troops, trainees, and Status of 
Forces Agreements) are accompanied by some sort of manifestation U.S. military personnel for 
troops treaties, sales of arms and training arrangements for training treaties, and the relocation 
and settlement of U.S. active military personnel and their families with Status of Forces 
Agreements. The U.S., when it makes credible commitments but is yet to put any pieces on the 
board (or boots on the ground), is growth-enhancing with respect to political treaties.  
U.S. economic aid shows a negative or null impact. This is contrary to common sense but 
not altogether surprising given the previous findings within the literature. U.S. economic aid is 
defined to be any aid that is not explicitly military in purpose. As such, U.S. economic aid could 
be suffering from the fungibility problem of all aid: governments failed to use the economic aid 
for productive means and instead financed existing projects with aid monies while funnelling the 
previously budgeted monies to non-productive uses. U.S. military treaties is negative in its 
impact, alongside the number and presence of U.S. military bases. Only when U.S. aid is 
interacted with U.S. military treaties do we see a slight attenuation of the net negative association 
with growth, and even then, it is quite small. U.S. politico-military integration, when given the 
choice, seems to be bad for growth in the long-run.  
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Chapter 3: Following the Funded Flag? The Impact of Foreign U.S. Military Aid, Military 
Presence, Trainees, and Basing on U.S. FDI 
 
 
Conflict often plays a role in securing direct investment. U.S. politico-military relations, 
in the form of U.S. military aid, U.S. troop deployment, U.S. training of foreign soldiers, U.S.-
funded military bases, and U.S. military bases hosted abroad may be assurances to U.S. investors 
that U.S. FDI is secure. If this is true, U.S. FDI would be seen to “follow the flag” with regards 
to FDI following U.S. basing and troop deployment activities. Following (Biglaiser & DeRouen, 
2007), I use panel data for 87 developing and emerging countries between 2000 and 2019 and 
test the effects of “follow the flag” variables on U.S. bilateral FDI. After controlling for 
macroeconomic conditions, economic and political reforms, and democratic regimes, I find that 
security factors do impact FDI in both the initial decision of whether to invest as well as the 
second decision, how much to invest. My results indicate a strong positive selection effect of 
U.S. military presence (active duty, reserve troops, and civilian DOD employees). The main 
equation shows a negative impact of U.S. military presence, as well as a negative impact of U.S. 
trainee presence. However, these negative impacts are small economically, especially when 
compared to the outsized economic significance of U.S. military aid spending abroad. 1% 
increases in U.S. military presence is associated with increases in FDI of only 0.56%. Lastly, the 
coefficient estimate for the logged total U.S. aid shows statistical (but not economic) 
significance, while the coefficient estimate for the military share of aid shows no significance. It 
seems that U.S. politico-military integration is associated with greater likelihood of positive FDI 
flows and greater amounts of FDI flows, but only for U.S. investors and not for global investors.   
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This paper investigates whether U.S. FDI “follows a funded flag”: large U.S. FDI flows 
following not only U.S. troop deployments, but also U.S. military aid flows and the 
establishment of U.S. foreign military bases (both U.S. and U.S.-sponsored). This paper extends 
and builds on Biglaiser & DeRouen (2007)’s panel analysis of emerging and developing 
countries from 1966-2002, who find that U.S. “follows the flag” in that U.S. troop presence leads 
to an increase in the likelihood of net positive FDI and the amount of FDI. I find no significant 
evidence that the U.S. FDI only “follows a funded flag” while still finding evidence that U.S. 
FDI “follows the flag” similar to Biglaiser & DeRouen (2007). While U.S. military base 
presence shows the correct sign and size (the presence of at least one base increases the 
likelihood of positive U.S. FDI by 34% that year), U.S. military aid has no impact in the 
likelihood of positive U.S. FDI that year and has a negative impact on U.S. FDI flow volume. 
Why is this? After all, the logged total aid shows a statistically significant and positive 
coefficient estimate throughout most of the specifications—even when looking at global FDI 
flows, not just U.S. FDI. It may be that U.S. military aid crowds out U.S. FDI. Having U.S. 
troops and U.S. bases is one thing, but large yearly receipt of military aid could stifle private 
investment activity in the recipient countries, deterring both domestic and foreign investment.  
While increases in the number of U.S. troops increases the likelihood of net positive U.S. 
FDI, increases in the number of U.S. troops decreases the amount of U.S. FDI flowing that year. 
This holds for U.S. trainees of foreign troops as well: increases in U.S. trainees increase the 
likelihood of net positive U.S. FDI but decrease the expected amount of U.S. FDI. This 
unexpected result is likely due to the inclusion of U.S. aid, a U.S. base presence dummy, and a 
variable capturing the share of aid devoted to military purposes.  
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The one expected result within, is with respect to U.S. bases: U.S. bases increase both the 
likelihood and the amount of U.S. FDI invested abroad in any given year. U.S. bases are costly to 
set-up and move, and so provide the most concrete and visible evidence of a U.S. backstop to the 
host nation. Note that these results hold whether I include unconfirmed U.S. bases, U.S.-funded 
bases, or smaller, supply- or refuelling-oriented “lily pad” bases.  
This paper focuses on the post-9/11 period of U.S. foreign policy. Other analyses are 
either now historical or they extend their analysis to cover both a portion of the post-9/11 period 
and earlier., Biglaiser & DeRouen (2007) looked over a period that includes both the Cold War 
and the start of the War in Iraq, and found that U.S. troop deployment has a positive impact on 
the collective decision-making of the U.S. investment community regarding foreign direct 
in/divestment, as well as a positive impact on the amount of FDI invested abroad. Host countries 
increasing U.S. troops deployed are associated with an increased chance of net positive U.S. 
bilateral FDI inflows by 24%. FDI also increased when U.S. troops increased. However, their 
analysis spans too great a period39 (1966-2002) and fails to capture the post-9/11 period. In 
addition, there is no mention of the impact of significant (and often complementary) element of 
U.S. foreign aid. This paper seeks to bridge that gap and add to it the important and understudied 
effect of aid and U.S. politico-military integration on FDI. 
Globerman and Shapiro (2003) uses the same two-stage estimation process as within to 
show the threshold effects of effective governance with regards to FDI: some minimum level of 
government/institutional quality is necessary for net positive FDI decision-making on the part of 
 
39 Using fixed effects requires that any unobserved heterogeneity holds for the period in question. Using 




international investors, and more effective governance infrastructure, particularly with regards to 
the legal system, are important determinants of the amount of multilateral FDI received.  
The inherent instability of financial flows and trade volume create pressure for 
governments to present and maintain a strong, trustworthy reputation in financial markets. As 
trust in a sovereign’s finances breaks down, financial flows reverse, and trade volume shrivels. 
Maintaining trust requires a  credible commitment to repaying debt. Despite the above problems, 
larger U.S. aid flows make debt commitments more creditable, and provides an implicit 
guarantee for foreign governments debts.  
In addition, greater U.S. presence (in the form of more than 100 active-duty deployed 
troops) improves sovereign credit ratings (Vea, 2015). Provided a country has not previously 
defaulted, a 1% increase in U.S. troop deployment is associated with an approximately 14 
percent improvement in the sovereign credit rating of the host country (Vea, 2015). As sovereign 
credit ratings are used by international investors when determining the interest rates at which the 
host countries can borrow, upgraded assessments of host countries provide tangible rewards in 
the form of cheaper capital and lower debt service payments. U.S. troop deployments have been 
shown to increase economic growth in host-nation states; every additional 100 troops deployed is 
associated with a small but significant increase (0.0023 percentage points) (Heo & Ye, 2019b). 
Countries that host U.S. active-duty troop deployments also host U.S. military bases or 
build U.S.-funded military bases of their own. U.S. military bases are either explicitly 
acknowledged, unacknowledged but documented, or small, mostly supply-oriented bases called 
“lily pads”40 (Vine, 2015). The specific impact of U.S. bases (outside U.S. troop presence) has 
 
40 For the purposes of this paper, these “lily pad” bases are not included; the presence of a lily pad, in and 




not been rigorously tested. There are anecdotal analyses, but few looks to the economic impact 
of the establishment of U.S. bases. There is a small literature on base closures  (Ashley & 
Touchton, 2014; Cooley, 2005; Hooker & Knetter, 2001; Paloyo et al., 2010; Sorenson & 
Stenberg, 2015), but the literature is heavily quantitative, focused on closures, and pertains to 
specific countries or periods of base closures and so is irrelevant for our discussion here.  
Foreign military aid is shown to have various impacts (positive and negative) on recipient 
country’s institutional and political outcomes (conflict, democratic backsliding or 
democratization, and human rights) (Dimant et al., n.d.; Dube & Naidu, 2010). U.S. aid may be 
associated with decreases in the human rights as government elites may use the extra aid (and 
influence) to suppress political opposition and/or democratization efforts, but U.S. aid and U.S. 
military presence may also improve human rights as U.S. military personnel are heavily trained 
to uphold human rights and (despite some notable exceptions) the moral leadership of U.S. 
foreign military troops may generate positive externalities with regards to fewer host-nation 
human rights abuses by host-nation police and/or troops (Apodaca & Stohl, 1999; Blanton, 2000; 
Blanton & Blanton, 2006, 2007; Meyer & Sinani, 2009).  
In this paper, I explore the idea that FDI flows are influenced by the perceived security of 
the country, which is enhanced not only by U.S. troop deployments and U.S. military aid, but 
also by the presence of U.S. foreign bases and U.S. trainees of foreign troops. Positive 
coefficient estimates in the first and second stage of the estimation are expected and will show 
that international investors collectively perceive U.S. involvement as a semi-permanent, 
bolstering signal.  
 
U.S. trainees of foreign troops. Only U.S. foreign military bases, U.S.-sponsored military bases, and 
unacknowledged U.S. military bases are included in this analysis for the above reason. 
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The overt wielding of U.S. military or aid mechanisms is no exception to the U.S. foreign 
policy playbook; it is the playbook. One example: U.S. Federal Reserve central bank swap 
auctions disproportionately benefit more U.S.-exposed countries (whether trade or asset 
exposure) (Rose & Spiegel, 2012). Theoretically, the impact of U.S. swap announcements on 
countries depends on three main things: exposure to the U.S., illiquidity, and dollar holding 
transparency/opaqueness. Empirically, only U.S. exposure shows robust, significant results, 
indicating a strong preference is given in swap auctions to those countries with strong U.S. ties 
(Rose & Spiegel, 2012). And with dollar liabilities to non-U.S. banks reaching $13 trillion (pre-
Great Financial Crisis levels), the need for dollar swaps is crucial (Aldasoro et al., 2020).  
A second example is the creation of Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in 
1969, a manifestation of the U.S.’s commitment to backstopping foreign investment. The U.S. 
Foreign Assistance Act was amended to include OPIC, an independent political risk insurer for 
U.S. multinational enterprises (Tarnoff & Lawson, 2010). OPIC was the direct response to host 
country contract abrogation, renegotiation, and even outright expropriation (Tarnoff & Lawson, 
2010). OPIC serves the U.S. by lowering risk for U.S. firms that invest in countries with foreign 
policy goals like the U.S. As the scope of OPIC operations is large, their actions can and do 
dampen general interest rates of host countries. OPIC operations have been large in scale and 
size, reaching over 150 countries41 in a various sectors have received funding/guarantee/or 
insurance for more than $200 billion since OPIC operations began in 1971 (Akhtar, 2016). In 
2012 (date of the latest Congressional Research Service report), OPIC provided $3.6 billion in 
new financing and risk insurance for U.S. firms (Akhtar, 2016) . 
3.1 Literature Review 
 
41 E.g., OPIC guaranteed the 1990 General Electric’s deal in Hungary. (Klein & Welfens, 2012) 
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In the most recent political economic analysis of U.S. foreign intervention, Coyne & 
Wood (2020) discuss the constraints of U.S. nation-building; successful foreign interventions 
require interveners to build more than physical infrastructure--institutions are equally important. 
The constraints stem from a knowledge problem, and the unintended consequences are fourfold. 
First, U.S. military and economic aid may increase corruption, while decreasing 
institutional quality. U.S. aid may introduce or perpetuate distortions to the public sector, 
increase rent-seeking, and delay policy reform (Coyne & Wood, 2020; Ear & Ear, 2015; 
Svensson, 2000) 
Second, U.S. aid can create a “dependency effect”, rendering recipient nations reliant on 
perennial foreign assistance. Also known as the “Samaritan’s Dilemma42,” this second effect is 
related to the “fungibility” of aid (discussed later), or the ability for aid to create disincentives for 
the recipient nation’s populace to invest productively (whether in themselves in the form of 
human capital, new business ventures, or necessary infrastructure) (Coyne, 2014; Coyne & 
Wood, 2020; Ostrom et al., 2002) .  
Third, there may be a “paradox of humanitarian action” in conflict-torn areas: interveners 
react quickly without full information of the political and ethical repercussions, thus creating a 
paradox where while intervention is almost always aimed at alleviating suffering, it may actually 
exacerbate it (Coyne & Wood, 2020). In a series of case studies of Pakistan, Honduras, Thailand, 
and Zaire, Terry (2013) shows the unsavory reality of how the rush for outsiders to “do 
something” resulted in resources in the hands of the very combatants that generated or were 
perpetuating the human suffering the aid was intended to ameliorate. Though hardly definitive, a 
 
42 Due to the fact that the “good samaritan”—in saving the distressed party—disincentivizes and/or 
precludes the possibility of the distressed party exerting sufficient effort (pulling up of one’s 
bootstraps) to be self-reliant. 
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recent study, U.S. Food Aid and Civil Conflict, showed that U.S. food aid can increase in the 
incidence and duration of civil conflicts43 (Coyne & Wood, 2020; Nunn & Qian, 2014). 
The fourth and final unintended consequence of foreign intervention is the crimes 
committed by interveners against host or recipient nations. These disturbing crimes include 
fraud, theft, assault, sexual assault, smuggling, and torture (Calder, 2010; Coyne & Wood, 2020; 
Vine, 2015).  
3.2 Determinants of FDI 
FDI determinants are generally split into three categories: (1) macroeconomic variables 
(which include “democratic advantage”), (2) state and regional security concerns, and (3) capital 
controls and other policy reforms.  In addition, foreign aid, would also have an impact on FDI.  
3.21 Macroeconomic Determinants 
Macroeconomic variables are important determinants of FDI, as they are the best 
quantitative indicators of an economy’s health (Oneal, 1988). Market size, real wage costs, 
infrastructure availability and growth, foreign exchange value, and gross capital formation are 
other factors widely seen as determinants of FDI flows (A. Chakrabarti, 2001; Kok & Ersoy, 
2009; Nunnenkamp, 2002). 
Agarwal (1980) found that host country market size the greatest determinant for FDI 
inflows to developing countries. When looking at multilateral FDI inflows to Africa, market size 
shows the expected large, positive coefficient estimate result (Kandiero & Chitiga, 2006).  
In perhaps the most well-known analysis, (Nunnenkamp, 2002) shows that market-related 
(macroeconomic) determinants are the most dominant in explaining FDI flows. Empirical 
 




evidence has and continues to confirm that market-related variables such as GDP, GDP growth, 
population, and GDP per capita are correlated to FDI, a result robust to conditional information 
backgrounds . A. Chakrabarti (2001) finds GDP per capita to have the greatest explanatory 
power, also disproving the usefulness of a whole set of traditional controls (wage, exchange rate, 
tariff, taxes, trade balance44). In addition, they find trade volume increases increase the 
likelihood of FDI inflows.  
Other, non-traditional variables have rarely held up to empirical scrutiny, apart from 
average years of schooling. However, this relationship may be more complicated than first 
appears, as the average level of schooling (i.e. above a primary education or secondary 
education) and the quality of schooling are shown to be important in how FDI flows impact 
growth, and so while it may also be an influence on FDI, we cannot consistently estimate the 
specific marginal impact with the current models and empirical tests (Wang & Wong, 2011).  
Multinational enterprises only choose direct investment when portfolio investment is 
relatively illiquid or non-existent. Traditional determinants (economic size, health, and growth) 
alone are surprisingly still dominant factors in explaining FDI (Nunnenkamp, 2002). Once again, 
of the non-traditional factors influencing FDI, only local skill (human capital) availability shows 
significance (Nunnenkamp, 2002).  
Spurred by (M. M. Olson, 1993)’s analysis of foreign investors’ penchant for 
authoritarian regimes, there has been significant debate regarding whether the governmental 
regime type is influential in attracting FDI, in stimulating growth and development, and in aid 
effectiveness. As there has been a broad trend of democratization in regimes globally, so too has 
 
44 And, surprisingly, the growth rate of GDP, which is excluded as a determinant in my equations for 
reasons explained below. 
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there been a trend towards showing that democratic regimes are “better” in terms of aid 
effectiveness, appeal to international investors, and growth. This so-called “democratic 
advantage” should be controlled for through the inclusion of some sort of institutional variable 
representing government regime type. 
3.211 Democratic advantage 
Democratization is said to play a large role in determining FDI flows (Biglaiser et al., 
2008; Busse & Hefeker, 2007; N. M. Jensen, 2003a; Li & Resnick, 2003; Oneal, 1994b; Tures, 
2003). Authoritarian regimes don’t have to worry about keeping their populace happy, and so 
may be less likely to bend to populist whims and more likely to hold fast to investment 
agreements (so is the argument of (Tuman, John P. Emmert, 2004)). However, democratic 
institutions can help oversee financial markets and contain corruption, making them the more 
attractive place for FDI (Biglaiser & Danis, 2002; N. M. Jensen, 2003a), 
Overall, democratic regimes have been shown to positively influence FDI inflows, 
regardless of their origin. This so-called “democratic advantage”—a signal to foreign investors 
that their investments are less likely to be expropriated or interfered with—does hold. After 
controlling for democratic regimes, security alliances still have a positive impact on FDI (Li & 
Vashchilko, 2010a). This impact may be partially or wholly the result of U.S. military aid (the 
“funding”) and its multiplier effects. I investigate within this chapter whether the supplemental 
funding (in the form of U.S. military aid) has a significant impact on U.S. FDI flows, after 
controlling for democratic regimes and security alliances.  
3.22 Security, Conflict, and FDI 
It makes sense that conflict would decrease, and alliances increase net bilateral FDI: 
regions with greater conflict are less likely to have the sustained increase in economic activity 
 
163 
desired by MNCs and foreign investors. It  may also be true that areas with greater conflict may 
also draw investors as they think (maybe correctly) that they can demand higher rates of return 
for their capital and/or fill the gap where domestic production may fall short. A broad analysis 
studying 95 developing countries from 1980-2000 finds strong evidence for enduring risk of 
internal and regional conflicts to foreign portfolio flows, but only finds weak evidence with 
regards to FDI (Kim, 2016).  
In a similar manner, political instability is shown to have negative impacts on FDI flows, 
at least historically (Schneider & Frey, 1985). Stability may be bolstered by U.S. troop presence 
(Braithwaite & Kucik, 2017). Using an IV regression and endogenizing troop deployment, 
(Braithwaite & Kucik, 2017) find supporting evidence of U.S. troops reducing civil conflict 
likelihood in host states. Li & Vashchilko (2010) find that interstate military conflict negatively 
impacts bilateral FDI.  
As we have observed above, FDI’s impact is often due to the existing infrastructure or 
affected by extent of spending on productive infrastructure during and after FDI spending. The 
presence of U.S. troops and the receipt of U.S. aid (economic and military) can have positive 
externalities, above and beyond the direct injection when U.S. bases are built, troops spend off-
base, and foreign governments spend U.S. aid dollars; there can be “ship-yard externalities” from 
the knowledge transfer that comes from hiring local residents and training them in new 
production processes.  
However, U.S. presence abroad is not always positive. Nor is it necessarily negative. U.S. 
bases have been shown to only improve human rights conditions in places with low security 
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salience45 (Bell, Clay, Machain, et al., 2017); U.S. military interests can sometimes overshadow 
human rights concerns with regards to aid (Apodaca & Stohl, 1999). To complicate matters 
further, strong human rights are an important political determinant for FDI (Blanton & Blanton, 
2007). 
U.S. military presence may be linked to increases in terrorist episodes, when looking at 
106 countries between 1986 and 2011 (Dimant et al., 2017). However, it is important to keep in 
mind that the above paper fails to distinguish between business-related and non-business-related 
terrorism; only business-related terrorism has a significant negative impact on FDI (Powers & 
Choi, n.d.). Analyzing a cross-sectional, time-series dataset spanning 123 countries from 1980-
2008, the authors found no evidence that non-business-related transnational terrorism 
significantly impacts FDI (Powers & Choi, n.d.).  
Studies have also investigated the connection between aid and public spending. Country-
specific studies, such as (Pack & Pack, 1990) for Indonesia and  (Gang et al., n.d.) for India, 
show that total (bilateral plus multilateral) foreign aid is retained in the public sector, primarily 
stimulating development (Khilji & Zampelli, 1994). However, multilateral aid shows no 
significant correlation with recipient country military spending. Looking at 46 less developed 
countries over the 1975-1980 period, (Cashel-Cordo & Craig, 1990) disaggregate aid and public 
spending and find no correlation between DAC bilateral ODA loan disbursements, DAC bilateral 
ODA grants, local currency disbursements, and highly conditional IMF disbursements—they did 
find a slight negative correlation between low conditional IMF disbursements and IMF 
 
45 According to Bell et al. (2017), “While any state where the U.S. has a large military presence will have 
some security salience, among the wide array of states where the U.S. has troops present there is going 
to be variation in just how important that state is to the U.S. security goals”. 
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commodity disbursements. In addition, (Cashel-Cordo & Craig, 1990) find that bilateral aid is 
largely diverted to the private sector.  
(Feyzioglu et al., 1998) form a model of aid fungibility46 and test it on a panel of 14 
developing countries from 1971-1990 and with annual time-series data from 1970-1990 on 38 
countries to find that only a fraction of development assistance shows up in increased public 
investment. Most aid is fungible, as the sectoral analysis in the smaller sample shows that 
concessionary agricultural, energy, and education-related loans are diverted when aid inflows 
increase; only transport and communication sector loans are fully spent on donor-intended 
purposes (Feyzioglu et al., 1998).  
3.23 Capital Controls / Policy Reforms 
Multinationals may be wary of investment due to the risk of expropriation. Certain policy 
choices may assure (or deter) international investors, depending on the country and geopolitical 
environment.  
Economic and policy reform variables include indicators for trade restriction and capital 
control measures. However, there are issues regarding the conflicting nature of how capital and 
trade restriction measures are received by international investors. Trade restrictions like tariffs 
and quotas at times and under certain circumstances positively and negatively impact FDI flows, 
so the net impact is ambiguous. For instance, FDI may be more likely to occur where tariffs are 
lowest, an intuitive result as profitability increases when taxes of any type are lowest (Agarwal, 
Gubitz, and Nunnenkamp 1992).  
 
46 Fungibility denoting the ability/penchant/action of diverting resources away from government sectors 
or programs that are now to receive foreign aid funding. 
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On the other hand, FDI may be involved in circumventing high trade barriers; high trade 
barriers would then be sometimes positively correlated with FDI, and they are (Ellingsen and 
Warneryd 1999). However, the perceived trend of the 1990s and early 2000s—where FDI was 
formed to jump tariffs and other trade controls—lost its little evidence supporting it as general 
liberalization of FDI frameworks have resulted in explosion of service sector activity, and failed 
to result in any significant impact regarding export-oriented sectors or efficiency-seeking 
industries (low-labor and/or low-environmental regulatory cost) (Nunnenkamp, 2002).  
With regards to capital controls, there is also a time and a place for when they are 
positive indicators for FDI and when otherwise are seen to be negative. While it seems natural 
that reduced capital controls would incentivize greater FDI, international investors may react 
positively, perceiving the continual presence of capital controls as an indication of a stabilized 
economy (Desai, Fritz, and Hines (2005)47. Capital control liberalization is positively correlated 
with a 6.9% increase in annual rates of property, plant, and equipment (investment) growth by 
U.S. multinational firm spending abroad (Desai et al., 2006). 
 Capital account openness is shown to be associated with increases in developing country 
FDI inflows48 (Reinhardt et al., 2013). Other papers have fail to find significant evidence that 
capital flows are significant determinants of medium-run capital flows, but posit that this is 
likely due to measurement error rather than a finding that capital controls have no impact on net 
capital flows (as measured by changes in the current account balance) (Chinn & Prasad, 2003). 
In an extension of that work on medium-run capital flow dynamics, Chinn et al. (2014) find that 
 
47 Bilateral investment treaties with the U.S., when and only when they are in force, are associated with 
increases in FDI (Haftel, 2010). Later iterations of this paper will include enforced bilateral investment 
treaties as an independent variable. 
48 They also find that more open capital accounts are associated with net capital outflows in developed 
countries. This paper only pertains to developing and emerging countries though. 
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removing capital controls can be harmful, making the direct, negative impact of financial 
development on the current account even worse.  
While macroeconomic indicators, political and economic policy reforms, and the level of 
democratization may play a role in FDI flows, the focus here is on how U.S. military aid and 
military presence impacts FDI. Therefore, I control for the factors above. The 
politicians/bureaucrats in charge are, after all, primarily concerned with retaining power, 
maintaining sovereignty, and expanding economic development, all of which foreign investment 
support. Barring some natural resource windfall, developing and emerging countries simply lack 
the existing capital, domestically, to expand at a rate to which their populace expects.   
While theory and common sense would have FDI catalysing growth, there is limited 
evidence that growth causes FDI49 (Avik Chakrabarti, n.d.). While market size does play a role, 
the growth of the market is also important to investors when looking at expanding MNC activity 
or investing abroad. I include the lagged growth rate of GDP as a control variable as a result.  
International investors, though, are justifiably cautious in further expansions of their 
balance sheets, as sovereign debt defaults often create untenable positions for those investors, 
resulting in complete losses or large hair-cuts. Governments do not care so much about a 
potential loss of credit rating; it will not keep them from defaulting, as shown in (Ahmed et al., 
2010). International investors will look to other enforcement mechanisms. Barring that, they will 
seek investments that—while still providing yield—are financially backstopped in some manner. 
 
49 In addition, there is mixed evidence regarding FDI’s impact on growth (Chowdhury & Mavrotas, 2005; 
Durham, 2003; Wang, 2009) 
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3.24 U.S. Aid and U.S. FDI 
The literature that attempts to directly link aid with FDI (and test the possible 
complementarities) is inconsistent. Schneider & Frey (1985) test four standard FDI flow models 
for 80 developing and emerging countries and find that that bilateral aid from western countries50 
is the strongest of the significant coefficient estimates found, with per-capita GNP a close 
second. Multilateral aid (when disaggregated into political and economic aid flows) also 
positively impacted FDI flows, though the impact is around 1/3 of that of bilateral aid from 
western countries.  
Harms & Lutz (2006) look at a panel of emerging and developing countries in the 1990s 
and find no significant impact of aid on FDI, even after controlling for governance and 
institutional controls. Their results reinforce those found by Rodrik (1995)51, who found no 
significant impact on lagged multilateral lending and private financial flows. Bird & Rowlands 
(2004) also fail to find any significant impact of multilateral lending on private financial flows, 
pointing to the heterogeneity of both capital flows and lending and the need to disaggregate. 
Ratha (2001) argues and shows that while a contemporaneous aid-FDI effect may not be present, 
there may be a staggered complementarity between aid and FDI as aid creates and sustains 
improved institutional environments, an attractive quality for FDI.  
 
50 As opposed to bilateral FDI from communist countries (which shows a statistically significant negative 
impact on FDI flows) (Schneider & Frey, 1985) 
51 One thing Rodrik (1995) did find was that multilateral lending seemed to follow private financial flows, 
providing support for a theory of international lending organizations “bailing out” private investors, a 
theory argued by (Dooley & Svenson (1994). 
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Aid could, theoretically, be good or bad for FDI. It could be good because aid, when 
accompanied by an increase in complementary factors of production52, can increase the 
productivity of all private investment and therefore make that aid recipient more attractive for 
international investors and multinational corporations (Selaya & Sunesen, 2012).. Aid could be 
bad for FDI because of the possibility of (1) crowding out the recipient countries’ tradeable 
goods sector (Beladi & Oladi, 2006) or the possibility that (2) aid inflows encourage rent-seeking 
behavior, decreasing productivity (Economides et al., 2008). 
Infrastructure is a possible channel for the impact of aid on FDI.Donaubauer et al. (2016) 
posits that there are inextricable dependencies between aid allocation (sectorally), infrastructure 
growth, and FDI flows. As such, they estimate three structural equation representing each of the 
above in a 3SLS process and find strong evidence that aid in transportation shows a significant 
direct link to FDI flows, while targeted aid and aid in infrastructure projects increase 
infrastructure directly53—and infrastructure is shown to directly increase FDI—and so also 
indirectly.  
This approach is well-guided, as foreign investors often comment that poor infrastructure 
is a leading bottleneck to FDI (Asiedu, 2002). And infrastructure indices are inconsistent, leading 
international investors to largely rely on reputation and (perhaps) previously funded and 
completed infrastructure-related aid projects as indicators of existing good infrastructure.  
The extent of politico-military integration with the U.S. would also affect bilateral FDI 
flows. Thus, U.S. bilateral FDI to Iraq has remained consistently positive despite the significant 
 
52 Complementary inputs defined to be health, educational, transportation, communication, and energy 
sectors (Selaya & Sunesen, 2012). Inputs that crowd out FDI were shown to be aid directed into 
“productive sectors” like industry, trade, agriculture, and banking (Selaya & Sunesen, 2012). 
53 Vijil & Wagner (2012) find evidence that well-targeted aid improves infrastructure, using a cross-
country approach similar to Donaubauer et al. (2016). 
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drawdown of U.S. troop deployment in Iraq in 2011 and the correlating pattern of perennial net 
negative multilateral FDI that has lasted from 2012 to 2019 (BEA, WDI). U.S. bilateral FDI to 
Afghanistan has also been perennially positive in the years for which data has been collected 
(BEA, WDI). In both these circumstances, the presence of the U.S. military has a lasting and 
positive impact on FDI decisions.  
U.S. FDI, when involving considerable integration with the host country or in a higher-
skilled sector, tends to value stronger human rights, particularly physical integrity rights (Blanton 
& Blanton, 2009).  
Further, the positive impact of U.S. military presence on FDI decisions may like the 
impact of aid, flow through an infrastructure spending channel. After all, large aid packages are 
offered in compensation54 for basing rights, and barring significant corruption, greater amount of 
government revenue allows for and encourages productive public spending, possibly leading to 
better infrastructure and institutions.  
The literature surrounding security and U.S. FDI shows evidence that U.S. FDI “follows 
the flag”, in that U.S. investors feel more comfortable when U.S. basing and troop deployments 
are present in the country within which they are considering investing (Biglaiser & DeRouen, 
2007; Bove et al., 2014). What has received less attention is the impact of the interplay of 
military aid and military presence on FDI flows. This is gap that this study addresses. 
  
 
54 For example, President Ismael Gulleh of Djibouti renegotiated from $7 million annual in aid in 2002 
(when the U.S. base was established) to over $90 million in 2003 and 2004. Rental payments for the 




There are causality issues with both “follow the flag” and aid-for-FDI dynamics. Is it that 
U.S. investors invest abroad when the U.S. security apparatus appears to be enhancing the 
security of the region? Or does U.S. policy reflect the changing foreign interests of U.S. 
investors and multinational companies? Ultimately, correlation may play a key factor here too: a 
low capital may stock reflects the high aid need for aid and that same dearth in capital is often 
accompanied by larger returns for investors. Similarly, highly corrupt governments 
disincentivize aid donors and international investors alike.  
To estimate how the security variables impact U.S. FDI, I control for macroeconomic, 
policy, and polity conditions in an approach familiar in the literature (Dreher & Jensen, 2007; N. 
M. Jensen, 2003a; N. Jensen & McGillivray, 2005; Lee et al., 2012). The Hausman test suggests 
the need to model fixed effects (Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007). There are likely unobservable 
systematic factors influencing U.S. investment decisions with regards to FDI (Biglaiser & 
DeRouen, 2007; Blanton & Blanton, 2006; Reed, 2000). U.S. FDI may fail to go to the poorest 
developing countries or those with frequent conflict. If this occurred, the coefficient estimates for 
the independent variables of interest would be biased. If a selection process predetermines the 
countries receiving FDI (as opposed to disinvestment—net financial outflows from the 
host/recipient country), I must solve two equations simultaneously, one for the selection equation 
and one for the main equation (Reed, 2000) (Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007).  
The reason for the two-stage Heckman process is that bilateral FDI is negative at times. 
As the relationship is non-linear, there are two solutions to analyzing the net bilateral FDI flows. 
The first is to use a Heckman process whereby a dummy variable is created and coded to 1 when 
FDI is positive and 0 otherwise. A (probit) selection equation is estimated with the dummy 
variable as the dependent variable while a main equation uses just the selected datapoints to 
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estimate with (now, only the positive) bilateral FDI country-year datapoints. A two-stage 
Heckman process is used to model the two equations simultaneously. Consistent estimators are 
produced despite the possible selection bias (Blanton 2000:127) (Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007). 
Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007, pp. 836-837) assert that security influences both the decision to 
invest internationally as well as the amount invested. Following this logic, FDI would follow an 
enhanced security status, due, in part, to U.S. military presence, military aid, and non-active 
troop foreign military employment.  
Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007, pp. 836-837) use the same methodology as Blanton 
(2000), who looks at U.S. military aid and uses the same two-stage model where a selection 
(“gatekeeping”) stage bifurcates the dataset depending on whether the country received aid or 
not. The dependent variable of Blanton (2000)’s outcome equation is the amount of aid. Negative 
FDI years (divestment years) are treated as non-selected and coded as 0 in the selection equation. 
Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007, pp. 836-837) use U.S. FDI and the percentage of GDP that is 
global FDI as the dependent variables in their analysis. I use the same dependent variable in my 
outcome equations.  I expect all security factors (troops, non-troops, trainees, military aid, 
number of bases) to be positive and significant in both phases but particularly economically 
significant in the gate-keeping (selection) phase.  
The second approach is to add some constant, c, to the dependent variable before taking 
the logarithmic transformation of it. I do this in the fixed effects regression, same as (Biglaiser & 
DeRouen, 2007).  
Lastly, to investigate whether the “follow the flag” phenomenon is isolated to U.S. FDI, I 
include another robustness check where I use the same Heckman selection process but code a 
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new variable, Multi_Positive_FDI_Dummy, which takes the value of 1 when multilateral net 
FDI inflows are positive and 0 when they are negative.  
3.4 Data 
The variables used within reflect the seminal paper from which is my point of departure, 
Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007, pp. 836-837). In the following section, I detail the variables 
employed and their sources. There are some notable exceptions with regards to my attempt to 
replicate (Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007) in exact: there are a different set of capital controls and 
the new inclusions of military bases and military aid.  
3.41 Summary Information for Data 
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Chapter 3.41 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
GDP (constant 2010) 1,704 $120 B $328 B $29 M $2.9 Trillion 
Bilateral FDI 1051 $20 M $265 M - $2 B $3.6 B 
Bilateral Trade  1,671 $50 M $114 M 0 $730 M 
Hostility dummy 1,739 .0477286 .2132527 0 1 
Democracy dummy 1,330 .5894737 .4921144 0 1 
      
Troops 1,739 120.7677 607.3531 0 12174 
Trainees 1,528 305.0465 630.9117 1 9122 
Military Aid 1,548 $29.8 M $149 M 0 $1.3 B 
Number of Bases 1,244 .1720257 1.021564 0 8 
Capital Control Dummy 517 .4719536 .4996963 0 1 
DoD Civilian Employment 799 5.688039 24.50397 0 257 
Labor Force 1619 16 B 53 B 43 M 49 B 










Bilateral FDI (bilat_FDI) Negative values indicate divestment; 
positive values indicate net investment 
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U.S. Troops > 100  
(active_duty_over_100) 
U.S. forward presence episodes (years 
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Capital Control Measure 0 for no direct investment inflow capital 
controls, 1 for enforced direct investment 
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0 for nondemocratic, 1 for democratic 
regime 
Skaaning et al. 2015 
Democratization 
(polity) 
Polity IV measure (-10 to 10, 10 = most 
democratic) 
Marshall and Jaggers 2002 
Regime Type  
(htw_regime1ny) 
Regime type, collapsed  Hadenius et al. 2013 
 
3.42 Dependent Variable 
I use 85 developing and emerging countries to assess the effect of U.S. security ties on 
bilateral U.S. FDI. I use every available case where data is available. FDI data is provided by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The data provided by the BEA is in nominal millions of 
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dollars and measures long-term investments by U.S. residents. Deflating this with the GDP 
deflator controls for inflation. As the BEA suppresses some years from their analysis (to avoid 
the possibility that investments can be traced back to a single investor/firm), I exclude those 
country-year data from my analysis, following (Rosecrance & Thompson, 2003)  (Little et al., 
2004) and (Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007). Similarly, country-years where changes in financial 
stocks fall between -$500,000 and $500,000 are omitted from the BEA data and are not 
available. In this way, the U.S. bilateral FDI flow data is bottom-coded. 
U.S. military deployment data is missing for the years of 2006 and 2007. The Department 
of Defense DMDC provides data on global troop deployment locations starting in September 
2008. I use these to augment the existing database of U.S. troop deployments, made available by 
Tim Kane and the Heritage Foundation. The Heritage Foundation troop database provides 
detailed information for the active-duty personnel positioned abroad beginning in 1950 and 
ending in 2005. Data availability for many developing- and emerging countries is spotty at best 
pre-2000. I use all data available post-2000, including the most recent year (2019). 
3.43 Independent Variables 
3.431 Security Variables: 
The United States maintains an extensive network of foreign basing operations and has 
since the end of World War II in addition to widespread U.S. military deployment abroad (Heo 
& Ye, 2017a; Vine, 2015).  Moderate estimates price the cost of U.S. foreign base maintenance 
around U.S.$85 billion annually (Vine, 2015). Overseas military bases employed 81,425 local 
residents and has been valued around 127 billion USD in 2005, the last date available (Vine, 
2015; Johnson, 2006). 
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Greater U.S. foreign basing presence, military aid, and non-military deployment impact 
trade relations, capital flows, and economic growth. Greater involvement of the U.S. security 
apparatus (as proxied through non-troop deployment and U.S. basing presence) can be seen to be 
strengthening regional stability, one reflection of which is better sovereign host nation credit 
ratings (Vea, 2015).  
U.S. troop deployment is measured as any country-year observations where active-duty 
troop deployment is greater than 100. This cut-off is common to the literature, as troop 
deployments of less than 100 are indicative of small contingency forces guarding embassies 
and/or other small U.S. holdings. U.S. non-troop deployment is an aggregation of all reserve and 
civilian (DoD) employees (U.S. DMDC) as well as all U.S. trainees (SecurityAssistance.Org). 
U.S. basing presence is calculated as a dummy variable, coded as 1 when there is a U.S. 
base, U.S.-funded base, lily-pad base, or unconfirmed U.S. base, or any combination.  
Total aid is calculated by combining economic aid and military aid. Economic and 
military aid is sourced from both government and non-government organizations and is the most 
encompassing measure of U.S. transfer payments abroad.  
The military share of aid is calculated by dividing military aid by total aid.  
3.432 Macroeconomic Variables: 
Macroeconomic variables are, as shown above, the foundation of the FDI determinant 
literature. Specifically, countries with high growth rates, increasing living standards (as proxied 
by GDP per capita), and large markets are sought by multinational enterprises as FDI 
destinations. The macroeconomic variables used in the regression are: GDP per capita, economic 
growth, lagged, logged bilateral trade with the U.S., the total number of employed persons in that 
country, a dummy variable for the presence of at least one hostility event that year, a dummy 
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variable for capital controls on foreign direct inflows, a dummy variable for whether the country 
is a democracy or not, and a squared distance between capital cities variable as the gravity model 
applies to financial flows as well as trade.  
3.433 Economic / Policy Reform Variables: 
Despite the mixed evidence regarding capital controls and their hypothesized impact on 
FDI, I choose to include capital controls since I am closely following (Biglaiser & DeRouen, 
2007). As I was unable to acquire or otherwise replicate the exact capital controls used in 
(Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007), I use a new capital control dataset published by the NBER in 
2015. This capital control dataset is unique in that it disaggregates capital control measures by 
the sector and flow measure. As I am interested in FDI flows from the U.S. to host/recipient 
nations, I look at the direct investment inflow (dii) controls (Fernández et al., 2015).55  Instead of 
the 9-point capital control measure developed by (Brune et al., 2001), I use the (Fernández et al., 
2015) measurement, while is a simple binary variable with 0 indicating no capital controls on 
direct investment inflows and 1 indicating enforced capital controls on direct investment inflows. 
3.434 Democratization Variables: 
As with growth, it is hotly debated as to whether democratization is an important 
determinant of FDI. On one side, researchers find that “benevolent dictators” with authoritarian 
regimes create and maintain domestic stability, which then allows for and translates to 
international creditworthiness (G. O’Donnell, 1978; G. A. O’Donnell, 1988; Oneal, 1994a; 
Tuman, John P. Emmert, 2004). On the other side, it is argued that democratic institutions are 
more effective at monitoring and defending capital (Tures, 2003).  
 
55 Upon further reflection, I should run another regression set with dio, direct investment outflow 
controls, as the ability to withdraw funds may be what really drives FDI behavior.  
 
179 
Democratic countries are not conclusively found to be more attractive in the eyes of 
international investors nor more prone to economic growth (when compared to authoritarian 
regimes). Indeed, despite the merits of democratic rule, “benevolent dictators” so-to-speak can 
and do quite well at managing their economies and, as such, attract significant FDI and see 
consistent economic growth (Burnside & Dollar, 2000a; N. M. Jensen, 2003b; M. Olson, 1993). 
Olsen (1993) and Heo & Ye (2017a) assert that regime type (democratic vs. authoritarian) had a 
significant impact on domestic and foreign investment. And while regime type did statistically 
and economically significantly impact the measures of domestic and foreign investment and 
trade, the seemingly unrelated regression dropped that variable from sub-regression where 
economic growth was the dependent variable, further justifying skepticism regarding the growth 
impact of regime type (Heo & Ye, 2017a).  
Democratic institutions can and do provide international credibility as they are shown to 
bolster property rights enforcement and lower political risks for foreign investors (Biglaiser & 
Danis, 2002; Li & Resnick, 2003). I include a democracy dummy as well as the commonly used 
Polity IV index to control for this. 
3.44 Regression Equations 
The Heckman two-stage process is combined with lagging the LHS variable one period 
and lagging select RHS variables one period. The main equation is: 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1. 𝐼𝑛(𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵2.𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝐵3. 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵4. ln (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑖𝑑)𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝐵5. 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵6. 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵7. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 +𝐵8. 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵9. 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
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𝐵10. 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵11. 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵12. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖2 +𝐵13. 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
The selection equation is: 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1. 𝑙𝑛 (𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵2. 𝑈𝑆 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +𝐵3. 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵4. 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝐵5. 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵6. 𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝐵7. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖2 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
As I am looking at how the inclusion of aid and bases impacts the already established 
impact of U.S. troop deployment on FDI, I include a second and third Heckman regression: one 
without aid & bases, and with troops & trainees; and one with aid & bases, but without troops or 
trainees. The main equation for the Heckman 2 regression (without aid & bases) is as follows: 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1. 𝐼𝑛(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 100)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵2.𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝐵3. 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵4. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵5. 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝐵6. 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵7. 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +𝐵8. 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵9. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖2 + 𝐵10. 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
While the selection equation changes from (2) to become: 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1. ln (𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + +𝐵4. 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝐵5. 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵5. 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +𝐵6. 𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + B7. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖2 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
Heckman 3 regression drops troops and trainees, keeps total aid and the military share of 
aid in the main equation, replace the Base Presence Dummy for Number of U.S. Bases and adds 
total aid and the military share of aid to the selection equation as well. The result is as follows: 
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𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1. ln (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑖𝑑)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵2. 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝐵3. 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵4. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵5. 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝐵6. 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵7. 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +𝐵8. 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵9. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖2 + 𝐵10. 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵11. 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑆 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (5) 
The selection equation is: 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1. 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵2. 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +𝐵3. 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵4. 𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 +B5. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖2 + 𝐵6. ln(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑖𝑑)𝑖,𝑡 +𝐵7. 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (6) 
The fixed effects regression is accomplished by first adding a constant56 to bilateral FDI 
and then taking the logarithmic transformation. This is the same procedure used in (Biglaiser & 
DeRouen, 2007). The fixed effects equation is: ln (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐹𝐷𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1. 𝑈𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵2. 𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +𝐵3. 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵4. ln (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑖𝑑)𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝐵2. 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵3. 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝐵4. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵5. 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝐵6. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵6. 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝐵7. 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + +𝐵10. 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (7) 
 
56 For my data, I used $17 million as the variable 𝑐, since the lowest value in my net FDI data was less 
than $16 million 
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For further robustness, (Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007) thought to test whether the security 
impact is isolated to just U.S. investors. By looking at multilateral FDI (global FDI), and running 
the same Heckman selection model, I look at whether or not the gatekeeping and security-
enhancing effects still hold. I use the same measure of multilateral FDI as  (Biglaiser & 
DeRouen, 2007): global FDI as a percentage of GDP. The equation is below: 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖_𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1. 𝐼𝑛(𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵2.𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝐵3. 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵4. ln (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑖𝑑)𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝐵5. 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵6. 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 +𝐵7. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵8. 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵9. 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +𝐵10. 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵11. 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵12. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖2 +𝐵13. 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖_𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (8) 
The selection equation is: 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖 𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1. ln (𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝐵2. 𝑈𝑆 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵3. 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +𝐵4. 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝐵5. 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵6. 𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 +B7. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖2 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (9) 
3.5 Results 
Results of the two-stage Heckman process models and the panel time-series are shown in 
Table 3. The first column reports the selection results as well as the full Heckman specification. 
Robust standard errors are employed. Column two reports the Heckman 2 model, the model 
without aid & bases but with active duty over 100 and the aggregate maximum presence 
variable. Column 2 presents the regression results most similar to those in (Biglaiser & 
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DeRouen, 2007), although comparisons should be made cautiously as my sample is smaller, the 
time period different, and I include the additional variable of U.S. trainees as well as U.S. active 
duty troops over 100 (the latter of which is the same primary independent variable used in 
Biglaiser & DeRouen (2007).   
Column 3 presents the Heckman 3 results, which includes total aid, military share of aid, 
and number of bases, but leaves out U.S. troops and trainees. Column 4 presents the panel time-
series fixed effect regression results (using logged positive FDI as the dependent variable). The 
fourth column reports the findings from the main and selection specification for a multilateral 
FDI model. The Wald tests on the two Heckman models are inconclusive, indicating that the 
selection and main equation equations may not be independent, suggesting these results should 
be interpreted with caution.  
The story within is as follows: U.S. military presence, when logged and lagged, shows a 
positive impact on the selection of U.S. FDI flows but a negative impact on the amount of U.S. 
FDI. A 1% increase in U.S. military presence last year is associated with a 17.5% increase in the 
likelihood of positive bilateral FDI flows to that country this year. These findings are largely 
consistent with those found by (Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007), who found that 1% increases in 
military presence increases the likelihood of positive U.S. FDI by ~24%. However, the 
similarities end there, as the coefficient estimate for U.S. troops on the main equation (that 
determining the actual U.S. FDI flow that year if it is net positive) is negative in my analysis, not 
positive as expected. Increases in U.S. troops increase the likelihood of U.S. investors to directly 
invest abroad but decreases the amount of FDI invested abroad, even after controlling for the 
typical macroeconomic determinants of FDI as well as variables reflecting security concerns, 
policy differences, capital controls, and democratization. For every 100 additional U.S. troops, 
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there is an associated decrease in U.S. FDI of $69,000. Looking military base presence, I find 
that the presence of a U.S. base, lily-pad, or U.S.-sponsored base increases the likelihood of 
positive U.S. FDI by 34%.  
Logged total aid is consistently statistically significant, even in the regressions using 
global FDI flows57 instead of U.S. FDI flows. A 1% increase in total aid is associated with a 
22%-31% increase in total U.S. FDI. The military share of aid is playing a large role here as 
well, but not in the selection equation or “gatekeeping” phase and not in the direction I 
hypothesized. Once the decision has been made by U.S. investors to invest abroad, the military 
share of U.S. total aid has a large and statistically significant impact on the amount of FDI 
invested. A 1% increase in the military share of aid is associated with a decrease in total bilateral 
U.S. FDI of ~$260,000. This result makes sense if increases in military aid are always associated 
with increases in conflict or hostility58. Since the coefficient estimate of changes in total aid are 
consistently positive, this means that economic aid is associated with positive changes in FDI 
flows.  
U.S. troops are not the only determinant at work here in the selection equation. In the 
selection equation, we see that democratic regimes, employed persons, and the presence of at 
least one U.S. military base have a positive and significant impact on whether U.S. FDI flows are 
net positive that year. Democratic regimes are also associated with increases in the amount of 
U.S. FDI. The presence of a democratic regime increases the likelihood of positive FDI by 30% 
 
57 The coefficient estimate for logged, lagged total U.S. aid on global FDI flows is statistically 
significant but much lower in magnitude than when looking at U.S. FDI flows only: 0.007% compared to 
22-42%.  
58 Hostility Presence Dummy should be controlling for that. Perhaps the inclusion of a robustness 
check using the Correlates of War Projects’ Militarized Interstate Dispute (v3.10) data would be worth 




to 45% and increases the average amount of $1.3 million. These are both large impacts, further 
confirmation of the “democratic advantage” hypothesis.  
All control variables—apart from the hostility variable—show statistical significance. 
This is reassuring, as I am attempting to replicate the process used and same control variables 
used as in in Biglaiser & DeRouen (2007)59. In addition, although my sample and time-period of 
study are different, the unobserved factors should be considered and accounted for by the 
Heckman two-stage selection models. The consistent range of coefficient estimates is also 
consistent.  
Capital controls are one vexing result. Capital controls are only statistically significant 
and economically significant in the selection equation of Heckman 3. In this one statistically 
significant result, the impact of capital controls on the likelihood of positive net U.S. FDI is as 
large as that of having at least one U.S. military base and being a democracy (31% for capital 
control dummy, 34% for base presence dummy, and 30% for democracy dummy).  This result is 
counter to my expectation, as capital controls are usually seen as restrictive and undesirable. The 
presence of capital controls, in and of themselves, is not seen as a bad thing. However, it is more 
likely that capital openness (lower capital controls) is associated with greater FDI flows, so the 
result of a positive and large impact of capital controls on foreign direct inflows is perhaps 
capturing the impact of some unobserved variable that is highly correlated with FDI inflow 
capital controls. For now, taking the results at face value, it seems that U.S. investors see capital 
controls as just as important as U.S. backstopping (in the form of at least one U.S. base) and the 
democratization of the recipient country.  
 
59 Excepting the inclusion of a variable for alliance portfolio similarity. 
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However, investors may see capital controls, at times, as good and sometimes bad, and 
perhaps have no opinion. Regardless, the coefficient estimates for my measure of capital controls 
was statistically insignificant. Of course, this could also mean that an alternative measure of 
capital controls is needed. While the NBER capital control dataset is nice in that it disaggregates 
control measures into the inflow/outflow as well as by type, the sample size is low, and the 
simplicity of the dummy variable leaves something wanting. Robustness checks will use 
alternative measures of capital controls, or even lagged values of capital volume (inflows + 
outflows) as the methodology and construction of most capital controls are problematic for panel 
analysis. 
The main equation shows that U.S. Trainees, the presence of a U.S. base, and U.S. 
military aid are significant determinants in the amount of U.S. FDI invested abroad. When these 
are taken into account, there is no longer a positive impact of U.S. troops on U.S. FDI, as found 
in (Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007) (who found a mere 26 to 55 constant 1995 dollars increase per 
1% increase in U.S. troops—only $495.70 when U.S. troops are moved from their minimum to 
their maximum and multiplied by the coefficient estimate!).  
In the Heckman 1 specification, U.S. troops show no statistical significance at all; U.S. 
trainees and the Base Presence Dummy are the only statistically significant determinants, and 
only holding at the 10% significance level. A 1% increase in U.S. trainees of foreign soldiers 
decreases U.S. FDI by $35, an economically insignificant amount. The coefficient estimates for 
the base present dummy variable are both statistically and economically significant: U.S. base 
presence is associated with a $1.87 million increase in FDI, the largest impact of the regressions.  
It seems that establishing some kind of U.S. base (whether it’s a declared U.S. base, U.S. 
Lilypad base, U.S.-sponsored foreign base, or unconfirmed U.S. base) is a strong signal to U.S. 
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investors that the U.S. will financially backstop the host nation, after controlling for the relevant 
determinants60. U.S. basing presence increases the likelihood of positive U.S. FDI by around 
35%.  
Increasing U.S. troop presence, however, increases only the likelihood of investing 
(rather than divesting) in that country that year but decreases the expected amount of net positive 
U.S. FDI invested that year.  
All in all, the three Heckman specifications (1-3) indicate that U.S. military aid and U.S. 
base presence, as well as the changes in total U.S. aid and the number of total U.S. bases, have 
an impact on not only the decision of whether to invest abroad in the form of FDI, but the 
amount invested. U.S. troops and bases increase the likelihood of positive FDI, while U.S. 
trainees of foreign troops and U.S. military aid decrease the amount of FDI invested after that 
initial decision is made. The regression results taken together suggest that a little bit of help from 
the U.S. may, on average, increase the likelihood and amount of U.S. FDI, but too much of this 
activity seems to signal to investors that the U.S. backstopping may not be enough to compensate 




60 Other notable determinants of FDI include: the change in the total amount of aid, the change in 
the military share of aid, GDP per capita, logged bilateral trade volume, whether the host nation is a 




Table 6: Regression Results for Chapter 3.5 
3.6 Discussion 
 
Heckman 1 Heckman 2 Heckman 3 FE--Full Model Global FDI--Full Model 
Main Equation Full Model Without aid & bases Without troops & Trainees 
  
Log Military Presencet-1 -0.2 
  
0.0 -.0000692*** 
Log Active Duty over 100 
 
-.6915082** 
   
Military Presence+Trainees+ 
Reserves+Civilian DoD (Max Presence) 
 
.0004713*** 
   
Trainees t-1 -.0003572* 
  
0.0 0.0 
Base Presence Dummy 1.873603* 
  
0.0 0.0 
Log Total Aid t-1 .4153898* 
 
0.2 .2158009*** .000067*** 
Military Share of Aid t-1 -2.579634** 
 
-2.725596*** 0.0 0.0 
GDP per capita (constant 2010 USD) .0005926** 0.000595 .0004057* 0.0 0.0 
Economic growth (% of GDP) 0.1 -.1288018*** 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Log Bilateral Tradei,t (Constant 2010 USD) .0152971*** 0.0 .0158351*** -.0034924*** 0.0 
Hostility Presence Dummy 0.7 -1.192097*** 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Capital Control Dummy 0.9 -0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Democracy Dummy 1.333848* 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.0 
Distance squared -1.34e-08** 0.0 -1.52e-08** 
 
-8.28e-13* 
FDI t-1 0.2 .3055673** 0.2 -.3334088*** 
 




Positive bilateral FDI t-1 
   
-0.1 
 
Multilateral FDI t-1 
    
0.0 
Positive Bilateral FDI (Pos Multi for Global) 
     
Log Military Presence t-1 .1755058**  
  
-0.1 
 Max Presence  0.001226***    
Trainees t-1 0.0  
  
0.0 





Hostility Presence Dummy 0.0 0.2 0 
 
-0.1 
Capital Control Dummy 0.2 0.8 .3045503** 
 
0.0 
Democracy Dummy .4537121*** 0.4 .306112* 
 
0.0 
Civilian Employment (# of persons) 3.63e-09*** 0 4.35e-09*** 
 
0.0 
Distance squared 0.0 8.83-09*** 2.06e-09* 
 
0.0 








athrho -.3626667* 0.0 -.5066637*** 
 
17.52804*** 
lnsigma 1.362525*** -.5905** 1.399708*** 
 
-7.885279*** 
N 350 277 395 222 297 
Selected 90 17 100 
 
290 
Nonselected 260 260 295 
 
7 
Country Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes 
* denotes 10%, ** denotes 5%, *** denotes 1% significance level 
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Going beyond the traditional focus on macroeconomic determinants of FDI flows, this 
study finds that troops and trainees, as well as total aid and base presence, are the important 
determinants that shape investor sentiment about the security of a country. This study also finds 
that increases in total aid and having a U.S. military base are associated with increased U.S. FDI 
flows, while increases in the military share of aid is associated with decreases in U.S. FDI.  
Puzzling results from the study are that U.S. troops and U.S. trainees—while positively 
shaping investor sentiment and influencing the likelihood of net positive U.S. FDI—are 
associated with decreases in U.S. FDI flows, a result counter to the existing literature. The 
existing literature does not consider aid flows or U.S. foreign basing presence, with the limited 
literature showing that U.S. troops are associated with increases in U.S. FDI flows, not decreases 
as I found here.  
It is the inclusion of U.S. politico-military integration that brings to light the harmful 
impact of U.S. troops and trainees abroad on U.S. FDI (and multilateral, global FDI flows as 
well). After controlling for conflict, development level, standard of living, bilateral trade, and all 
of the typical FDI flow controls used in the literature, I find that while the presence of a base 
increases the likelihood of net positive FDI, there is small support (one specification) that 
increases in the number of bases are also negatively associated with the amount of U.S. FDI. 
There is a similar story with U.S. troops: while troops are positively associated with the 
likelihood of net positive FDI, additional troops (and U.S. trainees of foreign troops) are 
associated with decreases in the amount of U.S. FDI.  
One refreshing result is that of logged total U.S. aid: coefficient estimates consistently 
show the positive impact of total U.S. aid on U.S. (and global) FDI. Aid, after controlling for the 
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share of aid that is military aid, the degree of U.S. politico-military integration, and other 
standard FDI controls, seems to positively influence U.S. FDI.  
U.S. bases and foreign military personnel are—when possible—supported and 
provisioned by the host countries themselves. The U.S. military rents facilities, purchases 
material (from food to spare parts), hires local civilians, and hires local companies to perform 
services (Tillson, 1997). This makes sense given my results: there is no observed effect on the 
quantity of U.S. FDI when U.S. politico-military integration increases. The U.S. military hires 
lots of host-nation civilians and contractors and does not prioritize U.S. firms. As it is, only 
‘command and control functions’, which, by definition, are to be handled internally, are 
explicitly disallowed from subcontracting to some form of external support, be it host- or some 
other foreign nation61.  
3.61 Limitations & Issues 
The approach within has issues, as the lagged dependent variables, by definition, are 
correlated with any unobserved country-specific effects (correlations between lagged values and 
the error term), and therefore are inconsistent estimates for both OLS and random effect 
estimators (Arellano & Bond, 1991). Fixed effect is biased and inconsistent too. I either need to 
test the lagged dependent variable with a Hausman test or use a specialized GMM estimator. 
Right now, my finite sample selection bias is 1/T, so near 5% here whereas the finite sample 
selection bias in Li & Vashchilko (2010b) was around 10% 
 
61 Filipinos and Indian nationals and other “Third-Country Nationals” or (T.C.N.s as they are 
known in military parlance) have often been called the U.S.’ “invisible army” due to the widespread use 
of civilian contractors by the U.S. military (Stillman, 2011). In 2011, over 70,000 T.C.N.s were working 
(often through a chain of subsidiaries) for the U.S. military throughout the world, on bases and shipyards 
and adjacent locales (Stillman, 2011).  
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In addition, there is most probably a problem in that the presence of special dependence 
creates bias in my coefficient estimates. If the security ties and U.S. foreign aid decisions made 
in other countries B, C, and D influence the decision of country A. The solution is to allow third-
party observations so I can analyze not only alliances the U.S. forms with other countries but 
also the alliances those countries form without any U.S. involvement. Similar to the example 
provided in Neumayer and Plumer where “Whether country i and country j form an alliance may 
partly depend on what other alliances exist between countries in the world, including those that 
either country i or country j have concluded with countries besides each other (inclusive of 
alliances that countries i and j have with other countries” (Plümper & Neumayer, 2010). Using a 
dyadic spatial-effect model: spatial lag model or a spatial autoregressive model of what 
Neumayer and Plumper (2010b) named inclusive dyad contagion may be warranted.  
3.7 Conclusion 
In the post-9/11 era, the use of U.S. foreign aid, U.S. basing presence, and U.S. troop 
presence abroad is seen to be tied to financial behavior of large U.S. multinational companies. In 
this analysis of the period from 2000 to 2019, we see that there is clearly a bias of U.S. investors 
towards places with U.S. bases and troops and places receiving economic aid. While the 
presence of bases and troops increase the likelihood of positive bilateral FDI flows that year, 
further increases in those troops or number of bases appears to decrease the amount of FDI 
invested in that country. The same goes for foreign troops that the U.S. trains (U.S. trainees). The 
existence of at least one base and the receipt of U.S. aid are both seen to motivate U.S. investors 
and multinational enterprises to invest more in those countries that already receive positive 
amounts of U.S. FDI. Once the host/recipient nation has “embraced” the U.S. in terms of 
ramping up troop presence, receiving U.S. economic aid, or establishing a U.S. base, additional 
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troops or U.S. trainees has a negative impact on the amount of FDI invested by U.S. 
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Appendix B Remaining Equations for Section 4.2 Income & Expenditure 
 
 




 𝑠𝑙𝑐𝑢 ≡ 𝑐𝑙𝑐𝑢 + 𝑔𝑙𝑐𝑢 + 𝑥𝑙𝑐𝑢 (61) 
 𝑠$ ≡ 𝑐$ + 𝑔$ + 𝑥$ (62) 
 𝑆𝑙𝑐𝑢 ≡ 𝑠𝑙𝑐𝑢. 𝑝𝑠𝑙𝑐𝑢 ≡ (𝑐𝑙𝑐𝑢 + 𝑔𝑙𝑐𝑢 + 𝑥𝑙𝑐𝑢). 𝑝𝑠𝑙𝑐𝑢 (63) 
 𝑆$ ≡ 𝑠$. 𝑝𝑠$ ≡ (𝑐$ + 𝑔$ + 𝑥$). 𝑝𝑠$ (64) 
Where 𝑝𝑠 is the average price of all sales in each economy or price level. 
The price level of sales, 𝑝𝑠, is determined in a traditional, mark-up cost fashion, with a 
mark-up, 𝜌, on unit costs: 
 𝑝𝑠𝑙𝑐𝑢 = (1 + 𝜌). (𝑊𝑙𝑐𝑢. 𝑁𝑙𝑐𝑢 + 𝐼𝑀𝑙𝑐𝑢)/𝑠𝑙𝑐𝑢 (65) 
 𝑝𝑠$ = (1 + 𝜌). (𝑊$. 𝑁$ + 𝐼𝑀$)/𝑠$ (66) 
where 𝑊 is the nominal wage rate, 𝑁 represents employment in each block, and all 
profits resulting from the mark-up are assumed to be instantaneously distributed from the firms 
to the household sector (which, ultimately, do own firms and receive dividends and other 
payments from firm profits—though distributed very unequally62. 
 
62 Another limitation of this model is that all firm income is dispersed homogenously to the households as 
if all households owned the same amount of firm stock, a far cry from the reality wherein a small 
minority own the majority of assets in the U.S. and in the rest of the world as well. 
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Domestic sales are prices as follows: 
 𝑝𝑑𝑠𝑙𝑐𝑢 ≡ (𝑆𝑙𝑐𝑢 − 𝑋𝑙𝑐𝑢)/(𝑠𝑙𝑐𝑢 − 𝑥𝑙𝑐𝑢) (67) 
 𝑝𝑑𝑠$ ≡ (𝑆$ − 𝑋$)/(𝑠$ − 𝑥$) (68) 
Domestic sales value: 
 𝐷𝑆𝑙𝑐𝑢 ≡ 𝑆𝑙𝑐𝑢 − 𝑋𝑙𝑐𝑢 (69) 
 𝐷𝑆$ ≡ 𝑆$ − 𝑋$ (70) 
 
Domestic sales volume: 
 𝑑𝑠𝑙𝑐𝑢 ≡ 𝑐𝑙𝑐𝑢 + 𝑔𝑙𝑐𝑢) (71) 
 𝑑𝑠$ ≡ 𝑐$ + 𝑔$ (72) 
Nominal GDP 
 𝑌𝑙𝑐𝑢 ≡ 𝑆𝑙𝑐𝑢 − 𝐼𝑀𝑙𝑐𝑢 (73) 
 𝑌$ ≡ 𝑆$ − 𝐼𝑀$ (74) 
Real GDP 
 𝑦𝑙𝑐𝑢 ≡ 𝑠𝑙𝑐𝑢 − 𝑖𝑚𝑙𝑐𝑢 (75) 




 𝑝𝑦𝑙𝑐𝑢 ≡ 𝑌𝑙𝑐𝑢/𝑦𝑙𝑐𝑢 (77) 
 𝑝𝑦$ ≡ 𝑌$/𝑦$ (78) 
Value of consumption: 
 𝐶𝑙𝑐𝑢 ≡ 𝑐𝑙𝑐𝑢. 𝑝𝑑𝑠𝑙𝑐𝑢 (79) 
 𝐶$ ≡ 𝑐$. 𝑝𝑑𝑠$ (80) 
Value of government expenditure: 
 𝐺𝑙𝑐𝑢 ≡ 𝑔𝑙𝑐𝑢. 𝑝𝑑𝑠𝑙𝑐𝑢 (81) 
 𝐺$ ≡ 𝑔$. 𝑝𝑑𝑠$ (82) 
Tax revenue: 
 𝑇𝑙𝑐𝑢 ≡ Θ𝑙𝑐𝑢. (𝑌𝑙𝑐𝑢 + 𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢−1. 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,𝑙𝑐𝑢−1 + 𝑟$−1. 𝐵𝑙𝑐𝑢,$−1 . 𝑥𝑟$) (83) 
 𝑇$ ≡ Θ$. (𝑌$ + 𝑟$−1. 𝐵$,$−1 + 𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢−1. 𝐵$,𝑙𝑐𝑢−1 . 𝑥𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢) (84) 
Employment: 
 𝑁𝑙𝑐𝑢 ≡ 𝑦𝑙𝑐𝑢/𝑝𝑟𝑙𝑐𝑢 (85) 
 𝑁$ ≡ 𝑦$/𝑝𝑟$ (86) 
























































































9) Burkina Faso 
10) Bangladesh 
11) Bulgaria 












22) Cabo Verde 










































58) Saint Lucia 






































91) Sierra Leone 
92) El Salvador 
93) Somalia 
94) Serbia 




















112) Viet Nam 
113) Yemen 










As FDI flows are notoriously erratic, a common convention within the literature is to use 
3-year rolling averages instead of single-year data when analysing bilateral FDI under a panel 
context. The table below reflects a similar regression specification to that of the main paper, with 
some slight differences, and ultimately shows the same phenomenon.  
For greater granularity, I no longer use the US foreign basing variable (as it does not vary 
over time) and use the newly constructed dataset from Paper 2 to include military-related treaties 
and political-related treaties as determinants of both the selection and main equation determining 
US FDI flows. Using different instruments, I find the same thing: US politico-military 
integration is associated with periods of negative FDI flows and decreased total US FDI amounts 
invested abroad. This impact is mitigated, somewhat, by the expansion of US military-related 
treaties, although each individual impact is large and negative. Changes in total amounts of US 
aid are shown to have no impact on the 3-year moving average of FDI flows, possibly due to the 
long time periods with which aid requires to have its effect present and observable. Dummy 
variables for SSA, ME, and Asia show no significance, and clustering by region does not alter 
standard errors observably.  
The inclusion of different policy indices (Economics Intelligence Unit Democracy Index, 
Polity2, Democracy Lexical Index) does not alter the main conclusions: that US politico-military 
integration, even after controlling for different types and specifications of hostility (squared, 
cubed, logged, etc), is associated with net-negative probability of positive US FDI flows and less 
amounts of US FDI. Increases in US military-related treaties (those having to do with troops, 
treaties, or bases) independently are negatively associated with the probability of positive US 
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FDI and the amount of US FDI. As the interaction term between military aid’s fraction of total 
aid and the number of years with active US military-related treaties shows, this negative impact 
is ameliorated, although not entirely, when both the US military aid’s fraction of total aid and 
number of years with US military-related treaties are positive in that three year period.   
Table 7: 3-Year Average US FDI Heckman Robustness Checks 
 
 
Log(Bilateral US FDI)   
Main Equation Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5 
Log Total Aid t 0.00899 0.0289 -0.0376 0.0398 0.0533 
Military Aid Fraction of Aid T -9.546* -13.43* -14.14* -10.13* -10.01* 
Military Treaties -0.446 -1.029 -0.327 -0.513 -0.467 
Political Treaties -0.0877 0.0229 -0.311 -0.0944 -0.102 
Military Fraction ∩ Military Treaties 3.545* 4.932** 4.458 3.779** 3.683* 
GDP per capita (constant 2010 USD) -0.221 0.347 -0.468 -0.380 -0.360 
Economic Growth (% of GDP) -0.116 -0.331 -0.296 -0.0367 -0.0698 
Log Bilateral Trade (Constant 2010 USD) 0.281 0.310* 0.646*** 0.405** 0.404** 
Log Education Spending Share of GDP -0.635 -0.997* -0.293 -0.588 -0.589 
Hostility Presence Dummy 0.267 
 
-0.191 0 -0.0862 -0.0667 
K -0.00191 0.0136    
Economics Democracy Index   0.00797 
 
  
Polity2    0.00813 
 
 
vDem Polyarchy Index     -0.237 
 
Government Spending 2.39e-11** 1.92e-11* 1.77e-11 2.80e-11*** 2.85e-11** 
 
   
  
Selection Equation (Positive Bilateral FDI) 
   
  
Log total aid 0.0303 0.0501 0.0708 0.0372 0.0432 
Military aid fraction of total aid -5.287* -3.586 -2.484 -3.283* -3.542* 
Military Treaties -0.806** -0.547* -0.488* -0.545*** -0.573*** 
Political Treaties 0.145 0.142 0.174* 0.133 0.146 
Military fraction ∩ Military Treaties 1.902* 1.298 1.117 1.286* 1.329* 
Hostility Presence Dummy -0.554 
 
0.215 0.484* 0.188 0.213 
SSA Dummy  -0.132    
ME Dummy   -.502   
Economics Democracy Index   -0.0135 
 
  
Polity2    0.0203 
 
 
vDem Polyarchy Index -0.0337 -0.0998   -0.0729 
athrho -0.0340 0.0155 -0.966 -0.0574 -0.223 
lnsigma -0.0340 0.0155 -0.966 -0.0574 -0.223 
N 146 146 151 146 146 
